



# NEWSLETTER

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**No. 99-6**

**JUL 99**

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**CTC CSS:**



***The Tail Talks***

**Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures**

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**CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)  
U. S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)  
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-1350**



## FOREWORD

**D**eveloping a viable concept of logistics support and fully integrating that support into the overall battle plan are essential to mission success.

Recent experience at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) has shown that units have difficulty estimating support requirements, maintaining equipment readiness, establishing area protection and security, evacuating casualties, and synchronizing logistics operations in the Brigade Support Area (BSA).

*CTC Combat Service Support (CSS): The Tail Talks* is published by CALL for the Logistics Observer/Controllers (O/Cs) at the National Training Center (NTC), Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTTC). The articles are authored by CSS O/Cs and provide recent trends and the TTP that the O/Cs have found to help units achieve success in the environment of the CTCs.

These tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) should not be construed as doctrine; they simply reflect **smart ways of doing business** in the CSS area.

This newsletter is intended to assist not only logisticians, but also maneuver commanders at brigade and battalion/task force levels.

**MICHAEL A. HIEMSTRA**  
**COL, FA**  
**Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned**



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#### **CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED**

##### *Director*

**Colonel Michael A.  
Hiemstra**

##### *Managing Editor*

**Mr. Rick Bogdan**

##### *Editor plus*

**Layout and Design  
Mary Sue Winneke**

##### *Authors*

**Senior JRTC, NTC and  
CMTC O/Cs**

##### *Project Analyst*

**Mrs. Becky Doyal**

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
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## CHAPTER I

### CSS: *PLAN, PREPARE, EXECUTE*

# COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS) OPERATIONS MADE EASY

by MAJ Scott Farquhar, Lynx Team, NTC

**T**his article shares some tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for task force-level CSS at all levels, from the individual soldier through field trains. It discusses feeding, fueling, fixing, arming, and manning, and is organized into the three mission phases of planning, preparation, and execution.

**ATTITUDE:** Closely read the characteristics of CSS as stated in FM 100-5 and think about how they apply to a task force and its subunits. In the field trains, tomorrow's battle is fought today; very little of what a task force does in its main battle area fight can be influenced by the field trains in less than several hours. This does not give a day's "slack time" to the soldiers and leaders in the BSA. Quite the opposite. They must continually be thinking a full day ahead of the rest of the task force (anticipation). An HHC battalion commander summed up his intent when he stated his success criterion was *"...to prevent the task force Commander from ever even thinking about CSS. I want him focusing forward on the enemy and not rearward toward us."*

### Planning:

If the CSS elements are organized for combat in accordance with FM 71-2, Chap 7, and are using echeloned trains, the distance from the task force's most forward positions (e.g., the Scout Platoon Sergeant) to its rearmost element (the task force field trains in the brigade support area (BSA)), can be 60 kilometers or more. As vast as these distances are, the times that are required to transit from one end to the other are also much longer than any other aspect of the task force. This distance, then, is the "CSS battlespace." Much of the following discussion demonstrates ways to shorten or make the most of these times and distances.

1. The brigade headquarters communicates the mission via an OPORD to the task force main command post (CP), thereby initiating task force-level troop-leading procedures.
2. The task force, in turn, transmits an order to its subordinate units. Even if the task force rigidly adheres to the 1/3-2/3 planning rule, the task force CSS operators are already at a disadvantage because of the aforementioned time and distance considerations. Rather than waiting for the order to be briefed at the task force CP (25-30 kms away), the HHC commander or representative can obtain a copy of it through the nearby (1-2 km) brigade Rear CP or forward support battalion (FSB)/BSA CP much faster. Remember, the service and support annex of the brigade OPORD was probably written at that location. If not, it can be transmitted from wherever it was written to the Rear CP via MSE facsimile or other means.



3. What does the HHC commander need to know?
- The task organization and command relationship** (i.e., whether it is attached, OPCON or direct support (DS)). Brigade OPORDs usually have this information down to company level.
    - **When will the task organization take effect?** (At least narrow it down to before or after LOGPAC.)
    - **What attachments will the task force receive from outside the organization** (e.g., GSR, chemical smoke, Fox reconnaissance or decontamination assets, treatment teams from C/FSB, ADA, engineer)? These attachments will affect the entire LOGPAC composition, to include number of meal breaks, fuel trucks, barrier and ammunition packages, etc.
  - Area of Operation (AO).** Determine left and right boundaries, LD, LOA, and objectives/BPs. (Do not fret if it is not precise; the four sets of four-digit grids that determine the corners of the brigade or task force AO is more than they knew before). This information will allow the HHC commander to recommend locations of main supply routes (MSRs,) logistics release points (LRPs), etc., to the task force S4.
  - Enemy and friendly situation.** Who is doing what to whom? Are we the main or supporting effort? Do we have priority of support? If so, as of when?
  - The mission.** Who, what, where, when, and why (task and purpose)?
  - Coordinating instructions.** What are the times and locations of orders, rehearsals, AARs, the refueling and rearming time windows and their locations, and CSRs, if any?
- Documenting the answers to these questions automatically produces an adequate WARNO for the HHC commander that can be rapidly transmitted to the task force combat trains command post (CTCP). This gives the task force's forward logistics planners a head start.
4. If the HHC commander plans to transmit the WARNO using the task force FM A/L net, the CTCP should conduct a net call beforehand, to allow the 1SGs and specialty PSGs to monitor it. If the WARNO is transmitted via MSE, the CTCP must transmit it on the A/L net as soon as possible. By using the brigade Rear CP as an information conduit "shortcut," the logistics WARNO may be the first information the task force receives on the upcoming mission. In any case, the HHC commander becomes a liaison to the brigade from the task force.
5. To be effective, the OPORD produced by the HHC commander must be an aggregation of three sources:
- **Brigade Service and Support Annex.** (Get this early from the brigade Rear CP.)
  - **FSB OPORD.** (Get this early from the brigade Rear CP.)
  - **Task force OPORD.**
- The brigade service and support annex to the OPORD** is a good source for the first, second, and a portion of the third paragraph of the HHC commander's OPORD. Remember, the battlespace of the field trains elements reach from the BSA, along the MSR, into the task force MBA (present and future locations) and back. The brigade annex tells the HHC commander:
    - ✓ **WHO** (the task organization).
    - ✓ **WHAT** (support his task force via echeloned or unit trains, unit or supply point distribution).
    - ✓ **WHERE** (BSA and MSR locations).
    - ✓ **WHEN** (attack/defend times, through backward planning gives LOGPAC/LRP times).
    - ✓ **WHY** (brigade subunit instructions to his task force).



b. **The FSB order** provides the **HOW**. It contains information for the execution paragraph of the HHC commander's OPORD. He determines his scheme of maneuver much the same as the infantry, armor, sapper or howitzer companies/batteries forward. The technique of task, purpose, method and endstate apply here as well. Scheme of maneuver may be laid out in phases that mirror the FSB's method of supporting the brigade (reconnaissance, attack/defend, and consolidation/reorganization). The FSB OPORD gives the HHC commander his Class I, III and V supply times and locations. Coupled with the FSB plan, a thorough IPB will drive reconnaissance, surveillance, and security and readiness postures, MOPP status, and air defense status. Movement formations and techniques for different phases or locations will also be dictated here. Examples of this would be for the LOGPAC to move in column, traveling from BSA to task force rear boundary, traveling overwatch from rear boundary to LRP, and herringbone or coil at halts. For planned BSA moves or planned dispersal from the BSA (determined by threat proximity, long-range fires or in-bound air/missile tracks), the quartering party may bound in a wedge or vee, while main body overwatches in a line formation.

c. **The task force OPORD**, when received by the HHC commander, can then be delivered to the field trains as a FRAGO. This OPORD will allow the HHC commander to refine his own OPORD with such information as task organization to the platoon level, the main and supporting effort, and additions or changes to the LRP times and locations. Because the HHC commander already knows how many companies he is going to support, tailoring the LOGPAC means only loading the company supply trucks with platoon chow breaks and arranging the appropriate number of ammunition and fuel trucks to accompany them.

6. Meanwhile, at the task force CTCP, the S4, S1, battalion maintenance officer (BMO) and Medical Platoon Leader issue WARNOs (based on the HHC commander's WARNO) to their platoons and staff sections. They can now answer the following questions and begin preparing a hasty logistics estimate for the upcoming mission analysis:

- a. What are the statuses of Classes I, III, V, VIII, and IX?
- b. What are the predicted levels of these Classes in six-hour increments from now until LD/defend time?
- c. What is the OR rate of combat systems? Replacements?
- d. What are the supply consumption estimates?
- e. What are the casualty estimates? (For this one, use the wargaming step of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), i.e., use the loss estimates of each course of action (COA) to generate casualty estimates. As an example, if COA1 results in the loss of four M1s and six M2s, then the task force will have to locate, evacuate and treat about eight casualties from the tanks and 18 - 24 from the Bradleys. Although **FM 101-10-1/2, Staff Officers' Field Manual, Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data Planning Factors**, is the proponent manual for these estimates, it is intended for use at a much higher echelon than the sharp end of a brigade or battalion.) A discussion of calculating patient estimates is included in **FM 8-55, Planning for Health Service Support**.

7. After receiving a heads-up on the mission from the HHC commander, and having completed their logistics estimate, the task force S4 and S1 can now begin their planning phase at the task force CTCP.

a. When organized for combat in accordance with **FM 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force**, the combat trains is as large or larger than any other unit in the task force AO. Within it are three distinct subordinate elements, each having separate and diverse missions and requiring their own brief planning processes:

- **The unit main collection point (UMCP).**
- **The battalion aid station (BAS).**
- **The combat trains command post (CTCP) itself.**



b. Upon receipt of the WARNO, the S4 begins to plan his *scheme of support* using the same process as does a maneuver company team. He must determine how to arrange his force of mechanics, medics and truck drivers to best provide continuous and responsive support. Two possible techniques or concepts for making these determinations are described below. Using a combination of the two concepts has been found to work well. Refer to FM 63-20, *Forward Support Battalion*, for further discussion on FSB operations.

- \* **Point Support Concept:** Units move to a central location, such as the LRP or Combat Trains to receive support.
- \* **Area Support Concept:** Units are tasked (and resourced where necessary) with supporting other units that operate in their vicinity.

## DEFENSIVE MISSIONS.

### Point Support Concept.


**EXAMPLE.** The task force is given a mission to defend. The task force assigns one company team and the Scout Platoon supported by a Heavy Mortar Section to screen the task force front. Using the point support concept (see Diagram 1), the Scout OPs, Mortar, and AD Sections would be supported by their PSG or would move to a *point* (in this case, the LRP or combat trains) to receive supplies or support. The Scout PSG, for example, would pick up supplies from the LOGPAC at the LRP and then move forward to conduct either tailgate or service station resupply for the OPs.

### Point Support Concept Advantage:

Allows traditional support by the unit's chain of command:

- Not complicated.
- Does not place an additional burden on the

TMs.



**Diagram 1**





## Area Support Concept.

**EXAMPLE.** The task force is given a mission to defend. TM A provides support to Scout OPs 1, 2 and 3, and Mortar Section A, as well as AD Section 1. TM C provides support to OP 4, AD Section 3, and Mortar Section B (see Diagram 2). In the diagram, the areas of support are drawn to illustrate the concept only and do not denote a tactical boundary.


As TM A and TM C have CSS assets attached to them in their trains to support only their platoons, both TMs must be reinforced with CSS assets to accomplish their added support roles.

Based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available and civil considerations (METT-TC\*), the S4 anticipates TM A will bear the heaviest logistical burden, from fuel to food to casualties; therefore, the task force S4 should task-organize his assets accordingly. In this case, the S4 should place a Medical Treatment Team, an Ambulance Team, an M88, and a fuel truck under the operation control of the TM A ISG. The S4 should place an Ambulance Team under the operational control of the TM C to meet that unit's increased responsibilities. The ISGs can either incorporate these support packages into their TM Trains, or they can locate them where they best support the mission.

Note that, because of terrain and distance factors, the entire Scout Platoon is not supported as a single entity. Instead, the closest TM supports its dispersed OPs. The S4 must clearly give the task and purpose of these supporting elements, to both the supporting and supported units.

This *improvised* organization allows all of the units conducting the screen to be supported by an element that is *responsive* due to its proximity and continuous because a single leader controls it. The S4 must ensure that these taskings are specified in the task force OPORD as part of the Subordinate Unit subparagraph, and that the method and assets used to accomplish them are in the Service Support paragraph.

Never forget that **the only CSS commodity that is time-sensitive is human life**. There is very little impact if fuel takes 30 minutes versus one hour to arrive; this time difference merely affects the backward planning process. But survivability decreases by 50 percent for the most urgent casualties after 30 minutes. ***Evacuation times must remain the driving force for placing and moving logistical support.***



**Diagram 2**

\*The acronym METT-T is changing to METT-TC with the revised version of **FM 100-5, Operations**.



**Area Support Concept Advantage:** Decentralized execution of a central plan, which:

→ Instills a great deal of trust by the support units in the 1SGs under which they are operationally controlled.

→ Gives the Scouts and AD sections a shorter distance to move for hot chow or evacuation by a supporting TM.

→ Frees those PSGs to concentrate on command rather than focusing solely on CSS of those scattered sections.

→ Frees the HHC 1SG to concentrate his efforts on either the field trains, the task force Main CP, or any of the far-flung platoons of HHC.

→ Eliminates the time-consuming "cross-decking" of supplies from the HHC Supply Sergeant's truck to the PSGs at the LRP.

→ The support platoon leader can supply the combat trains, and the HHC Supply Sergeant (or HHC 1SG) can deliver to the Main CP. This provides the dual benefits of dedicated supply support assets to the CPs, as well as an opportunity for updates between the support platoon leader and S4, and the HHC 1SG and the CSM.

## OFFENSIVE MISSIONS.

**Point Support Concept.** The positioning of CSS assets in the task force formations is well illustrated in FM 71-2 (pages 3-10 through 3-16).

**Area Support Concept.** The task force CSS assets are dispersed among the formation. Rather than moving as a single unit as depicted in FM 71-2, the combat trains use split operations very much like the Heavy Mortar Platoon. A multi-functional "support team" is formed consisting of a C<sup>2</sup> element, Treatment Team and Ambulance Squad, a Recovery Team, and emergency resupply of CLIII and V.

**Technique:** Have the S1 operate as the net control station (NCS) from the CTCP M577, while the S4 and BMO lead the two support teams. Each of these "support teams" has a leader for each of its logistics functions; the Treatment Teams and Ambulance Squads have the MED-O (the field medical assistant) with one and the platoon sergeant (PSG) with the other, the Recovery Teams have the battalion maintenance sergeant (BMS or team (BMT)) and recovery section sergeant, respectively. These two "support teams" can then move by following the flank company teams when in the task force diamond or wedge formation and the trail company teams while using the box formation. If the task force uses the column or "V" formations, then the "support teams" follow the split mortar sections. A further refinement of this technique is to plan to establish the support element in the vicinity of the task force's planned mortar firing points (MFPs), a distance of 800-1,000m and off of the outgoing and incoming gun-target line. These planned support positions mirror the task and purpose of the MFPs. Just as the mortars halt to provide responsive fires in support of maneuver, so too will the support elements remain close to their supported company teams.



8. Whether an offensive or defensive mission, the S4 uses the information given to him by the HHC commander's WARNO to conduct IPB of the AO, selecting possible locations for logistical control measures throughout the sector to be defended, or the zone or axis of attack.

a. The S4 analyzes the terrain for trafficability for main supply routes (MSRs), trail or road junctions for logistics release points (LRPs), cover and concealment for locations of the combat trains (or the aforementioned support teams), the battalion aid station (BAS), or decontamination points.

b. Anticipate the enemy's effect on the task force, such as obstacles, special munitions, phases of fires, air avenues of approach. Conduct a casualty estimate for soldiers and equipment.

c. This IPB product and the S4's decision as to whether he will use the point or area concept of support will then form the basis of the WARNO that the S4 issues to the Medical Platoon and UMCP, who can then proceed through their troop-leading procedures.

d. With this initial information, the CSS operators can conduct their reconnaissance:

✓ **The S4 can plan LRPs.**

✓ **The Support Platoon Sergeant can conduct a route reconnaissance of part or all of the proposed MSR.**

✓ **The HHC XO can reconnoiter future field trains locations or dispersal sites.**

9. When the S4 participates in the planning process at the task force Main CP, he should be accompanied by the S1, BMO, and Field Medical Assistant for the mission analysis and remain until the restated mission and commander's guidance are issued. This technique results in good synchronization by the CSS staff, both among themselves and integration with the maneuver staff and also allows them to gain first-hand knowledge of the mission and commander's guidance.

10. The CSS staff can now return to the combat trains to continue their troop-leading procedures with the CTCF crew, the UMCP and the Battalion Aid Station.

a. The S4 will refine his IPB during his participation in the task force planning process, using the S2's threat COA and the friendly scheme of maneuver.

b. The S4 will plan LRPs along the primary and alternate MSR for each phase of the battle.

c. The S4 will establish Decontamination Points in concert with the NBC Officer and NCO, based on the templated threat. He should assign a CSS graphic control measure to each significant maneuver control measure. For example, a support-by-fire (SBF) position that will be occupied by a company team should be supported by an LRP where a "support team" will be located to refuel, rearm, repair and receive/treat casualties.



## Preparation:

**Fight tomorrow's battle TODAY!**

### **MISSION: *Deliberate Attack.***

→ Order bangalore torpedoes *now*. Do not wait until the task force OPORD to designate the exact company for the mission, and *then* order the bangalores for the attack or they will never arrive in time. Issue them to whichever company will be assigned to conduct the breach.

→ Move the mine rollers or mine-clearing blades to the company team that is tasked with conducting the breach, or the engineer company, or at the very least, to the task force UMCP.

### **MISSION: *Defend.***

→ Begin *now* to move Classes IV and V toward the planned BPs and drop it to their rear. Do not wait for eight-digit grids of FSPs and Pre-stock Points (PSPs, or caches). Even if you are off by 5 kilometers, that is still 20 kilometers closer than it was sitting in the BSA. Use the FSB assets, such as PLS or S&P trucks, for the long haul from the BSA to the vicinity of the BP, and then use the Support Platoon's HEMTTs or company supply trucks to move it around the task force AO. Empty or idle trucks are wasted assets as long as they remain in that state.

→ Have those mine rollers or mine-clearing blades dropped at a central point (such as the LRP or UMCP) for eventual pickup. Either way, get the blades and rollers off the low-boys as soon as possible to enable the 22-ton trucks to be used to haul other supplies.

**Rehearse, Rehearse, Rehearse**

- Rehearse to make sure all the players understand their mission.
- Rehearse to find potential execution problems and make adjustments accordingly.
- Rehearse to *make sure the plan will work*.

Rehearsals are critical to mission success and should be conducted by all of the task force's CSS elements.

1. To assist the task force CSS operators in maximizing their time during the troop-leading procedures, construct a terrain model at the combat trains. Base the model on the knowledge of the mission gained from the CSS staff's participation in the task force planning process. Because the CTCP crew is usually too austere to construct this alone, recommend augmentation by (or delegation to) the BAS to complete this task. As the soldiers in the CTCP and BAS medics are usually not well trained in this skill, cross-training them with the Main CP crew is recommended. The S4 (or S1 if the S4 has not returned from the Main CP) can issue the OPORD to the combat trains personnel using the terrain model, and the BAS and UMCP can subsequently do the same.



2. Another technique is to build the terrain model at the LRP (which is usually in the vicinity of the combat trains). Have the various units of the combat trains "proof" it by conducting their OPORDs and rehearsals on it.

3. Having been issued the OPORD, the CSS operators can begin their reconnaissance in detail. In some cases, rehearsals and reconnaissance can be conducted simultaneously. For example, platoons can rehearse their casualty evacuation drills from the anticipated point of injury and then reconnoiter the route(s) to the platoon and company casualty collection points.

a. It is imperative that each company's attached Combat Medics drive the route to the Treatment Teams' present and proposed locations. To rehearse this move, have the medics accompany the 1SG on his way to the LRP to meet the LOGPAC. This company-level action is a necessary component of a task force rehearsal, no matter which type or technique of rehearsal the task force uses.

b. The Ambulance Section of the BAS should also rehearse its move to the present and proposed locations of the ambulance exchange points (AXPs).

c. The BAS HQ conducts a practice aerial evacuation from its LZ.

4. If the task force mission is to attack and driving the routes is not possible, the CSS operators at all levels must then rely on other means of reconnaissance and rehearsals. Just as a company commander should bring his platoon leaders and FSO to a vantage point that allows them to identify the locations of the company team's axis of attack, support-by-fire positions, or objectives, so too should the 1SG load up his senior medic and maintenance team chief. The 1SG would concentrate on the casualty collection points, LRPs, evacuation routes, and the like. The soldiers of the combat trains must do the same; because of the decentralized nature of their duties, ambulance section and support platoon supply truck drivers must be included.

5. Participants in a task force rehearsal should include:

- ✓ **The 1SGs.**
- ✓ **The companies' senior medic.**
- ✓ **The companies' maintenance team chief, the scout, mortar and air defense PSGs.**
- ✓ **The CSM.**
- ✓ **The chaplain.**
- ✓ **The BMO, BMT and recovery section sergeants.**
- ✓ **The medical platoon's surgeon, physician's assistant (PA) and field medical assistant.**
- ✓ **The ambulance section and treatment team sergeants.**

6. The task force S4 should conduct the rehearsal, but the S1 or CSM should be prepared to do so in his absence. If the terrain model technique is selected, the best location of the task force CSS rehearsal is at the LRP, beginning about an hour prior to the LOGPAC's arrival.

a. A terrain model task force CSS rehearsal is best conducted on a area approximately the size of a basketball court to portray the depth and allow the participants to "deploy" on it (see **CALL Newsletter No. 98-5, Rehearsals**, Mar 98).

b. As the task force participants practice their part of the plan on the terrain model, the Battlefield Information Control Center (BICC) or Intelligence Analyst should portray the enemy's anticipated actions. This will allow the effects of the enemy's COA to be understood by the CSS operators of the task force. As units close with the enemy and take losses from his fires IAW the S1's casualty estimates, the medical evacuation of casualties and the evacuation of personnel and equipment and resupply of ammunition and fuel can be practiced.



**Load ‘em up, move ‘em out!**

## **EQUIPMENT PREPARATION.**

1. Preparation of equipment should be conducted concurrently with the LOGPAC. This allows the task force to be postured for its mission in terms of commodities and units at the conclusion of its resupply and has the added benefit of cutting down on "moving parts."

a. The support platoon leader readies the LOGPAC to support the task force by assembling a march unit made up of company supply trucks and his fuel and cargo trucks. Likewise, the HHC commander gathers the attached or DS elements from the FSB or brigade slice.

b. By moving the attached or DS elements forward from the field trains to the task force along with the LOGPAC, they go forward under positive control and will complete the task organization.

2. To augment the ambulances in the BAS, company supply trucks can be tasked as non-standard evacuation vehicles. This can be accomplished by dropping off one of the two company trucks at the return LRP for pick up by a leader from the BAS. The implied task is that all the personnel and equipment needing to be back-hauled to the BAS is cross-leveled from the tasked truck so it will be ready to transport patients IAW **FM 8-10-6, *Medical Evacuation in a Theater of Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures***. Use the trucks to transport patients from the BAS to the BAS, or to augment the ambulance section in evacuating casualties from the Company Teams' collection points to the BAS.

3. The technique of augmenting the BAS with supply trucks can be emulated at the company team level.

a. The company team 1SG can task-organize his habitual attachments to triple his medical evacuation assets by placing a medic in his and the maintenance team's M113s, and replacing the combat medic section's M113 driver with a mechanic. This disperses the medics, allows the senior medic to establish the casualty collection point, and allows the armed M113s to go forward to the point of injury to treat and/or evacuate casualties.

b. Another way to increase the evacuation capability of the company team is to use the commander's and 1SG's HMMWVs as non-standard evacuation vehicles. Properly rigged IAW FM 8-10-6, these two vehicles can be used to transport both ambulatory and litter patients from the company team collection point to the BAS, freeing the senior medic to concentrate on treating casualties and the armored ambulances to evacuate from the zone of enemy fire.

4. As part of combat trains preparation, the S4 should assemble the fuel and ammunition trucks to form the emergency resupply. This can be accomplished upon the return of the LOGPAC to the LRP.

a. Cross-level fuel and ammunition into the designated vehicles to ensure the maximum amounts of Classes III and V are placed in the minimum number of trucks. This will help the support platoon leader in reloading his trucks upon his return to the BAS by giving him an exact amount of fuel and ammunition remaining.



b. The S4 should help facilitate this by calling the amount remaining/needed back to the field trains or brigade rear CP before the LOGPAC departs the LRP. This allows the FSB to allocate fuel and ammunition to refill the support platoon.

c. The composition of the emergency resupply in the combat trains should be based on METT-T and unit SOP.

→ For an offensive mission, one fuel truck and one ammunition truck per company team are best as this allows all the units to be refueled and rearmed simultaneously during a pause in the attack. Load at least one truck with mortar ammunition as well.

→ The drivers of the trucks must be carefully briefed, using the combat trains sand table, as they will be expected to be sent individually across a battlefield to find a company that may be engaged with the enemy.

→ Each pair of trucks is assigned in support of a designated company and teamed up with that unit's supply truck (in the combat trains for the non-standard casualty evacuation role). This will greatly ease the burden of the truck drivers so they can concentrate on a single unit's planned axis of advance. This will also help the supported ISG as well by letting him know for which vehicles he should be looking. To help the ISGs identify the trucks, an 8" X 10" metal placard or acetated construction paper can be attached to the bumper or in the window, respectively, with the company's color code (use chemlights at night).

5. The S4 should integrate the combat trains into the fire plan of the task force. Sectors of fire and observation are delineated to the subordinate parts of the combat trains.

a. In the defense:

→ Vehicles in the UMCP should be placed where they can cover likely avenues of approach and fulfill their part of the task force R&S plan. The covering of mounted, dismounted, and air avenues of approach are assigned to those vehicles whose main and secondary armaments, sights and crews are operational.

→ Combat vehicles that are down for automotive reasons can be powered via slave cables from tool trucks, generators or vehicles with inoperable armament.

b. In the offense:

→ The combat trains (or "support teams") are assigned sectors of observation and fire in the same manner as a platoon or company. The UMCP CP controls these actions by requiring the crews of evacuated vehicles to report their mechanical, personnel and supply status upon their arrival, and assigning tasks based upon these reports.

→ Special skills (master gunner, combat lifesaver, etc.) of crewmen can be utilized by the BMS/BMT, and shortages of supplies of fuel, ammunition or Class VIII can be made good by assets in the combat trains.

→ Crews of inoperable vehicles in the UMCP can serve as OPs, patrols, litter bearers, EPW guards, and augmentation for NBC decontamination teams and patient decontamination teams.

→ An empty pallet ("honeycomb") for tank main gun ammunition should be kept in the UMCP to allow downloading of vehicles needing turret or electrical repair.

→ Crews of vehicles that have been repaired must again report to the UMCP CP and be given a full briefing (to include issue of operations overlay) on the tactical situation before they are returned to duty. This prevents the crew, who is eager to get back into the fight, from driving into a minefield, chemical





strike, etc. The UMCP should notify the vehicle's parent 1SG of its imminent return and ensure that the returning crew does a radio check with him prior to departure.

→ **The BMO must establish cut-off times whereby vehicles will no longer be repaired and are either readied to fight, evacuated or rigged for demolition.** The disposition of the crews of those vehicles must be part of the unit's SOP.

→ **Requirements for extra towing vehicles or HET lift must be identified by the BMO to the S4 so that the latter may request the assets from the FSB SPO.**

c. If a chemical threat is predicted, the S4 and medical officer must make preparations to the combat trains to provide support for patient and vehicle decontamination.

→ **Based on the Threat COA developed by the S2, the S4 and Medical Officer designate which treatment team will handle contaminated casualties.**

→ **The task force decontamination equipment and operators must be positioned forward early enough to take part in at least the CSS rehearsal.**

→ **Personnel to augment the task force's patient and vehicle decontamination points must be identified and trained.** Augmenting personnel can include crews of vehicles in the UMCP, as well as the cooks and KPs who can come forward from the field trains on the LOGPAC. As early as possible, the HHC commander should take control of any brigade decontamination assets that are task-organized to support the task force. He should either send them forward with the task force decontamination operators or with the LOGPAC.

→ **Push all assets as far forward as early as possible to maximize their time to rehearse and reconnoiter.**

## **Execution:**

### **TASK FORCE MISSION**

Seize a motorized rifle company-prepared defensive position to allow a second task force to envelop the remainder of the MRB.

### **SITUATION**

A balanced task force will conduct a deliberate attack. The attack is a four-phased operation: Phase I is reconnaissance and infiltration; Phase II is from the Line of Departure (LD) to occupation of SBF positions; Phase III is the breach, and Phase IV is consolidation and reorganization. The attack is preceded by 36 hours by the infiltration of the Scouts and COLTs to gain reconnaissance and surveillance of the objective.

### **THE ATTACK**

**Phase I:** The Scouts and COLTs cross the LD and move along planned infiltration routes to their planned observation posts (OPs). The S4 has planned for Casualty Collection Points (CCPs) along the infiltration route based upon the S2's template, and the medical platoon leader has located the CCPs in the vicinity of where the





Scouts nor the COLTs are likely to make contact. The Scouts plan to recover their casualties to these points for treatment and further evacuation. (See Phase I diagram on page I-13.)


### Techniques:

→ A BAS (-) Advanced Trauma Management Team accompanies the infiltration and establishes a concealed first-echelon care point at the CCP nearest the LD. From this point, patients can be stabilized for either evacuation or held until the task force catches up in its attack. Evacuation of patients from the CCP, if not by internal assets, can be either by air or from assets of the forward-most company team. Implied tasks: A planned cross-FLOT operation with SEAD, AD status changes, et al.

→ The ground option requires tasking the lead company team and reinforcing the trains with at least an ambulance, in the same manner as the screening company team in the "area support" concept discussed earlier. The company team commander should plan this as a combat operation in the form of a raid, and either escort the evacuation vehicle with a tank or BFV platoon or by using M2s to evacuate the patients. These are not simply "dust-offs." They are complex combat operations requiring detailed combined arms planning.

→ If half of a task force's advanced trauma management capability (the surgeon or PA) is committed to establishing a BAS (-) Advanced Trauma Management Team (or any other task that will prevent it from providing care to the task force mission), then the S4 must immediately request an augmenting aid station from the FSB. The HHC commander must closely follow this up and facilitate the augmenting aid station's move forward from the BSA to the task force BAS(-).

→ Prior to LD (as early as the previous day's LOGPAC), the "two support teams" move to their positions in the assembly area or attack position. This will allow the support teams to be in place to provide support to the company teams and platoons prior to LD. Some tanks will inevitably need to be topped off, and enemy phase I or counter fires may cause casualties.



**Phase 1**



**Phase II:** The task force crosses the LD in its box formation, the "support teams" following the trail company teams. The S4 has planned along the axis of advance MSR/ASRs and "support team" locations, the CSS graphic control measures each having a task and purpose to support the maneuver graphics. (See Phase II diagram.)

#### Techniques:

→ Actions at these locations will include security by all (sectors designated for air and ground search on the move are maintained or adjusted).

→ The treatment team marks a hasty LZ.

→ Casualties of personnel and vehicles during this phase will be evacuated to a single, designated "support team" to allow the other team to continue to move with the task force main body toward the objective.



→ When the company teams maneuver into the support-by-fire (SBF) positions, at least one of the support teams is set up to their rear. From here this support team will push forward Class V and receive any casualties. The other support team will continue to handle the casualties suffered along the axis of advance. Once the patients are evacuated from that support team's treatment team, it can join the assault force for actions on the objective.

**Phase III:** The task force begins its actions to reduce the obstacles at the objective, and its "support team" joins the assault force. (See Phase III diagram.)

#### Techniques:

→ As the assault force attacks and clears the objective, the support team moves through the lane to sustain it.

→ The recovery section recovers damaged vehicles from the lane to maintain the assault's momentum. It is especially critical for the assault force to maintain combat power once it seizes the objective as the enemy may close the lane via FASCAM or chemical strike, counterattack, or both.





→ The other support team continues to sustain the task force elements on the friendly side of the lane and prepares to assist the forward passage of the remainder of the brigade.

→ Vehicles and positions that have been hit and contain casualties must be marked. The brigade should have a SOP for marking positions and vehicles.

The two techniques used most commonly at the CTCs are:

1) **Mark the presence of casualties.** To do this, the crew or squad raises a flag or panel to advertise the presence and category of casualties to guide the treatment or evacuation vehicles to their location.

**Advantage:** The presence of the marker attracts attention, day or night, to the location of casualties. A simulated battlefield has flashing MILES lights and other ROE effects, whereas an actual combat-damaged vehicle may not be so obvious, particularly from the rear, and so must be clearly marked.

**Drawbacks:**

→ The crew or squad should focus on the battle drill of *treat and evacuate* and not on marking the vehicle.

→ If the marker is not removed (in the haste to evacuate, particularly if under fire), subsequent evacuation assets will continue to investigate the position and waste time.

→ The crew or squad may be unable to mark their position because they are all too badly injured, or the marker is lost or destroyed.

→ The crew's current position or situation makes raising a flag tactically unsound.


2) **Mark vehicles or positions that have been cleared of casualties.**

**Advantage:** Marking cleared vehicles/positions allows the ambulance crews to concentrate on those that still have casualties.

**Phase IV:** The support teams rejoin to form the combat trains on the objective. (See Phase IV diagram.)

**Techniques:** Support teams continue to:

- ✓ Treat and evacuate casualties.
- ✓ Recover and repair vehicles.
- ✓ Replenish empty fuel tanks and ammunition racks.⊕



**Phase IV**



## **RSO&I Operations for the Main Support Battalion (MSB) and the Corps Support Battalion (CSB): *Building the Capability to Support* by MAJ Bryan K. Robbins, Senior DSA Trainer, NTC**

*"RSO&I is not logistics. However, it is operations with heavy logistical implications....To be successful at RSO&I requires the same level of command emphasis, planning, rehearsal, synchronization drills and attention to detail as other operations." CALL Newsletter No. 97-7, Reception, Staging, Onward movement & Integration, Feb 97.*

RSO&I Week...Draw Week...Prep Week...whatever you call it, the first week of a rotation at the National Training Center is a hectic and busy week for main and corps support battalions. These battalions provide support from the Division Support Area (DSA) to the brigade combat team throughout the entire rotation at NTC to include the time spent in the "Dust Bowl" before and after the "war." During RSO&I week, the main and corps support battalions of the DSA must build their own logistical and combat power simultaneous with providing support to the brigade combat team (BCT) to assist them in building combat power.

### **STANDARD RSO&I MISSIONS for the DSA**

- Establish accounts and interface with the Theater Logistics Base.
- Inventory and sign for supply stocks.
- Issue UBL for Class I, II, IIIP, IV, and V for all units in the BCT.
- Establish and operate the Field Ammunition Supply Point (FASP).
- Provide bulk fuel support to the brigade combat team (BCT).
- Provide a Battalion Aid Station for the rotation unit bivouac area (RUBA).
- Provide linehaul transportation support to the RUBA from the railhead.
- *Draw equipment and prepare to support combat operations for the BCT.*

The monumental task of deconflicting the battalion's internal and external support issues can be a little less difficult by establishing clear priorities of work for RSO&I and adopting some proven techniques and procedures from other units.

***TRACKING BUILDUP OF LOGISTICAL COMBAT POWER.*** It is absolutely critical for the MSB or the CSB supporting the DSA to maintain an accurate status of the equipment draw and logistic capabilities.

**Problem:** Many units have tried putting the S4 and the Battalion Maintenance Officer together in a small control cell in the draw yard, tasked with monitoring and controlling the entire draw process, and posting updates at their little control cell in the draw yard. Unfortunately, this method puts all the information in a vacuum, and, when neither of those individuals can be found, the information is usually unavailable.



**Technique:** Have the Support Operations Officer (SPO) post the information on charts in the TOC, to include periodic updates throughout the day to maintain accuracy. The charts should be by company, with a battalion rollup showing status by class of supply and type of equipment. Evening updates by company commanders can confirm or deny information gathered during the day, and provide a further update on the most recent activities. This becomes more important as the week progresses and more support missions are required by the BCT as they prepare to roll out of the cantonment area.

Without this information, the battalion cannot adequately plan and prepare for future support missions on a daily basis. Appendix B of **CALL Newsletter No. 97-7, Reception, Staging, Onward movement & Integration**, has good examples of combat power-tracking charts for a forward support battalion that can easily be modified for the systems and capabilities found in a main or corps support battalion. Company charts should be maintained as well as battalion rollup charts. The company charts are more suited to track specific mission capabilities of that unit. Trying to pull that information out of a battalion rollup chart can be complicated and misleading.

**EXAMPLE:**

**HOW TO TRACK DAILY COMPANY STATUS BY SYSTEM.**

**PROJ = NUMBER PROJECTED TO HAVE ON TD00**

**OH = CURRENT NUMBER ON HAND**

**STATUS = GREEN, AMBER, RED, OR BLACK**

PROJ / OH	D-5	D-4	D-3	D-2	D-1	STATUS
FUEL TANKERS*	11 / 1	11 / 4	11 / 7	11 / 11	11 / 11	GREEN
WATER TANKERS*	6 / 1	6 / 1	6 / 3	6 / 5	6 / 6	GREEN
931 TRACTORS	18 / 2	18 / 5	18 / 10	18 / 17	18 / 18	
6K FORKLIFT	4 / 1	4 / 3	4 / 4	4 / 4	4 / 4	

\*TANKERS ARE CERTIFIED FMC AND FILLED.

**WHAT SHOULD WE KEEP TRACK OF?** Individual commanders will provide guidance on what they deem critical systems; i.e., the capabilities and equipment available in main support battalions are different from those of corps support battalions. Support Operations Officers will track what their support battalion deems as critical systems or capabilities. Regardless what is deemed critical to a specific battalion's mission, there are some basic pieces of equipment that are common to all battalions and their support mission at the National Training Center:



***Critical systems for main or corps support battalions - and average number used at NTC:***

- 931 Tractors - 48 total prime movers for trailers, fuel tankers, and water tankers
- Fuel tankers - 11 for JP8
- Water tankers - 6
- MHE - 8 total with mixed variety of sizes from 4K to 10K
- HETs - 3 systems
- 871 Trailers - 44 for trash and general bulk cargo
- PLS (if available) - 3 to 27 based on availability for Class V and other bulk cargo

Water tankers and fuel tankers should be tracked for draw, certification, testing, and filling. Just because a tanker is out of the draw yard does not mean it is available for support.

→ **The fuel tankers must pass fuel filter effectiveness tests, and the water tankers must be certified for potable water use by the preventive medicine (PVNTMED) team.**

→ **Deploying a PVNTMED team with bio test kits gives the unit an advantage in completing this task on schedule because they do not have to rely on host-nation support.**

→ **Water teams for the FSB are normally attached on RSO&I day four or five if this should be a priority task.**

***WHAT OTHER TASKS MUST BE COMPLETED?*** In addition to all the other tasks, **the battalion must complete vehicle crew drills for rollovers and fire** before moving into the maneuver box. These drills must be done during the week of RSO&I--drills done at Home Station prior to deployment do **NOT** qualify a crew at the National Training Center.

MSB and CSB soldiers should also complete ammunition draw and weapons zero. The DSA should *expect* to use their weapons against the OPFOR. The NTC battlefield is becoming more and more "lethal" as the PPG and OPFOR continue to increase their attention toward the logistics forces. Convoys are interdicted on the MSR, the BSA is attacked, and civilians on the battlefield (hostile and non-hostile) provide ample opportunity for MSB and CSB soldiers to get into the action. Therefore, **it is a must that they zero their weapons (MILES) during RSO&I!**

***DAILY TRAINING PLAN FOR RSO&I WEEK:*** Many units deploy to NTC after having completed a thorough training plan in preparation for the rotation. They arrive at NTC training complete, and ready to just get their equipment and start the rotation. However, there is always something in which the unit could use some extra training, and there is time during RSO&I week to accomplish that training.

***What to train:*** There may be specific tasks to train that are unique to the upcoming mission, but the basic fundamentals are always a good place to start. At a minimum, units should conduct training on the following tasks during RSO&I:

- **night driving with NVGs for terrain familiarization**
- **route reconnaissance (with approval from 52d Div G3)**
- **convoy defense battle drills**
- **reporting procedures**
- **vehicle crew drills for rollover and fire - REQUIRED**



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***How to fit training into the RSO&I schedule:*** Some of these tasks cannot easily be done in the first part of the week; however, there is usually time for units to conduct this training in the evenings beginning on Wednesday, or RSO&I day three. Some techniques observed that worked well are:

→ **leaders (squad through company commander) conduct reconnaissance of routes via HMMWV on RSO&I days two through four**

→ **convoy defense battle drills completed at platoon and squad levels without vehicles, just walking**

→ **terrain familiarization driving with NVGs between the cantonment area and the Field ASP**

→ **reporting procedures trained during COMMEX for radio checks, or from squad leaders and platoon leaders to the company commander after completing training or support missions**

**The bottom line** is units must be imaginative in developing ways to conduct the training. Publish a written training schedule of **essential, important, and opportunity tasks** by unit, for each day, and follow through with completing the training to standard.

***IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE? YES!*** The alternative is to coordinate for the support of a Reserve Component support unit to be on station during the RSO&I mission. This unit would conduct all the normal support missions for the BCT while the battalion supporting the DSA focuses on preparing itself for future operations. The battle handover of support missions usually occurs on the evening of RSO&I day four. Historically, units that have coordinated this support have had a much easier week and are successful much quicker in preparing their personnel and equipment for future missions. However, support from the Reserve Components is only available approximately four rotations per year.

### ***SUMMARY***

Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration is an arduous mission. Failing to plan and prepare makes it more difficult. The week of RSO&I at the National Training Center is even harder on the battalion supporting the DSA because of the logistical support requirements occurring at the same time. The support the Reserve Component can provide is great, but units cannot count on external support always being available everywhere in the world. Units can be successful in this mission on their own with the appropriate amount of planning and preparation prior to deployment, and synchronized and supervised execution on arrival in theater. Command emphasis is required to make this happen. Remember, ***this is a mission***, and must be treated as such. Commander's intent, concept of the operation, and all the other pieces of the operations order give the subordinate commanders the guidance and direction needed to go out and be successful in this mission. Keep this in mind the next time your unit begins preparation for deployment to the Mojave Theater of Operations. ☸



## EIGHT KEYS TO SUCCESS FOR THE SUPPORT BATTALION

### MAJ Howard R. Christie, ADLER 08 Support Operations O/C, CMTC

Units *must* cross the LD with their Combat Service Support (CSS) intact to *make* it to their objective. To get the fighters *successfully* across the LD, CSS units must carefully examine how they plan, prepare, and execute CSS operations.

Do you have CSS in place to support a Brigade Combat Team (BCT)? Does it work? Is it reliable? Synchronized? *Flexible*? Training for high intensity conflict (HIC) is tough enough. Some units have the additional burden and unenviable task of transitioning from non-linear stability actions and support actions back to linear High-Intensity Conflict (HIC) operations. CSS planners' tasks are complicated at Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) by this transition. Provided in this article are some key techniques to help CSS planners ensure *timely* and *flexible* support to maneuver units.

For the supported unit to be successful, CSS support must include the right mix of all classes of supply, PLUS maintenance and services. We all know that the Support Battalion's success is rated relative to the achievement of its supported maneuver units (did they get their tanks and Bradleys across the LD?) The support battalion staff elements could easily start the process by asking themselves the following basic questions:

1. How do we support the BCT?
2. How do we synchronize the Concept of Support (COS)?
3. How do we ensure continuity of supporting plans and verify the sustainability of the tactical plan?
4. How do we communicate over long distances to provide timely and accurate CSS support?
5. How do we regenerate combat power at CMTC?
6. How do we manage our systems?
7. How do we synchronize BSA operations?
8. Why should we understand how the maneuver fights?

**KEY No. 1.** Establish reliable, synchronized and well-defined CSS to support a Brigade Combat Team (BCT).

- Include all classes of supply, maintenance and services to achieve success for the supported units.
- Train up and rehearse before deploying to CMTC.

**KEY No. 2.** Develop a sound Concept of Support (COS) for the supported BCT *before they arrive* at CMTC.

The COS provides the framework for all CSS support to deployed units.

- An effective COS clearly defines how units will receive support.
- CSS planners must synchronize the COS to make certain they will provide the full spectrum of support.
- Support battalions must synchronize the COS with the brigade S4 before the CSS rehearsal.

Clear definition and synchronization allow all CSS planners and executors to understand and apply the plan.

**KEY No. 3. Rehearse!** Just as combined arms rehearsals contribute to tactical success, a CSS rehearsal improves support operations for the supported BCT.

- CSS and CHS planners work together to plan and rehearse CSS operations.
- Rehearsals validate synchronized plans, ensure continuity of supporting plans, and *verify the sustainability of the tactical plan* within the maneuver commander's intent.





● When conducted with the right players, rehearsals can remove anxiety from the maneuver commanders.

**KEY No. 4.** Plan and train to establish and maintain reliable, redundant tactical communications, to include logistics connectivity.

● A unit that cannot communicate cannot support or win. Each battle presents a new set of logistics requirements.

● Units must communicate the logistic demands of this ever-changing environment, or it will not provide timely and accurate CSS support for the BCT.

● Redundant communication systems and determined soldier action to maintain positive communications spell the difference between logistics life and death.

**KEY No. 5.** Understand the maintenance and Class IX systems from crew level to direct support.

● With this understanding, planners can identify the weak links in their systems and correct the problem(s) as they occur. This ensures the delivery of combat power to the BCT.

● Hold *daily maintenance meetings to stay informed*. To be useful, these meetings must have a defined agenda, a scheduled time (based on tactical and logistical operations), and *must be attended by the key CSS planners in the BCT*.

**KEY No. 6.** Establish a system of reporting and tracking to manage information systems.

● CSS planners must have an accurate means to gather information, anticipate CSS shortfalls, and manage CSS.

● Without a COS, units cannot provide accurate tactical logistical requirements to the BCT.

● Exercise, refine, and incorporate the system into existing standing operating procedures (SOPs), and *follow the SOPs*.

● The bottom line for information management remains maximizing combat power for the maneuver commander.

**KEY No. 7.** Conduct daily BSA tenants' meetings.

● These meetings provide the support battalions and the brigade staff excellent opportunities to integrate all tenants into the BSA.

● The meetings synchronize BSA base defense operations, administrative issues, and operational logistics (internal and direct support).

**KEY No. 8.** Understand how maneuver units fight.

● How the BCT will fight determines all logistic planning, including the best method to support, which requires broad tactical and technical proficiencies.

● A logistician who does not understand warfighting will not adequately track, anticipate, or provide timely CSS support to the BCT.

## CONCLUSION

CMTC provides the support battalions with many training challenges and opportunities for learning. The keys to success presented here can bring success only when applied at all levels of the support battalion. Keying on these techniques allows units to establish the standard and get the most from their CMTC training experience.🎯



## **TASK FORCE-LEVEL CSS PLANNING**

**by CPT Kurt J. Pinkerton and CPT Sean Jenkins, Tarantulas, NTC**

**A**lpha Company has suppressed Objective Ray for 45 minutes. The breach is complete, and the engineers are emplacing the second breach. Charlie Company has cleared Objective Tom, and the reserve force is assaulting to seize Objective Ray. The task force commander receives a fragmentary order over the radio to move his support-by-fire force through the breach and orient fires onto Objective Dave to allow the brigade main effort to assault.

The staff informs the task force commander that the task force is incapable of executing the mission because they lack the fuel, ammunition, and additional support required to evacuate casualties.

**QUESTION:** How did the task force get to this point?

**ANSWER:** Improper logistical estimate.

During the past two years at the National Training Center (NTC), the *number one* reason logistical support fails is the **lack of planning at the task force and company levels**. An S4 trainer routinely observes the S4's fight to be integrated into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), but a company/team trainer routinely sees a lack of CSS planning and graphics at the company level.

These deficiencies are not usually tied to a lack of knowledge on the part of the CSS players, but, rather, a lack of experience in developing an integrated CSS plan to support the maneuver plan. Normally, the first time a task force CSS team is required to think through the entire spectrum (before, during and after operations) of CSS planning is during their NTC rotation. At the company level, the NTC rotation is usually the first time a 1SG and XO have to provide support to their company for an extended period of time.

FM 7-20, *The Infantry Battalion*, FM 71-2, *The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force*, FM 71-123, *Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion Task Force, and Company Team*, and numerous articles published in Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletters outline CSS operations and discuss how they must be synchronized with the maneuver plan, but how is it actually done? This article discusses a technique for CSS planning and execution.

The technique most frequently discussed and seen today in planning CSS operations has three phases: **Before, During, and After**. By organizing operations into phases, the S4 can methodically break down his planning requirements and develop a solid CSS plan.



## ***BEFORE OPERATIONS***

The S4 should execute the MDMP for the CSS plan just as the S3 does with the maneuver plan. Throughout the process, the S4 must ensure the CSS plan is disseminated as accurately and as regularly as the maneuver plan. In accordance with FM 71-123, a task force should issue approximately three warning orders (WARNOs) prior to the dissemination of the operations order (OPORD) (Figure 1-1):

**WARNO No. 1:** Goes out immediately upon receiving the mission from brigade.

**WARNO No. 2:** Goes out upon completion of the mission analysis brief and issuance of the commander's guidance.

**WARNO No. 3:** Goes out upon completion of the course-of-action (COA) brief and commander's decision.

### **WARNING ORDERS**

#### ● ***Warning Order No. 1***

1. Mission.
2. Specified Tasks:
  - \*a. Maintenance Status -- BMO.
  - \*b. Personnel Status -- S1.
  - \*c. Haul Status -- Support Platoon (cargo, fuel, and troops).
3. General Instructions:
  - a. Movement of combat trains command post (CTCP).
  - b. Movement of unit maintenance collection point (UMCP).
  - c. Directions to medics and field trains command post (FTCP).

\*All statuses are current and projected.

#### ● ***Warning Order No.2***

1. Restated Mission statement.
2. Task Organization.
3. Specified Tasks:
  - a. Changes to ration cycle.
  - b. Changes to maintenance priority.
  - c. Changes to personnel priority.
3. General Instructions:
  - a. Guidance to support the counter-reconnaissance fight.
  - b. Guidance to FTCP to support task organization changes.

#### ● ***Warning Order No. 3\*\****

1. Task Force Mission.
2. Specified Tasks.
3. General Instructions.

\*\*Graphics distributed with this warning order.

**Figure 1-1**

To ensure that the CSS players are planning and preparing for CSS operations, each of the three WARNOs needs to provide more detail than the previous one so the executors (HHC commander, support platoon leader, truck platoon leader, BMO, etc.) can prepare and begin CSS operations.



### **CSS Planning Techniques:**

1. Upon receipt of the mission, the S4/S1 immediately issues **WARNO No. 1** via a net call over the administration/logistics net to let the CSS players know of the impending mission.
2. Mission Analysis. The S4 begins his mission analysis focusing on the logistical and personnel estimate (Figure 1-2).

### **Logistical Estimate “A Way”**

**Arming** - Do we have enough Class V? How long can the mortars suppress/illuminate? How many tanks/BMPs can we kill? Who is support by fire? Can I get Class V resupply in by air or ground? How responsive (time) will our emergency resupply be? What will it contain? Will we get a resupply before the line of departure (LD)? Who is priority? When do scouts leave the LD?

**Manning** - How many casualties will we take? Where? What MEDEVAC will we have? How do we evacuate casualties? Through an EA? Ambulance exchange point (AXP) locations up close due to distance? Other unit AXP/battalion aid stations/forward aid stations? How can we evacuate scouts?

**Fixing** - Will the wrecker go forward? Self-recovery - can we consolidate tow bars to AT/ADA Plts? Can we get some from sister elements? Where are their MCPs? What is our Combat Power? At UMCP? At field trains?...Projected status in 24 hours?

**Transporting** - Do we have enough aircraft? How many trucks/Will they transport the whole unit? Can we use vehicles for non-standard CASEVAC? How long will it take to make a complete route and return? Will we have the capacity for resupply?

**Fueling** - Haul capacity? Time to refuel before LD? Will we need to refuel prior to mission complete?

**Figure 1-2**

a. The S4 should arrive at the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) for the task force MDMP with the following status:

- ☛ **Current and projected combat power.**
- ☛ **Current and projected logistical assets (fuel and cargo trucks, medical ambulances, etc.).**
- ☛ **Current and projected personnel status.**
- ☛ **Current and projected supply status (specifically Class III, IV and V).**

The S4 collects this critical data from the key CSS players (BMO, S1, support platoon leader and medical platoon leader) and then changes it into information that the task force commander can use in determining whether he can support a course of action.



b. Once the S4 and S1 arrive at the TOC, they immediately begin reviewing the brigade operations order and CSS graphics.

● The S4 reads all paragraphs of the order, putting special emphasis on paragraph 4, and reviews

the brigade CSS graphics.

● The S1 with the medical platoon leader look over the maneuver graphics and CSS graphics and start preparing a personnel estimate and developing a CHS plan.

● The S4 should have a complete personnel and logistical estimate and a clear understanding of the specified and implied tasks upon completion of this stage. Items that should be identified are:

- ✓ AXP in the task force sector/zone.
- ✓ Changes in task organization that will affect the supply requirements.
- ✓ Potential treatment site locations that may coincide with AXPs.
- ✓ Potential limitations or constraints.

An example of a limitation or constraint would be the inability to support in depth with treatment teams, or the inability to develop a complete defense because of a lack of Classes IV/V.

● The S4 then ensures that key CSS times are placed on the Task Force timeline (LRPs, CSS rehearsal, Classes IV/V point established, etc.).

c. The S4 then briefs the task force commander on the unit's capabilities (logistical/personnel estimates) to support the operation with the current requirements (see Figure 1-3 on page I-26).



## Logistical Estimate

### "A Way"

#### 1. Arming:

- Bn has 19 Dragons = 9 tanks (2/tank).
- Bn has 30 M1s x \_\_\_\_ rounds = \_\_\_\_ tanks (1.5/tank).
- 20 M2s x \_\_\_\_ TOW rounds = \_\_\_\_ tanks (1.5/tank).
- 20 M2s x \_\_\_\_ 25-mm AP = \_\_\_\_ BMPs (8/BMP)
- 4.2 MORT
  - > 90 rds HE suppresses a tank.
  - > 108 rds HE destroys a tank.
  - > 30 rds destroys wheeled vehicle.
  - > 6/9/12 rds HE troops open/dug in/overhead for one casualty.
  - > 36 WP = 12 min of smoke for 300m screen.

#### 2. Fueling:

- M1: 6-8-hour burn time.
- Package: Turboshift (10-20 qts/day/CO/TM), FRH.
- Emergency resupply vs schedules resupply vs ROM/RAM.

#### 3. Fixing:

- Tow bars with ADA.
- Wrecker with CO/TMs (area coverage).

#### 4. Transporting:

- 26 km from CTCP to OBJ???
- Planning rate is 10MPH = 5 min/k = 2 hrs and 10 minutes travel time.

#### 5. Manning:


- Casualties (personnel and patient estimate) - numbers and locations
- Six M113s and two 5-tons - enough assets??

Figure 1-3

It is important that the data briefed is quantifiable. For example:

**"Sir, we have 30 M1s and 20 M2s available for the fight; additionally we have 12 Fuel HEMMTs. As the support-by-fire force for the brigade, we should be able to fight for approximately 12 hours or travel 400 miles and suppress the objective for 2 hours."**

d. When the briefing is complete, the S1 disseminates **WARNO No. 2** on the A/L net to issue further guidance to the CSS executors, and then returns to the CTCP to begin CSS preparation and tracking.



b. The S4 adds routes that the task force will use as task force Main Supply Routes (MSRs) and Alternate Supply Routes (ASRs) in their zone that will be linked into the brigade MSRs and ASRs.

d. The S4 then plans the locations for the scheduled resupply points (could include a Refuel On the Move/Rearm on the Move (ROM/RAM)) and LRP throughout the depth of the zone. Later the S4 must confirm the brigade S4 received a copy of the plan so he can plan support for the PZs, LRPs and ROM/RAMs as necessary.

e. If the task force plans to transition to a defense upon completion of the mission, then the S4 plans the tentative locations of the Classes IV/V point with recommendations from the engineer representative at the TOC. The end product from this process is a CSS overlay to support the entire operation and an execution matrix (Figures 1-4 and 1-4a).





## Execution Matrix

	Prior to LD	LD	Breach Tm PL White	Asslt Tm OBJ Lee	Reorg/Recon On Lee
III	top off co/tms just prior to LD in atk pos	w/CTCP Atk Pos grid....	Refuel SBF Tm	Continue Refuel SBF Team	w/CTCP vic PL BLUE grid....
IV	vehicles w/UBL pkgs configed and in BSA	N/C	N/C	Pkgs SP from BSA	CL IV arrives CL IV Pt grid....
V	Rearm at LOGPAC	w/CTCP Atk Pos grid....	Rearm SBF Tm	Continue Rearm SBF Tm	w/CTCP vic PL BLUE grid....
Maint	UMCP grid....	N/C	grid.... Priority: CMOB	FRT PL White grid....	w/CTCP grid....
Med	FAS grid.... MAS grid....	N/C	F: red: grid.... M: to White: grid....	M: White: grid.... F: to blue: grid....	F: at Blue grid....

Figure 1-4a

4. **Wargaming.** During wargaming, the S4 must ensure the CSS overlay is used so he and the medical platoon leader can *synchronize the CSS plan with the maneuver plan*. Routinely, units will develop a good CSS plan, but will fail to synchronize the plan with the maneuver plan, resulting in the maneuver units outrunning their logistical support during execution. Upon completion of wargaming, the S4 and all the wargaming participants brief the task force commander, and the maneuver and CSS plans are approved.

5. **WARNO No. 3** is now issued with a set of graphics to the CTCP, UMCP, medical platoon leader, support platoon leader, and the FTCP. There are numerous techniques for getting the graphics to the critical players:

a. Send the S4 driver with the S1 or the S1/S4 NCOIC from the combat trains to each location to hand-deliver the products.

b. Deliver them at the next logistics package (LOGPAC) meeting -- a good technique if the planning process ends relatively close to the LOGPAC time.

6. Another product developed throughout this entire process is a critical information list or a commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) list for CSS. The CCIR list for CSS is a valuable tracking tool for the S4. This list should be posted in the CTCP, UMCP, FTCP, company command posts (COCs) and the battalion aid station to ensure everyone reports the critical tasks that are complete, and any changes to the proposed support package. This information allows the task force commander to make decisions about potential changes to the plan and preparation because of CSS constraints. These tasks are vigilantly tracked by all command posts and progress briefed throughout the entire preparation phase.





7. The CSS rehearsal is another critical event during the preparation phase. The rehearsal can be done in conjunction with a LOGPAC (preferred method) or as a separate event at the task force Rock Drill site. The final activities that take place throughout the preparation phase are LOGPACs. During the LOGPAC meetings, the CSS status is being updated through the exchange of data. Because this data could affect the plan, it is important to ensure everyone is at the meeting, that they are turning in their LOGSTATs and DA Forms 5988, and *that nobody leaves until everyone is in agreement.*

## **EXECUTION.**

The execution phase is relatively routine if proper effort was put into the preparation phase.

1. It is crucial that the S4 closely battle-track the fight to allow the logistics tail to maintain the momentum with the combat forces. The CTCP should be set up to remain mobile and still be able to maintain a battle-tracking chart and situational map. A technique used by one task force is displayed below.

### **CTCP/FTCP Tracking**

#### **> Operational Tracking**

- Friendly Disposition
- Enemy Disposition
- NBC/Minefields
- Combat Power

#### **> CSS Elements (Locations)**

- |               |        |
|---------------|--------|
| → FTCP        | → GREG |
| → UMCP        | → EPW  |
| → Trtmt Tms   | → CCP  |
| → AXPps       | → LRP  |
| → Decon Pts   | → FLE  |
| → CL IV/V Pts |        |

#### **> CSS Status**

- LOGSTAT Reports
- CL I Ration Cycles
- CL III, IV, V
- Transportation Assets
- Personnel Replacements
- Maintenance/Recovery/WSRO
- Casualty Location/Numbers

#### **> Concept of Support**

- BCT/TF CSS Graphics
- Mission Analysis
- LOG Estimate
- Wargaming/Orders/Rehearsals
- CSS Critical Events
- Adjacent Unit Coordination
- LOGPAC Time/Location



## SITUATIONAL MAP

**Figure I-5**

- # I-30



- a. Companies call in all resupply requests to the S4 at the CTCP using the color code system (green, amber, red, black) to reduce transmission times. The request should consist of the color code, location of unit and the marking system for guiding in the support platoon.
  - b. Companies send the number of casualties by type (routine, urgent, priority) and grid location directly to the medical platoon leader on A/L. Markings are in accordance with the unit SOP.
  - c. Companies call in bumper numbers, grid and general deficiencies with damaged vehicles to the BMO. Later during lulls in the battle or during consolidation/reorganization, the remainder of the information can be transmitted (i.e., battle roster numbers).
3. The S4 must focus on the fight to ensure that the treatment teams are positioning on time and at the correct locations. He must activate scheduled resupply if necessary or initiate emergency resupply operations if the situation arises, and ensure that vehicle recovery is being executed in an efficient and effective manner. The S4 does not have time to have long conversations on the radio, nor do you want your A/L net so busy.

## **AFTER OPERATIONS**

1. Once the fight is complete, the CSS "fight" begins. CSS players really earn their money during the consolidation phase.
  - a. The S4 must ensure that scheduled resupplies are executed. Changes to the priority of effort must be identified immediately and relayed to the appropriate people to ensure proper execution.
  - b. Companies submit updated reports to the CTCP if they have not already done so.
  - c. Submission of accurate LOGSTATs at the first LOGPAC meeting are absolutely crucial to ensure the companies receive the proper quantities of supplies to prepare for the next fight. Most LOGSTATs list O/H, 24-hour, 48-hour and 72-hour needs - - the O/H quantity is the most critical data. Logisticians should be able to order the correct amounts of supplies with the O/H quantities.
2. Personnel tracking is the most difficult process.
  - a. The S1 and the companies must get the proper accountability of KIAs, WIAs and MIAs as quickly as possible.
  - b. The DA Forms 1155 and 1156 must be collected immediately. If they were not sent with the casualty and collected at the treatment site by the S1 representative, then the best place to consolidate these forms is at the first LOGPAC meeting.
  - c. The other half of personnel tracking is the proper accountability of replacement personnel arriving at the companies. This entire process must be tracked continuously and will usually continue up to departure for the next mission.
3. The S4, along with a lot of the key CSS leaders, starts to prepare and/or move to the TOC to prepare for the next mission (starting the entire process over again).

## **CONCLUSION**

Planning, preparing, and executing CSS operations is not an easy task. There are many activities that take place throughout the process and few personnel to ensure it all comes together. If you can master this process, then you will greatly increase the chances for success and have a definite influence on the outcome of the battle. If you come to NTC with the knowledge of how to plan and execute CSS operations and you understand the ROE used at the NTC, you have a better-than-average chance of winning on the NTC battlefield!👊



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## **CHAPTER II**

### **COMMAND AND CONTROL (C<sup>2</sup>)**

#### **The Task Force XO: Roles and Responsibilities**

**by MAJ Juan Hernandez (T02)**

**T**his article will help the task force XO prepare for Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTTC) by providing tasks on which he can focus his efforts during a rotation. These tasks fall into two areas:

1. The XO as the battalion/task force Chief of Staff.
2. The XO as the Chief Logistician.

This article reviews the XO's duties in both these areas and spells out the doctrinal responsibilities. This assessment is based on recent observations of units going through both High Intensity Conflict (HIC) and stability actions and support actions rotations at CMTTC. The article describes key functions that ultimately contribute to a task force's success and directs the task force XO to readily available publications that will help prepare him to execute as a task force XO at the CMTTC. The intent is to equip the task force XO to more efficiently manage what little time is available during missions in "the box."

#### ***XO Responsibilities:***

The XO's responsibilities in combat as described in the Commander's Battle Staff Handbook<sup>1</sup>, are:

- Establishing staff operating procedures.
- Ensuring the commander and the staff are informed on matters affecting the command.
- Assembling and supervising the staff during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), and ensuring a coordinated, synchronized plan.
- Establishing timelines (1/3-2/3 rule).
- Establishing the required liaison.
- Ensuring information flow between the staff and commander on staff recommendations and the commander's decisions.
- Representing the commander (when required) and supervising the main CP and its operations.
- Monitoring the overall battle and supervision planning of future operations.
- Directing the staff.
- Displacing the main CP.
- Enforcing SOPs.
- Providing for battalion logistical support.



**What the XO needs first:** *Find out from the battalion commander how he intends to use the XO.* "The commander may use the XO to operate the unit's main CP...or supervise the overall logistical effort. He must decide how he can use the XO most effectively given individual staff strengths, mission requirements and METT-TC,\* and then communicate his intentions clearly."<sup>2</sup> Therefore, some questions that the XO must ask well before ever coming to the CMTC are:

- ➔ What is my battalion commander's command philosophy?
- ➔ What is my commander's intent and guidance?
- ➔ How does the battalion commander plan to use me?
- ➔ What are my responsibilities in TOC operations?
- ➔ What is my relationship to the S3?
- ➔ What is my decision-making authority for the commander/command structure?

The answers to these questions provide the groundwork for the XO to decide how he wants to allocate his time and effort as the Chief of Staff and/or Chief Logistician.

### ***XO as Chief of Staff:***

The XO is the principal agent responsible for synchronizing the entire battle staff. The XO:

- ➔ orchestrates each step of the MDMP.
- ➔ ensures staff integration throughout the planning, preparation and execution phases of the operation.
- ➔ enforces the timeline.

Using the Plan/Prepare/Execute methodology, key functions of the XO are:

#### **Plan**

- Chief of staff during the MDMP. Two helpful sources are **CALL Newsletters Nos. 93-3<sup>3</sup> and 95-12.<sup>4</sup>**
- XO as keeper of the timeline.
  - ☞ Upon receipt of the Bde FRAGO, publish the timeline for the operation. *Post for all in the TOC to see. Update as required!*
  - ☞ Include all rehearsals (fires, task force, CSS, Bde level, etc.) in the timeline.
  - ☞ Most importantly, enforce the timeline.
    - ➔ Once enforced, the battlestaff will live by it.
    - ➔ The XO is the guy with the club to beat up those that stray out of line.

\* METT-T will change to mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available and civil considerations (METT-TC) in the revised version of **FM 100-5, Operations.**



### Prepare

- **Quality control for OPORD and graphics.**
- **Rehearsals.**
  - ☞ It's the commander's rehearsal, but the XO runs it.
  - ☞ Don't let it turn into a wargame.
  - ☞ Rehearse the rehearsal with the battle staff.
  - ☞ Keep the rehearsal length to an hour or less.
  - ☞ Maintain the standard defined in **CALL Newsletter No. 91-1, *Rehearsals***, Apr 91.
- **Review the OPORD for quality control. Again, as in the rehearsal, rehearse the OPORD.**

### Execute

- **During the battle, ensure cross talk laterally (Co/Tms) and higher/lower (Bde/Bn).**
- **Ensure that the battle staff is drilled to the point that it can analyze, develop, synchronize and recommend a course of action within minutes of receiving a FRAGO from the task force Commander or Brigade.**
- **Know the Rules of Engagement (ROE)!**

### **XO as Chief Logistician:**

"The TF XO is the most critical player on the CSS team.

- ➡ Synchronizes all staff actions to support the mission.
- ➡ Must know the functions and responsibilities of the CSS team
- ➡ Effectively supervises them on the battlefield."<sup>5</sup>

Task-force CSS Rehearsals are probably the most important events the XO can do to ensure complete synchronization and understanding of the task force CSS Concept of Support. Units coming to the CMTC do this poorly and the end result is an unsynchronized CSS plan that does not support the task force. Refer to **CALL Newsletter No. 91-1, *Rehearsals***, Apr 91, for excellent rehearsal techniques.

Listed below are a number of CSS areas traditionally requiring the XO's attention during a rotation which are often addressed during unit AARs:

- **Logistics integration into the MDMP.**
- **CSS integration of attached units into the task force.**
- **In paragraph 4 of the OPORD. *Who checks the CSS plan for completeness and synchronization?***
- **Is the task force Concept of Support synchronized with the Bde Concept of Support?**
- **CSS Rehearsals.**
- **LOGPAC operations (plan/prepare/execute).**
- **Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) and Field Trains Command Post (FTCP) SOPs and operations.**



- **Maintenance:**
  - ☞ "Circle X" and Deadline criteria in the task force.
  - ☞ Who in the task force has "Circle X" authority?
  - ☞ Cross-leveling within the task force.
  - ☞ SOPs.
  - ☞ Daily PMCS/5988-E turn-in. How many are being submitted versus the task force vehicle density?
  - ☞ Daily Class IX requisitions.
  - ☞ Disk turn-in in the absence of e-mail or Electronic Logistics System (ELS).
  - ☞ PLL management.
  - ☞ Recovery Operations.
  - ☞ Full-up Power Pack (FUPP) availability.
  - ☞ Battalion Representation at the daily BSA Tenant Meetings and brigade-level CSS rehearsals.
- **Personnel Accountability.**
- **Processing 1156 Casualty Feeder Reports for all casualties.**
- **MEDEVAC and CASEVAC procedures.**
- **Combat Lifesavers and Combat Lifesaver Bags in the task force.**
- **Medical Treatment.**
- **Field Sanitation.**
- **Reconstitution Procedures.**☛

## **ENDNOTES**

- <sup>1</sup> *Commander's Battle Staff Handbook*, U.S. Army Research Institute, Fort Benning Field Unit, 15 May 93, p. 2-3.
- <sup>2</sup> *Commander's Battle Staff Handbook*, U.S. Army Research Institute, Fort Benning Field Unit, 15 May 93, p. 2.
- <sup>3</sup> *The Battalion and Brigade Battle Staff*, CALL Newsletter No. 93-3, TRADOC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Jul 93.
- <sup>4</sup> *Tactical Decision Making: Abbreviated Planning*, CALL Newsletter No. 95-12, TRADOC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Dec 95.
- <sup>5</sup> "Techniques for Sustaining Your Task Force," *Armor Magazine*, Mar-Apr 94, pp. 18-20.



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## 10 BATTLE DRILLS FOR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS) UNITS

by CPT James Fly, Grizzly 26

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**W**hat advantages can CSS units gain by training with, and using, battle drills? *The answer is in this article.*

The 10 battle drills presented here support the training and operations of a forward support battalion maintenance company. The battle drills were designed to support the company-level collective tasks as defined by ARTEP 43-009-30-MTP: *Defend Convoy, Defend against Level I Attack, and Defend Company Sector*. With some modification, they can support the mission-essential task list (METL) of other CSS units.

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FM 25-101 describes a battle drill as, “a collective action rapidly executed by a platoon or smaller unit without applying a deliberate decisionmaking process.” Well-trained, -practiced, and -executed battle drills are essential to successful small unit engagements. They can be the difference between victory and defeat for CSS units conducting rear battle operations.

We found that using a series of battle drills cross-walked from supported company-level collective tasks down to individual level common tasks offers several benefits:

1. Provides the unit with techniques, procedures and standards for squad-, section- and platoon-level training.
2. Maximizes the use of limited training time by focusing Sergeant’s Time on training the drills and their supporting common tasks to proficiency.

### DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION

A typical brigade support area’s reaction to a Level I threat is more like a meeting engagement than a perimeter defense. According to ARTEP 7-8 DRILL: “...battle drills are designed to be executed by platoon- and squad-sized elements. The speed of action is vital to success in combat or critical to preserving life. The drill is initiated on a cue, such as an enemy action or simple leader’s order, and is a trained response to the given stimulus. It requires minimal leader orders to accomplish...” Speed of action is critical to combat actions in defense of a brigade support area or convoy.

Battle drills facilitate a CSS unit’s defense because they provide subordinate units with a planned response to enemy action in the absence of orders. Brigade support areas (BSAs) reduce their perimeter manning in favor of supporting combat units forward. The actual defensive force that an enemy threat may encounter during an attack on a BSA could consist only of listening post/observation post (LP/OP) and crew-served weapon positions. The augmenting soldiers may have to move under fire from their work areas to the perimeter, which may be more than 500 meters away. The few soldiers who are able to make it to the perimeter in time to make a difference in such an attack must be ready to execute battle drills. Decentralized execution on the part of the soldiers who make it to the perimeter allow the remainder of the CSS unit’s perimeter to raise its security posture and gives the command time to analyze the situation and react.





## TRAINING FOCUS

CSS units do not have doctrinal manuals that provide the standards to train platoon- and squad-level operations. Battle drills can bridge the doctrinal gap between common tasks and company-level collective tasks for CSS units. They can focus training by providing a set of standards for squad-, section-, and platoon-level training in CSS units where few standards currently exist.

Battle drills maximize training time by effectively focusing on best ways to support a CSS unit's METL. Since battle drills support company-level collective tasks, a company commander can cross-walk the results from Sergeant's Time training on drills to evaluate his company's proficiency on METL tasks.

### Techniques:

1. Develop simple score cards for individuals, squads, sections and platoons to track progress of training the company battle drills and supporting common tasks during Sergeant's Time training.
2. Use battle drills and these score cards to increase soldier involvement, provide structure and minimize wasted training time for company-level training programs.

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## BATTLE DRILL No. 1

### Task: *React to Sniper Attack.*

**Conditions (Cue):** PLT/SQD has occupied a defensive position, is performing its direct support mission, and receives intermittent small arms fire.

### Standards:

1. PLT/SQD sustains no casualties following the initial attack.
2. PLT/SQD kills, captures or forces the withdrawal of the enemy.
3. PLT/SQD reorganizes defense, provides first aid and evacuates all casualties within 1 hour of injury.

### Performance Measures:

#### STEP No.

	<i>Who</i>
1. Take Cover (move to perimeter from work area)	ALL
2. Report contact to CP using SALUTE format	RTO
3. Move a crew-served weapon out of position	SL/PL/PSG
4. Attempt to locate sniper visually (thermal sights will help)	ALL
5. Request permission to engage sniper from CP	SL/PL/PSG
6. Attempt to locate sniper by fire (if required)	MG CREW
7. Engage and destroy sniper with crew-served weapon	MG CREW
8. Report results of engagements using ACE reports	RTO
9. Provide first aid to casualties and reorganize defense after and during lulls in contact.	SL/PL/PSG

### Abbreviations:

**RTO** = Radio/Telephone Operator  
**SL** = Squad Leader

**PSG** = Platoon Sergeant  
**PL** = Platoon Leader

**MG** = Machine Gun  
**PLT/SQD** = Platoon/Squad



**Supported Company-Level METL Task:** Defend

**Supporting Soldier Tasks:**

**Skill Level 1:** Report Enemy Information 071-331-0803; Estimate Range 071-326-0512; Perform Search and Scan Procedures 441-091-1101; Send a Radio Message 113-571-1016; Engage Targets with an M60 Machine Gun 071-312-3031; Select Temporary Fighting Position 071-326-0513; Perform Surveillance without the Aid of Electronic Devices 071-331-0804; Evaluate a Casualty 081-831-1000; Clear an Object from the Throat of a Conscious Casualty 081-831-1003; Perform Mouth-to-Mouth Resuscitation 081-831-1042; Put on a Field or Pressure Dressing 081-831-1016; Put on a Tourniquet 081-831-1017; Apply a Dressing to an Open Abdominal Wound 081-831-1025; Apply a Dressing to an Open Chest Wound 081-831-1026; Apply a Dressing to an Open Head Wound 081-831-1033; Prevent Shock 081-831-1005; Splint a Suspected Fracture 081-831-1034; Transport a Casualty using a One-Man Carry 081-831-1041; Transport a Casualty using a Two-Man Carry or an Improvised Litter 081-831-1041.

**Skill Level 2:** Use an Automated Signal Operation Instruction (SOI) 113-573-8006; Report Casualties 121-030-3534; Orient a Map using a Lensatic Compass 071-329-1011; Locate an Unknown Point on the Ground by Intersection 071-329-1014; Locate an Unknown Point of a Map and on the Ground by Resection 071-329-1015; Locate a Target by Grid Coordinates 061-283-1002.

**Skill Level 3:** Analyze Terrain 071-331-0820; Conduct a Defense by a Squad 071-430-0002; Consolidate a Squad following Enemy Contact while in the Defense 071-430-0003; Reorganize a Squad following Enemy Contact while in the Defense 071-430-0004.

**Skill Level 4:** Prepare a Platoon Sector Sketch 071-326-5770; Coordinate with adjacent Platoon 071-326-5775; Conduct a Defense by Platoon 071-430-0006; Consolidate a Platoon following Enemy Contact while in the Defense 071-430-0007; Reorganize a Platoon following Enemy Contact while in the Defense 071-430-0008.

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**BATTLE DRILL No. 2**

**Task:** *React to Artillery Attack.*

**Conditions (Cue):** PLT/SQD has occupied a defensive position, is performing its direct support mission, and receives indirect fire.

**Standards:**

1. PLT/SQD sustains no casualties following the initial attack.
2. PLT/SQD reorganizes defense, treats and evacuates all casualties within one hour of injury.



## Performance Measures:

### STEP No.

	<i>Who</i>
1. Take cover and dawn protective mask	ALL
2. Report artillery fire to CP using SALUTE format	RTO
3. Watch for indicators of chemical agent attack	ALL
(If chemical agent attack, then see Battle Drill No. 4; if not, go to all clear)	
4. Move to perimeter and prepare for ground attack	ALL
5. Assess damage to PLT/SQD area	PL/PSG/SL
6. Treat/Evacuate casualties to company medical collection PT	PL/PSG/SL
7. Report situation to CP (assessment of combat effectiveness (ACE) report)	RTO

### Abbreviations:

<b>RTO</b> = Radio/Telephone Operator	<b>SL</b> = Squad Leader	<b>PL</b> = Platoon Leader
<b>PSG</b> = Platoon Sergeant	<b>MG</b> = Machine Gun	<b>PLT/SQD</b> = Platoon/Squad
<b>CP</b> = Company Command Post	<b>PT</b> = Point	

### Supported Company-Level METL Task: Defend

### Supporting Soldier Tasks:

**Skill Level 1:** Report Enemy Information 071-331-0803; Send a Radio Message 113-571-1016; React to Indirect Fire while Dismounted 071-326-0510; Recognize and React to Chemical or Biological Hazard 031-503-1019; Evaluate a Casualty 081-831-1000; Clear an Object from the Throat of a Conscious Casualty 081-831-1003; Perform Mouth-to-Mouth Resuscitation 081-831-1042; Put on a Field or Pressure Dressing 081-831-1016; Put on a Tourniquet 081-831-1017; Apply a Dressing to an Open Abdominal Wound 081-831-1025; Apply a Dressing to an Open Chest Wound 081-831-1026; Apply a Dressing to an Open Head Wound 081-831-1033; Prevent Shock 081-831-1005; Splint a Suspected Fracture 081-831-1034; Transport a Casualty Using a One-Man Carry 081-831-1041; Transport a Casualty using a Two-Man Carry or an Improvised Litter 081-831-1041.

**Skill Level 2:** Use an Automated Signal Operation Instruction (SOI) 113-573-8006; Report Casualties 121-030-3534

**Skill Level 3:** Conduct a Defense by a Squad 071-430-000; Consolidate Squad following Enemy Contact while in the Defense 071-430-0004; Reorganize a Squad following Enemy Contact while in the Defense 071-430-0004; Supervise Positioning of the Chemical Agent Alarm 031-5043001.

**Skill Level 4:** Conduct a Defense by Platoon 071-430-0006; Consolidate a Platoon following Enemy Contact while in the Defense 071-430-0007; Reorganize a Platoon following Enemy Contact while in the Defense 071-430-0008; Conduct Operations Security (OPSEC) Procedures 113-573-0002; Supervise Unit Preparation for NBC Attack 031-503-4002.



## BATTLE DRILL No. 3

**Task:** *React to Ground Attack.*

**Conditions (Cue):** PLT/SQD has occupied a defensive position, is performing its direct support function, and LP/OP detects enemy movement to the front of perimeter.

**Standards:**

1. PLT/SQD is not surprised.
2. PLT/SQD kills, captures or forces the withdrawal of the enemy and accomplishes its mission within the commander's intent.
3. PLT/SQD reorganizes defense, treats and evacuates all casualties within 1 hour of injury.
4. PLT/SQD retains sufficient fighting force to continue its mission.

**Performance Measures:**

**STEP No.**

1. Report enemy activity to CP (SALUTE format)	<b>Who</b> RTO
2. Move to perimeter	ALL
3. Receive permission from CP and then use LP/OP to direct indirect fires NCT 500M in front of LP/OP position	PL/PSG/SL
4. Withdraw LP/OP prior to becoming decisively engaged	PL/PSG/SL
5. Engage enemy with indirect fire to NCT 500M in front of perimeter	PL/PSG/SL
6. Hold fire on all direct fire weapons until enemy has advanced to within 250M of perimeter positions	ALL
7. Engage enemy armored vehicles first with AT weapons using volley fire	ALL
8. Engage enemy dismounts with as many direct fire weapons as possible utilizing control measures to maximize effect	ALL
9. Fire FPFs when enemy closes to within hand grenade range	PL/PSG/SL
10. Report enemies progress (SALUTE) and current status (ACE) at each lull in the battle	RTO
11. Assess damage and reorganize defense following each attack	PL/PSG/SL
12. Treat/Evacuate casualties to medical collection point at CP	PL/PSG/SL

**Abbreviations:**

**RTO** = Radio/Telephone Operator

**FPF** = Final Protective Fire

**MG** = Machine Gun

**CP** = Company Command Post

**PSG** = Platoon Sergeant

**SL** = Squad Leader

**PLT/SQD** = Platoon/Squad

**NCT** = No Closer Than

**PL** = Platoon Leader

**AT** = Anti-Tank

**Supported Company-Level METL Task:** Defend

**Supporting Soldier Tasks:**



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**Skill Level 1:** Report Enemy Information 071-331-0803; Estimate Range 071-326-0512' Perform Search and Scan Procedures 441-091-1101; Send a Radio Message 113-571-1016; Engage Targets with a M16A2 Rifle 071-311-2007; Engage Targets with a M136 Launcher 071-054-0004; Engage Targets with a M203 Grenade Launcher 071-311-2130; Engage Targets with an M60 Machine Gun 071-312-3031; Employ Hand Grenades 071-325-4407; Employ an M181A1 Claymore Mine 071-325-4425; Use Challenge and Password 071-331-0801; Evaluate a Casualty 081-831-1000; Clear an Object from the Throat of a Conscious Casualty 081-831-1003; Perform Mouth-to Mouth Resuscitation 081-831-1042; Put on a Field or Pressure Dressing 081-831-1016; Put on a Tourniquet 081-831-1017; Apply a Dressing to an Open Abdominal Wound 081-831-1025; Apply a Dressing to an Open Chest Wound 081-831-1026; Apply a Dressing to an Open Head Wound 081-831-1033; Prevent Shock 081-831-1005; Splint a Suspected Fracture 081-831-1034; Transport a Casualty using a One-Man Carry 081-831-1041; Transport a Casualty using a Two-Man Carry or an Improvised Litter 081-831-1041.

**Skill Level 2:** Use an Automated Signal Operation Instruction (SOI) 113-573-8006; Report Casualties 121-030-3534; Orient a Map using a Lensatic Compass 071-329-1011; Locate an Unknown Point on the Ground by Intersection 071-329-1014; Locate an Unknown Point of a Map and on the Ground By Resection 071-329-1015; Locate a Target by Grid Coordinates 061-283-1002; Adjust Indirect Fire 061-283-6003; Supervise Construction of a Fighting Position 071-326-5704; Request Medical Evacuation 081-831-0101; Handle Enemy Personnel and Equipment 191-337-5250.

**Skill Level 3:** Establish an Observation Post 071-326-5705; Inspect Personnel/Equipment 071-328-5301; Analyze Terrain 071-331-0820; Direct Construction of Non-Explosive Anti-Vehicular Obstacles 051-195-3005; Conduct a Defense by a Squad 071-430-0002; Consolidate a Squad following Enemy Contact while in the Defense 071-430-0003; Reorganize a Squad following Enemy Contact while in the Defense 071-430-0004; Protect Classified Information and Material 301348-6001.

**Skill Level 4:** Prepare a Platoon Sector Sketch 071-326-5770; Conduct Movement Techniques by Platoon 071-326-5630; Coordinate with Adjacent Platoon 071-326-5775; Conduct a Defense by Platoon 071-430-0006; Consolidate a Platoon following Enemy Contact while in the Defense 071-430-0007; Reorganize a Platoon following Enemy Contact while in the Defense 071-430-0008; Conduct Operations Security (OPSEC) Procedures 113-573-0002; Supervise Handling of Enemy Personnel and Equipment at Unit Level 191-379-4450; Process Captured Material 301-337-6001.

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## BATTLE DRILL No. 4

**Task: React to Chemical Agent Attack.**

**Conditions (Cue):** PLT/SQD has occupied a defensive position and receives incoming artillery, rockets or air attack. Chemical alarm sounds and/or chemical detection paper reads positive. Soldiers show indications of chemical agent poisoning.

**Standards:**

1. PLT/SQD reacts to attack within 15 seconds.
2. PLT/SQD goes to MOPP 4 within 8 minutes.
3. PLT/SQD begins survey and ADC of immediate area immediately upon completion of attack and reports 100-percent accurate results to CP.
4. PLT/SQD retains sufficient fighting force to continue its mission.



## Performance Measures:

### STEP No.

1. Don protective mask within 9 seconds, hood within 15 seconds	Who ALL
2. Sound alarm (hand-and-arm signal to SMs in immediate area, three successive beeps on a vehicle horn or metal on metal to SMs in general area)	ALL
3. Seek shelter in fighting positions or closed vehicles	ALL
4. Don NBC overgarments, boots and gloves within 8 minutes	ALL
5. Report to CP (NBC 1 (initial))	RTO
6. Perform basic soldier skills decontamination as necessary	ALL
7. Initiate M256 kit survey immediate PLT/SQD area for casualties/contaminated equipment	PL/PSG/SL
8. Report status to CP (ACE report)	RTO
9. Treat casualties	ALL
10. Report to CP (NBC 1 (follow-up))	RTO
11. Evacuate casualties as directed by CP	PL/PSG/SL
12. Move to perimeter and prepare for ground attack	ALL

### Abbreviations:

<b>RTO</b> = Radio/Telephone Operator	<b>SL</b> = Squad Leader	<b>PL</b> = Platoon Leader
<b>PSG</b> = Platoon Sergeant	<b>PLT/SQD</b> = Platoon/Squad	<b>CP</b> = Company Command Post
<b>SM</b> = Service Member	<b>SL</b> = Squad Leader	

### Supported Company-Level METL Task: Defend

#### Supporting Soldier Tasks:

**Skill Level 1:** Send a Radio Message 113-571-1016; Decontaminate your Skin and Personal Equipment 031-503-1007; Put On and Wear MOPP Gear 031-503-1015; Recognize and React to Chemical or Biological Hazard 031-503-1019; Use M8 Detector Paper to Identify Chemical Agent 031-503-1014; Use M9 Detector Paper to Detect Chemical Agent 031-503-1020, 031-503-1023; Exchange MOPP Gear 031-503-1023; Replace Canister on your M40-series Protective Mask 031-503-1024; Put On, Wear, Remove, and Store your M40 Protective Mask with Hood 031-503-1025; Evaluate a Casualty 081-831-1000; Administer Nerve Agent Antidote to Self (Self-Aid) 081-831-1030; Administer First Aid to a Nerve Agent Casualty (Buddy-Aid) 081-831-1031; Clear an Object from the Throat of a Conscious Casualty 081-831-1003; Perform Mouth-to-Mouth Resuscitation 081-831-1042; Put On a Field or Pressure Dressing 081-831-1016; Put on a Tourniquet 081-831-1017; Apply a Dressing to an Open Abdominal Wound 081-831-1025; Apply a Dressing to an Open Chest Wound 081-831-1026; Apply a Dressing to an Open Head Wound 081-831-1033; Prevent Shock 081-831-1005; Splint a Suspected Fracture 081-831-1034. Transport a Casualty using a One-Man Carry 081-831-1041; Transport a Casualty using a Two-Man Carry or an Improvised Litter 081-831-1041.

**Skill Level 2:** Use an Automated Signal Operation Instruction (SOI) 113-573-8006; Report Casualties 121-030-3534; Use M256 or M256A1 Chemical Agent Detector Kit 031-503-2001; Prepare and Submit NBC 4 Reports 031-503-2004; Supervise the Fitting of Protective Masks 031-503-2012.



**Skill Level 3:** Consolidate a Squad following Enemy Contact while in the Defense 071-430-0003; Reorganize a Squad following Enemy Contact while in the Defense 071-430-0004; Conduct Unmasking Procedures 031-503-3002; Supervise the Crossing of a Contaminated Area 031-503-3004; Prepare and Submit NBC 1 Reports 031-503-3005; Implement Mission-Oriented Protective Posture 031-503-3008; Lead MOPP Gear Exchange 031-503-3009; Supervise Employment of Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Markers 031-503-3010; Supervise Positioning of the Chemical Agent Alarm 031-504-3001; Supervise Hasty Decontamination 031-507-3003.

**Skill Level 4:** Reorganize a Platoon following Enemy Contact while in the Defense 071-430-0008; Supervise Unit Preparation for NBC Attack 031-503-4602.

## BATTLE DRILL No. 5

**Task:** *React to Air Attack.*

**Conditions (Cue):** PLT/SQD has occupied a defensive position, is performing its direct support mission, and is attacked by aircraft CP signals imminent Air/Ground Attack with a long blast on vehicle horn.

**Standards:**

1. PLT/SQD members successfully identify threat aircraft.
2. PLT/SQD destroys or wards off all attacking aircraft.
3. PLT/SQD reorganizes defense, treats and evacuates all casualties within 1 hour of injury.
4. PLT/SQD retains sufficient fighting force to continue its mission.

**Performance Measures:**

**STEP No.**

	<b>Who</b>
1. Echo company signal for air attack (long blast on vehicle horn)	RTO
2. Move to perimeter fighting positions	ALL
3. Search assigned sector for A/C	ALL
4. Identify enemy A/C visually	ALL
5. Report enemy A/C activity (SALUTE)	RTO
6. Hold fire until attacked or directed to fire by CP	ALL
(Engage with all available weapons)	
7. Watch for indicators of a chemical agent attack	ALL
(if chemical agent attack, then see battle drill no. 4)	
8. Perform damage assessment after attack	SL/PSG/PL
9. Treat casualties	ALL
10. Evacuate casualties	ALL
11. Send status report to CP (ACE format)	RTO
12. Reorganize defense/prepare for ground attack	SL/PSG/PL





**Abbreviations:**

**RTO** = Radio/Telephone Operator  
**PLT/SQD** = Platoon/Squad  
**A/C** = Aircraft

**SL** = Squad Leader  
**CP** = Company Command Post  
**PL** = Platoon Leader

**PSG** = Platoon Sergeant

**Supported Company-Level METL Task:** Defend (Employ Passive and Active Air Defense Measures).

**Supporting Soldier Tasks:**

**Skill Level 1:** Report Enemy Information 071-331-0803; Perform Search and Scan Procedures 441-091-1101; Send a Radio Message 113-571-1016; Engage Targets with a M16A2 Rifle 071-311-2007; Engage Hostile Aircraft with Small Arms 441-091-1102; Engage Targets with an M60 Machine Gun 071-312-3031; Evaluate a Casualty 081-831-1000; Clear an Object from the Throat of a Conscious Casualty 081-831-1003; Perform Mouth-to-Mouth Resuscitation 081-831-1042; Put On a Field or Pressure Dressing 081-831-1016; Put On a Tourniquet 081-831-1017; Apply a Dressing to an Open Abdominal Wound 081-831-1025; Apply a Dressing to an Open Chest Wound 081-831-1026; Apply a Dressing to an Open Head Wound 081-831-1033; Prevent Shock 081-831-1005; Splint a Suspected Fracture 081-831-1034; Transport a Casualty Using a One-Man Carry 081-831-1041; Transport a Casualty Using a Two-Man Carry or an Improvised Litter 081-831-1041.

**Skill Level 2:** Use an Automated Signal Operation Instruction (SOI) 113-573-8006; Report Casualties 121-030-3534; Visually Identify Threat Aircraft 441-091-1040; Request Medical Evacuation 081-831-0101.

**Skill Level 3:** Reorganize a Squad following Enemy Contact while in the Defense 071-430-0004; Direct Unit Air Defense 441-091-3001.

**Skill Level 4:** Reorganize a Platoon following Enemy Contact while in the Defense 071-430-0008; Conduct Operations Security (OPSEC) Procedures 113-573-0002.

## CONVOY BATTLE DRILL No. 1

**Task:** *React to Sniper While Moving.*

**Conditions (Cue):** PLT/SQD is moving as part of a company march serial in convoy and receives intermittent small arms fire.

**Standards:**

1. Threat attacks are repelled, and the march is resumed.
2. PLT/SQD sustains no casualties following the initial attack.
3. Casualties are treated and evacuated within 1 hour.

**Performance Measures:**

**STEP No.**

1. Report enemy activity to march serial commander (SALUTE format)
2. Return fire to kill/suppress sniper
3. Increase rate of march to increase vehicle interval
4. Treat casualties reorganize march unit
5. Report status to march serial commander (ACE format)
6. Request ground/air MEDEVAC for casualties

**Who**

RTO/DRV

PIKZ

ALL

SL/PL/PSG

RTO/DVR

RTO/DVR





**Abbreviations:**

**RTO** = Radio/Telephone Operator   **PSG** = Platoon Sergeant   **DRV** = Driver   **SL** = Squad Leader  
**PIKZ** = Personnel in Kill Zone   **PL** = Platoon Leader

**Supported Company-Level METL Task:** Move (Defend Convoy).

**Supporting Soldier Tasks:**

**Skill Level 1:** Report Enemy Information 071-331-0803; Perform Search and Scan Procedures 441-091-1101; Send a Radio Message 113-571-1016; Engage Targets with an M16A2 Rifle 071-311-2007; Engage Targets with a M136 Launcher 071-054-0004; Engage Targets with an M203 Grenade Launcher 071-311-2130; Engage Targets with an M60 Machine Gun 071-312-3031; Evaluate a Casualty 081-831-1000; Clear an Object from the Throat of a Conscious Casualty 081-831-1003; Perform Mouth-to-Mouth Resuscitation 081-831-1042; Put On a Field or Pressure Dressing 081-831-1016; Put On a Tourniquet 081-831-1017; Apply a Dressing to an Open Abdominal Wound 081-831-1025; Apply a Dressing to an Open Chest Wound 081-831-1026; Apply a Dressing to an Open Head Wound 081-831-1033; Prevent Shock 081-831-1005; Splint a Suspected Fracture 081-831-1034; Transport a Casualty Using a One-Man Carry 081-831-1041; Transport a Casualty Using a Two-Man Carry or an Improvised Litter 081-831-1041.

**Skill Level 2:** Use an Automated Signal Operation Instruction (SOI) 113-573-8006; Report Casualties 121-030-3534; Orient a Map Using a Lensatic Compass 071-329-1011; Locate an Unknown Point on the Ground by Intersection 071-329-1014; Locate an Unknown Point of a Map and on the Ground by Resection 071-329-1015; Locate a Target by Grid Coordinates 061-283-1002; Request Medical Evacuation 081-831-0101; Handle Enemy Personnel and Equipment 191-337-5250.

**Skill Level 3:** Analyze Terrain 071-331-0820; Direct Convoy Defense Operations 551-721-3352; Protect Classified Information and Material 301-348-6001.

**Skill Level 4:** Prepare a Strip Map 551-721-3359; Conduct a Tactical Road March 071-326-3013; Conduct Movement Techniques by Platoon 071-326-5630; Conduct a Route Reconnaissance Mission 071-326-5805; Conduct Operations Security (OPSEC) Procedures 113-573-0002; Supervise Handling of Enemy Personnel and Equipment at Unit Level 191-379-4450; Process Captured Material 301-337-6001; Perform Duties as Convoy Commander 551-721-4326.

## **CONVOY BATTLE DRILL No. 2**

**Task:** *React to Ground Ambush (Road Not Blocked).*

**Conditions (Cue):** PLT/SQD is moving as part of a company march serial in convoy and receives intensive fires as part of a threat ambush.

**Standards:**

1. Vehicles in the kill zone immediately move out of the kill zone or move to a covered position in the kill zone.
2. Personnel on disabled vehicles in the kill zone dismount immediately assume concealed positions and provide a base of fire.
3. SQD/PLT successfully disengages the element in the kill zone or reduces the ambush.
4. Casualties are treated and evacuated within one hour.
5. Threat attacks are repelled, and the march is resumed.



## Performance Measures:

### STEP No.

### Who

1. Report enemy activity to march serial commander (SALUTE format)	RTO/DVR
2. Return fire to kill/suppress enemy ambush (nonvehicle drivers)	PIKZ
3. Stop vehicles not in kill zone of ambush	ALL
4. Increase rate of march for vehicles in kill zone of ambush	PIKZ
5. Keep roadway clear by pushing damage/destroyed vehicles aside	PIKZ
6. Organize security element of SMs not in kill zone	SL/PL/PSG
7. Direct fire and maneuver of security element to reduce ambush and allow remaining vehicles to pass	SL/PL/PSG
8. Treat casualties; reorganize march unit	SL/PL/PSG
9. Report status to march serial commander (ACE format)	RTO/DVR
10. Request ground/air MEDEVAC for casualties	RTO/DVR
11. Reorganize march serial and continue to move on route	SL/PL/PSG

### Abbreviations:

**RTO** = Radio/Telephone Operator

**SL** = Squad Leader

**PSG** = Platoon Sergeant

**PIKZ** = Personnel in Kill Zone

**DVR** = Driver

**SM** = Service Member

**PL** = Platoon Leader

**Supported Company-Level METL Task:** Move (Defend Convoy).

### Supporting Soldier Tasks:

**Skill Level 1:** Report Enemy Information 071-331-0803; Perform Search and Scan Procedures 441-091-1101; Send a Radio Message 113-571-1016; Engage Targets with an M16A2 Rifle 071-311-2007; Engage Targets with an M136 Launcher 071-054-0004; Engage Targets with an M203 Grenade Launcher 071-311-2130; Engage Targets with an M60 Machine Gun 071-312-3031; Evaluate a Casualty 081-831-1000; Clear an Object from the Throat of a Conscious Casualty 081-831-1003; Perform Mouth-to-Mouth Resuscitation 081-831-1042; Put On a Field or Pressure Dressing 081-831-1016; Put On a Tourniquet 081-831-1017; Apply a Dressing to an Open Abdominal Wound 081-831-1025; Apply a Dressing to an Open Chest Wound 081-831-1026; Apply a Dressing to an Open Head Wound 081-831-1033; Prevent Shock 081-831-1005; Splint a Suspected Fracture 081-831-1034; Transport a Casualty Using a One-Man Carry 081-831-1041; Transport a Casualty Using a Two-Man Carry or an Improvised Litter 081-831-1041.

**Skill Level 2:** Use an Automated Signal Operation Instruction (SOI) 113-573-8006; Report Casualties 121-030-3534; Orient a Map Using a Lensatic Compass 071-329-1011; Locate an Unknown Point on the Ground by Intersection 071-329-1014; Locate an Unknown Point of a Map and on the Ground by Resection 071-329-1015; Locate a Target by Grid Coordinates 061-283-1002; Request Medical Evacuation 081-831-0101; Handle Enemy Personnel and Equipment 191-337-5250.



**Skill Level 3:** Analyze Terrain 071-331-0820; Direct Convoy Defense Operations 551-721-3352; Protect Classified Information and Material 301-348-6001.

**Skill Level 4:** Prepare a Strip Map 551-721-3359; Conduct a Tactical Road March 071-326-3013; Conduct Movement Techniques by Platoon 071-326-5630; Conduct a Route Reconnaissance Mission 071-326-5805; Conduct Operations Security (OPSEC) Procedures 113-573-0002; Supervise Handling of Enemy Personnel and Equipment at Unit Level 191-379-4450; Process Captured Material 301-337-6001; Perform Duties as Convoy Commander 551-721-4326.

### CONVOY BATTLE DRILL No. 3

**Task:** *React to Ground Ambush (Road Blocked).*

**Conditions(Cue):** PLT/SQD is moving as part of a company march serial in convoy and receives intensive fires as part of a threat ambush. Enemy has employed a road block to halt convoy movement in kill zone.

**Standards:**

1. Vehicles in the kill zone immediately move to a covered position in the kill zone.
2. Personnel on disabled vehicles in the kill zone dismount, immediately assume concealed positions and provide a base of fire.
3. SQD/PLT successfully disengages the element in the kill zone or reduces the ambush.
4. Casualties are treated and evacuated within one hour.
5. Threat attacks are repelled, and the march is resumed.

**Performance Measures:**

**STEP No.**

**Who**

1. Report enemy activity to march serial commander (SALUTE format)
2. Report road blockage and approximate location of enemy to march serial commander
3. Dismount vehicles on opposite side of road from ambush
4. Immediately return fire to kill/suppress enemy ambush
5. Take up firing positions while awaiting order
6. Organize security element of SMs not in kill zone
7. Direct fire and maneuver of security element to reduce ambush and remove roadblock
8. Treat casualties; reorganize march unit
9. Report status to march serial commander (ACE format)
10. Request ground/air MEDEVAC for casualties
11. Reorganize march serial and continue to move on route

RTO/DVR  
RTO/DVR  
ALL  
PIKZ  
PNIKZ  
SL/PL/PSG  
SL/PL/PSG  
SL/PL/PSG  
RTO/DVR  
RTO/DVR  
SL/PL/PSG

**Abbreviations:**

<b>RTO</b> = Radio/Telephone Operator	<b>SL</b> = Squad Leader	<b>PL</b> = Platoon Leader	<b>PSG</b> = Platoon Sergeant
<b>PIKZ</b> = Personnel in Kill Zone	<b>DVR</b> = Driver	<b>SM</b> = Soldiers	<b>PNIKZ</b> = Personnel Not in Kill Zone





- |   |           |
|---|-----------|
| 5. Take up firing positions                               | ALL       |
| 6. Prepare MGs for firing                                 | MG CREWS  |
| 7. Fire only on attacking A/C or on command               | ALL       |
| 8. Treat casualties; reorganize march unit                | SL/PL/PSG |
| 9. Report status to march serial commander (ACE format)   | RTO/DVR   |
| 10. Request ground/air MEDEVAC for casualties             | RTO/DVR   |
| 11. Reorganize march serial and continue to move on route | SL/PL/PSG |

**Abbreviations:**

<b>RTO</b> = Radio/Telephone Operator	<b>PSG</b> = Platoon Sergeant	<b>A/C</b> = Aircraft	<b>DVR</b> = Driver
<b>SL</b> = Squad Leader	<b>PL</b> = Platoon Leader	<b>MG</b> = Machine Gun	

**Supported Company-Level METL Task:** Move (Defend Convoy).

**Supporting Soldier Tasks:**

**Skill Level 1:** Report Enemy Information 071-331-0803; Perform Search and Scan Procedures 441-091-1101; Send a Radio Message 113-571-1016; Engage Targets with an M16A2 Rifle 071-311-2007; Engage Hostile Aircraft with Small Arms 441-091-1102; Engage Targets with an M60 Machine Gun 071-312-3031; Evaluate a Casualty 081-831-1000; Clear an Object from the Throat of a Conscious Casualty 081-831-1003; Perform Mouth-to-Mouth Resuscitation 081-831-1042; Put On a Field or Pressure Dressing 081-831-1016; Put On a Tourniquet 081-831-1017; Apply a Dressing to an Open Abdominal Wound 081-831-1025; Apply a Dressing to an Open Chest Wound 081-831-1026; Apply a Dressing to an Open Head Wound 081-831-1033; Prevent Shock 081-831-1005; Splint a Suspected Fracture 081-831-1034; Transport a Casualty Using a One-Man Carry 081-831-1041; Transport a Casualty Using a Two-Man Carry or an Improvised Litter 081-831-1041.

**Skill Level 2:** Use an Automated Signal Operation Instruction (SOI) 113-573-8006; Report Casualties 121-030-3534; Orient a Map Using a Lensatic Compass 071-329-1011; Locate an Unknown Point on the Ground by Intersection 071-329-1014; Locate an Unknown Point of a Map and on the Ground by Resection 071-329-1015; Locate a Target by Grid Coordinates 061-283-1002; Request Medical Evacuation 081-831-0101; Handle Enemy Personnel and Equipment 191-337-5250; Visually Identify Threat Aircraft 441-091-1040.

**Skill Level 3:** Analyze Terrain 071-331-0820; Direct Unit Air Defense 441-091-3001; Direct Convoy Defense Operations 551-721-3352; Protect Classified Information and Material 301-348-6001.

**Skill Level 4:** Prepare a Strip Map 551-721-3359; Conduct a Tactical Road March 071-326-3013; Conduct Movement Techniques by Platoon 071-326-5630; Conduct a Route Reconnaissance Mission 071-326-5805; Conduct Operations Security (OPSEC) Procedures 113-573-0002; Supervise Handling of Enemy Personnel and Equipment at Unit Level 191-379-4450; Perform Duties as Convoy Commander 551-721-4326.

## CONVOY BATTLE DRILL No. 5

**Task:** *React to Artillery Attack while Moving.*

**Conditions (Cue):** PLT/SQD is moving as part of a company march serial in convoy and receives indirect fire.

**Standards:**

1. PLT/SQD sustains no casualties following the initial attack.
2. PLT/SQD reorganizes march serial, treats and evacuates all casualties within one hour of injury.



## Performance Measures:

<i>STEP No.</i>	<i>Who</i>
1. Attempt to drive clear of the impact area	VIIA
2. If vehicle is disabled, attempt to clear roadway	VIIA
3. If vehicle is disabled, dismount and move by the fastest route out of the impact area (between round impacts)	VIIA
4. Link up with vehicles outside of impact area	VIIA
5. Halt short of impact area and disperse vehicles	VNIIA
6. Report to march serial commander and request an alternate route around impact area	RTO/DVR
7. Move on alternate route and link up with trail end of march serial where break in contact occurred	VNIIA
8. Treat casualties, reorganize march unit	SL/PL/PSG
9. Report status to march serial commander (ACE format)	RTO/DVR
10. Request ground/air MEDEVAC for casualties	RTO/DVR
11. Reorganize march serial and continue to move on route	SL/PL/PSG

## Abbreviations:

**RTO** = Radio/Telephone Operator    **SL** = Squad Leader    **DVR** = Driver    **PSG** = Platoon Sergeant  
**VNIIA** = Vehicles Not in Impact Area    **PL** = Platoon Leader    **VIIA** = Vehicles in Impact Area

## Supported Company-Level METL Task: Move (Defend Convoy).

### Supporting Soldier Tasks:

**Skill Level 1:** Report Enemy Information 071-331-0803; Send a Radio Message 113-571-1016; Evaluate a Casualty 081-831-1000; Clear an Object from the Throat of a Conscious Casualty 081-831-1003; Perform Mouth-to-Mouth Resuscitation 081-831-1042; Put On a Field or Pressure Dressing 081-831-1016; Put On a Tourniquet 081-831-1017; Apply a Dressing to an Open Abdominal Wound 081-831-1025; Apply a Dressing to an Open Chest Wound 081-831-1026; Apply a Dressing to an Open Head Wound 081-831-1033; Prevent Shock 081-831-1005; Splint a Suspected Fracture 081-831-1034; Transport a Casualty Using a One-Man Carry 081-831-1041; Transport a Casualty Using a Two-Man Carry or an Improvised Litter 081-831-1041.

**Skill Level 2:** Use an Automated Signal Operation Instruction (SOI) 113-573-8006; Report Casualties 121-030-3534; Orient a Map Using a Lensatic Compass 071-329-1011; Locate an Unknown Point on the Ground by Intersection 071-329-1014; Locate an Unknown Point of a Map and on the Ground by Resection 071-329-1015; Locate a Target by Grid Coordinates 061-283-1002; Request Medical Evacuation 081-831-0101.

**Skill Level 3:** Analyze Terrain 071-331-0820; Direct Convoy Defense Operations 551-721-3352; Protect Classified Information and Material 301-348-6001.

**Skill Level 4:** Prepare a Strip Map 551-721-3359; Conduct a Tactical Road March 071-326-3013; Conduct Movement Techniques by Platoon 071-326-5630; Conduct a Route Reconnaissance Mission 071-326-5805; Conduct Operations Security (OPSEC) Procedures 113-573-0002; Perform Duties as Convoy Commander 551-721-4326.★



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## **CHAPTER III**

### **ARM, FUEL, FIX, SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT**

#### **UNIT MAINTENANCE COLLECTION POINT (UMCP) TTPs**

**by CPT Edward L. Campbell, CMTC**

**B**attalion Maintenance Officers (BMOs) encounter recurring problems while planning for support of High Intensity Conflict (HIC) and stability actions and support actions during their Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) rotation. The maintenance leaders of most task forces experience these same difficulties. This article discusses those problems and offers some techniques and procedures to overcome them.

First, let's review the task force's key maintenance tasks, as extracted from **ARTEP 71-2, *Mission Training Plan for the Tank and Mechanized Battalion***. The task force maintenance leadership should consider each of these tasks in relation to their SOP and the techniques discussed in this article.

#### **Key Maintenance Tasks for the Task Force (Plan, Prepare, and Execute)**

##### **PLANNING TASKS:**

- Issue TF warning order.
- Analyze TF mission.
- Determine maintenance requirements and priorities.
- S4 updates Commander on combat status of unit.
- Assess status of maintenance assets.
- Provide maintenance support.
- BMO coordinates with FSB Commander and staff for maintenance support.
- Develop maintenance support portion of TF Service Support Annex.
- TF evaluates ability of service support plan to support tactical operations.
- Issue Service Support Annex to TF OPORD.

##### **PREPARATION TASKS:**

- Provide maintenance support to TF and its elements.
- Manage Class IX repair parts resupply.
- Perform periodic services.
- Perform UMCP activities.
- Recover, repair and return NMC equipment.
- Continuously monitor and update combat status.
- CTCP staff coordinates DS maintenance requests.
- Combat trains command post (CTCP) staff coordinates pickup of repaired/replacement vehicles.
- Field Trains CP (FTCP) coordinates maintenance requirements with FSB.





### **EXECUTION TASKS:**

- Push maintenance forward in support of combat operations.
- Conduct Battle Damage Assessment and Repair (BDAR) as far forward as possible.
- Recover damaged equipment to next higher maintenance echelon.
- Combat trains and UMCP stay abreast of fighting forces needs.
- Perform controlled exchange.
- Maintain and report combat status.
- TF provides emergency maintenance support, recovery/repair.
- Process incoming equipment suspected of NBC contamination.
- Maintenance platoon consolidates and reorganizes.
- Prepare to continue battle or change mission.

### **THE PROBLEMS UNITS FACE:**

#### **1. Nonexistent or incomplete Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs).**

##### **Techniques or procedures:**

- Develop and read (and follow) your SOP.
- Update the SOP as necessary.
- Put the information out.
- Enforce the standards.
- Ensure that your entire task force (including attached elements) knows and follows it.

#### **2. Little time devoted to risk assessment and reduction.**

##### **Techniques or procedures:**

- Develop and maintain a program.
- Use it--do not just put it up for show.
- Document the procedures in your SOP.

#### **3. Safety measures not identified or taken.**

##### **Techniques or procedures:**

- Identify required safety measures, derived from your risk assessment.
- Enforce Safety Measures.
- Plan for eyewash stations, fire plan, POL contamination and spills, etc.

#### **4. Unsuccessful or disorganized vehicle recovery.**

**Techniques or procedures:** These are key planning factors for high mine threat areas such as Bosnia.

They are also critical for reducing the workload of your recovery section during HIC operations.

- Both tracked and wheeled vehicles need to be made capable of like-vehicle recovery.
- Ensure each vehicle has, or the crew has quick access to, a tow bar, cable, or chain.
- Train operators on how to *self*-recover.
- Ensure each recovery element knows how to properly recover the other equipment in your task force.

There have been too many Bradley drive trains destroyed by Armor company M88s because the Bradleys were not prepared for proper towing.





**5. No prior planning for support of high-use vehicles.**

**Techniques or procedures:**

- IFOR mission Scouts put 2,000-4,000 miles per month on their vehicles conducting patrol and escort duties. Identify support requirements for all high use vehicles such Scouts or MPs.
- Tank road wheels are critical parts if you are operating on rough terrain. Prior to deploying to the box, make sure you have identified all high use parts. Adjust your PLL and work with Direct Support to adjust your ASL (e.g., during ASL review boards).
- Ensure you have adequate quantities of Class III (P) on-hand.

**6. No integration of slice elements assets.**

**Techniques or procedures:** A task force is normally focused on its internal and attached elements and neglects planning for the support of slice elements.

- Find out how the slice elements, such as ADA, Engineers, and Chemical assets, are supported in your Task Force.
- Know what your slice is bringing in terms of assets and supplies.
- Make sure slice mechanics are integrated into the Task Force.
- Cross-talk with slice elements to share parts and assets as needed (e.g., M88s).
- Talk *before* you deploy to establish your requirements and standards.

**7. Nonexistent or incomplete Battle Damage Assessment and Repair (BDAR) kits.**

**Techniques or procedures:** BDAR is a key element in maintaining the offensive momentum by providing battlefield "quick fixes."

- Make sure you have BDAR kits and that they are "full up."
- Check for BDAR kits in your load plans.

**8. Standards for deadline reporting, PMCS, circle Xs, etc., not established and enforced.**

**Techniques or procedures:**

- Prior coordination with all your task force elements is essential for ensuring they know and comply with your standards (your SOP).
- Ensure you are tied into the CTCP for tracking combat power.

**9. Missing maps and overlays.**

**Techniques or procedures:** Keep a set of maps and overlays in *every* recovery vehicle. The CSS and the Obstacle overlays are the most critical as your recovery vehicles navigate the battlefield.

**10. Pre-combat inspections (PCIs) incomplete or not done.**

**Techniques or procedures:** PCI Checklists are essential for preparing for every mission. Include standard checklists in your SOP and *do the inspections*.

**EXAMPLE:**

- 1) When are repaired vehicles checked to verify that they have fuel, ammunition, and graphics before rolling out?
- 2) Who does that check?

**11. A "no-big-deal/business as usual" attitude.**

**Techniques or procedures:** Avoid the garrison mindset when planning and preparing for a mission. Stability and Support Operations (SASO), such as Bosnia, are not garrison environments. To succeed, plan and approach each mission as you would in high-intensity conflict (HIC).



## 12. Insufficient reporting and cross-talk.

### Techniques or procedures:

- Ensure cross-talk with the CTCP.
- Monitor the periodic reports from the companies to the TOC and CTCP (battle-tracking).
- In addition to the usual spot reports, establish and enforce a reporting schedule. This ensures your Company Maintenance Teams (CMTs) routinely report the status of the jobs they are working to the UMCP (every morning for example).
- Keep track and visibility of below the line faults (e.g., fuel transfer pumps on M1s, or vehicle heaters in the winter).

## 13. Inadequate focus on site security.

**Techniques or procedures:** Establish site security as a critical UMCP activity. Too often, the UMCP focuses strictly on repair and return of combat vehicles, and not on defense and survivability. Address the following questions:

- ☞ Are sectors of defense identified? (Units often try to jump sites while enemy reconnaissance is in sector.)
- ☞ Have responsibilities been assigned for each sector?
- ☞ Are there entry control procedures for the site?
- ☞ Does site security adjust based on the tactical situation? (Must maintain soldier situational awareness.)
- ☞ Is noise and light discipline enforced? (Units too often use uncovered white light with enemy reconnaissance in sector.)
- ☞ Are disabled vehicles integrated into the defense plan? (Ensure graphics are in recovery vehicles.)
- ☞ Who is in charge?
- ☞ Does your setup meet the Task, Conditions, and Standards identified in the MTP?

## THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME STATION

Home Station is the place to resolve the problems your unit encounters in the UMCP. Trying to fix problems after arriving "in the box" is too late.

1) Conduct the initial linkup at Home Station with your attachments and slice elements. Cover your standards (SOP), establish what personnel are coming, and find out problems ahead of time (what is broken, who is short personnel/equipment/parts).

2) Confer with your CTCP and CMTs to work out (or revise) how you function together, and how the reporting flow operates (e.g., a CPX or LOG STX).

3) Practice developing and publishing critical C<sup>2</sup> measures, such as the CSS matrix and graphics, and performing the CSS rehearsal as a team to synchronize your concept of support.

## SUMMARY

A working UMCP that repairs and returns combat equipment quickly is critical to the success of a Task Force. Good unit discipline and an effective SOP eliminate many of the war-stoppers described in this article. Without them, the UMCP will most likely fail. The SOP must be detailed. It must cover every facet of UMCP activities, including site security, and be understood by all organic, attached, and slice elements. The BMO, BMT, and BMS are the leaders that enforce the standards required to ensure the UMCP's success in supporting the Task Force.★



## Logistics Package (LOGPAC) Resupply Operations

by CPT Charles H. Allen

**S**ustaining combat operations requires an enormous, constant flow of supplies. According to one report, during Operation DESERT STORM, the 24ID alone needed 291 trucks to maintain the proper levels of fuel, water, food, ammunition and medical supplies. LOGPAC operations must support the task force mission, upload needs, and requirements for attached units. LOGPACs are pushed forward daily to keep units and soldiers combat ready for the next mission. The technique provided below, presented in the plan, prepare and execute format, is offered as a way to conduct a successful LOGPAC operation.

### I. PLAN: Company XO and Battalion S4 Conduct Mission Analysis.

Mission analysis provides information on the types and amounts of supplies needed for the next LOGPAC. LOGPAC requests may come from several sources:

- Unit SOPs.
- LOGSAT reports.
- Supply requests called in via FM.

The information is collected and disseminated to all sections in the field trains. A suggested tool to manage this information is the LOGPAC Matrix (Figure 1). Using the LOGPAC matrix helps field trains personnel organize and understand the supplies needed for the next LOGPAC. The matrix may be posted in the field trains Command Post where it can be easily updated and referenced by all section leaders in the field trains.

	CL I		CL II		CL III (B)		CL III (P)		CL IV		CL V		CL VIII		MAINT	
	AM	PM	AM	PM	AM	PM	AM	PM	AM	PM	AM	PM	AM	PM	AM	PM
CO/TM																
CO/TM																
CO/TM																
CO/TM																
SCT																
MRT																
TOC																
CBT TRN																
SLICE																
SLICE																

Figure 1. LOGPAC Matrix



## II. PREPARE:

The S4's Field Trains NCOIC initiates LOGPAC preparation and supervises the company supply sergeants. The NCOIC receives the supply requests for the next LOGPAC using the Matrix in Figure 1 during the planning phase. He now is prepared to coordinate the supply requirements with the sections in the field trains. He should be simultaneously monitoring the company supply sergeants while they build the next LOGPAC. The S4 NCOIC ensures all unit resupply requirements are met, and LOGPAC personnel are prepared for the LOGPAC briefing.

The support platoon leader, assisted by the S4 NCOIC, conducts a LOGPAC briefing prior to the LOGPAC departure (Figure 2). Use a large terrain model during the LOGPAC briefing to enhance the effectiveness of the convoy briefing. The support platoon leader and S4 NCOIC conclude the preparation phase by conducting a pre-combat inspection (PCI) of the LOGPAC vehicles. Using the LOGPAC matrix during the PCI ensures that all supplies are loaded into the correct vehicles.

### LOGPAC BRIEFING CHECKLIST

#### 1. Situation

- Terrain conditions along route, hazardous areas
- Type, disposition, composition of enemy elements that may be encountered
- Location of known or suspected enemy mine fields/obstacles
- Locations of CO/TMs, TOC, combat trains, UMCP, attached units

#### 2. Mission statement ("where" = convoy route)

#### 3. Execution

- Time line for LOGPAC
- Staging plan for vehicles (SP from field trains and return LRP site)
- Speed/distance between vehicles
- Battle drills (action on control, break in contact, air attack)
- Marking system for vehicles identification, day or night
- Actions/linkup at LRP site
- Contingency plan for return LOGPAC/no shows

#### 4. Service Support

- Vehicle breakdown procedures
- Combat life savers located in LOGPAC

#### 5. Command and Signal

- Communications plan for LOGPAC
- Key leaders' locations
- Uniform
- Risk assessment/reduction

Figure 2. LOGPAC Briefing Checklist



### III. EXECUTE:

LOGPAC execution begins as the convoy rolls out the gate headed toward the Logistical Release Point (LRP). LOGPAC operations are basically a push/pull system of resupply.

The S4 conducts the **LRP meeting** normally 30 minutes prior to the LOGPAC's arrival. There is no standard agenda for the LRP meeting. As such, the S4 may develop his agenda as he desires. Attendees for this meeting should include all key logistical personnel in the battalion. At a minimum, these should include:

- |                     |                          |
|---------------------|--------------------------|
| → S4                | → BMO                    |
| → S1                | → medical platoon leader |
| → battalion XO      | → PAC representative     |
| → battalion CSM     | → Chaplain               |
| → company XO or ISG |                          |

The S4 collects the company LOGSTAT reports and consolidates the information onto a LOGPAC matrix for the next LOGPAC. The support platoon leader, on the return trip, gives the matrix and copies of the company LOGSTAT reports to the field trains command post.

The LOGPAC arrives at the LRP without stopping. The company representative picks up the unit's LOGPAC and heads back to the front lines. This reduces the threat to air attack and/or ambush.

As the company is being resupplied, the supply sergeant confers with the XO and ISG on supplies requested on the logistics statistics (LOGSTAT) report that was previously turned in to the S4 at the LRP. The company LOGPAC returns to the LRP at the designated turnaround time. At this point, the supply sergeants wait for the support platoon leader to lead them back to the field.☛



## Unit-Level Logistics System Gunnery at the National Training Center

by MAJ Brian K. Vaught and CPT Gerhard Schröter

### *NTC Recurring Observations:*

1. Reception, Staging, Onward movement & Integration (RSO&I) ULLS Gunnery is not adequately resourced due to minimal planning and command emphasis.
2. At training day (TD) 0, the brigade has not rehearsed its CSS automation or validated its connectivity.
3. By TD 03, the entire brigade combat team has no status on any parts at the ULLS box.
4. By TD 04, many units in the brigade combat team do not show up on the C026 report.
5. By TD 10, the shop office has no repair parts status on the AHN-006.

The observations listed above are the direct result of those units not validating their CSS automation connectivity prior to departing the initial staging area. This oversight negatively impacted the operational readiness rate and combat power of the units during their entire 14-day campaign. To help units prevent these problems, the RSO&I phase of their NTC rotation requires all units to conduct a Unit-Level Logistics System Gunnery (ULLS Gunnery) to validate their CSS automation connectivity. This article describes the ULLS Gunnery technique.

The ULLS Gunnery is not unique to the Theater of Mohavia and the National Training Center. A force projection army must be prepared to use many of the same techniques at Camp Doha Army War Reserve (AWR-5), our Prepositioned Fleet (AWR-3), and other deployments around the world. Today and in the 21st Century, contingency deployments will require task-organizing an ad hoc organization that normally does not work together on a daily basis. These mission-tailored organizations must be able to operate together for extended periods with logistics information flowing through a supporting Standard Army Retail Supply System-1 (SARSS-1) and Standard Army Maintenance System-1 (SAMS-1) to manage normal maintenance and Class IX (CL IX) operations.


Our logistics automation systems are very flexible, but soldiers and their leaders must properly establish them and validate that they are connected and able to "talk" to their supporting logistics automation systems. This must often be done under austere conditions. At the NTC, we coach ULLS Gunnery as part of Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration (RSO&I), because RSO&I is the logical time to validate connectivity between systems. At NTC, the first phase of ULLS Gunnery begins on D-8, when units draw the rotational direct-support unit (DSU) authorized stockage list (ASL) with SARSS-1 computer. The last phase normally ends at D-1 after validating the brigade's automation connectivity.



## Force Projection Army

*C1 = 1-13 Training Days to be combat ready ...  
do we have the time?* Tomorrow ???  
(360 non-linear)

**History shows that tactical CSS  
units have been given little  
preparation notice  
and training time  
before their  
deployment.**



### TECHNIQUE:

**ULLS Gunnery** - is a four-phased operation as shown below (Figure 1).




FIGURE 1



The objective of the operation is to verify that combat service support (CSS) automation and parts distribution systems are "zeroed and boresighted" to produce accurate maintenance and supply information to facilitate a brigade's ability to rapidly build and sustain combat power. To validate this ability, all units within the brigade must clearly demonstrate the following capabilities:

- **Deadline equipment in ULLS.**
- **Create a maintenance disk, and transfer that data into the C026 via the shop office SAMS-1 site.**
- **Create an automated requisition in ULLS.**
- **Create an ULLS supply disk.**
- **Transfer the supply disk into the supply system via the FSB CL IX SSA SARSS-1 site.**
- **Receive parts status on ULLS supply requisitions and post them to the C026.**
- **Ensure the brigade's CL IX distribution system from the main SSA to the customer parts bin works.**
- **Customers know where to pick up their parts.**
- **ULLS clerks are able to close non-mission-capable (NMC) faults.**
- **Transmit closed NMC information into SAMS to remove the NMC system from the C026.**

This is a connectivity test of the automation systems between the organizational and direct support levels. As such, the primary responsibility for ULLS Gunnery normally rests with the Brigade S4 and the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) Support Operations Officer. Phase I of ULLS Gunnery is normally conducted on D-3 (RSO&I-3). An essential element of a successful ULLS Gunnery is coordinating the draw of prescribed load list (PLL) with shelters early in RSO&I so that units are prepared to execute ULLS Gunnery on RSO&I-3 and begin operating unit ULLS boxes in the staging area.

#### **PHASE 0, Planning and Preparation. D-8 through D-4.**

**Events:** Develop, coordinate, publish and rehearse the ULLS Gunnery execution plan.

1. The FSB support operations officer (SPO) and brigade S4 are responsible for developing the plan.
2. Identify an OIC (recommend the FSB maintenance officer) to serve as the brigade POC, with responsibility for executing the plan.
3. Rotational units deploy to NTC with Home-Station ULLS boxes. These are normally brought to accompany troops (TAT) on aircraft or via linehaul from Home Station.
4. On D-8, the rotation unit draws its authorized stockage list (ASL).
5. On D-6, the unit draws prescribed load lists (PLLs) and trucks.
6. On D-5, local contractors work with the rotational unit ULLS clerks to upload live NTC Department of Defense Activity Address Codes (DODAACs) for use during the rotation by each company-level unit within the brigade. Each ULLS box is also uploaded with all corresponding equipment for that company-level unit in the draw yard. This preparatory phase is complete when the bde is ready to execute the three primary phases of ULLS Gunnery (Figure 2).






Figure 2

### PHASE I, ULLS Operation. D-3.

**Events:** Verify that *all* ULLS boxes are able to:

- **Deadline equipment.**
- **Requisition parts from the supporting SARSS-1 site.**
- **Create a maintenance inoperative (inop) transfer disk that transfers data to SAMS-2 CO26 print via the supporting SAMS 1 site.**


1. Each ULLS clerk begins the arduous task of transferring systems in and out of his box to build the final task organization for each ULLS box (e.g., unit).

2. On D-3, all assets and equipment are set up in a manner conducive to a smooth execution and rapid completion of the ULLS Gunnery process. *We recommend consolidating the ULLS, SAMS and SARSS boxes with supporting small extension node (SEN) in one location* under the control of the ULLS Gunnery OIC. Consolidating all systems expedites the numerous disk transfers between units and enables the OIC to validate that all units have demonstrated their ability to transfer automated CSS data, understand the disk submission process and walked through the parts distribution and receiving system (see Figure 3 for tracking sheet format).





8. The ULLS clerks then create a supply disk and a maintenance disk.
  - a. The supply disk containing the requisition for the washer is submitted to the supporting SARSS-1 site for transmission into the retail supply system.
  - b. The maintenance disk containing the NMC system data is submitted to the supporting SAMS-1 site (Figure 5).



9. The SAMS-1 site then transfers the data via disk (manual) or mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) (automated – which is the preferred method), to the SAMS-2 site at the FSB support operations (SPT OPS).
10. FSB SPT OPS produces the brigade's C026 containing all of the test NMC systems. The SPT OPS maintenance officer verifies that all units (e.g., DODAACs) appear on the C026 with the test NMC system.
11. Phase I concludes upon verification that all ULLS boxes are able to:
  - **Deadline equipment.**
  - **Create a maintenance inoperable transfer disk.**
  - **Transfer the inoperable information onto the C026 print via the supporting SAMS-1 site.**
  - **Create an automated requisition.**
  - **Submit an automated requisition into the retail supply system via the supporting SARSS-1 site.**

#### **PHASE II, ULLS Connectivity. D-2.**

**Events:** Verify that all units are able to receive status on their requisitions and post that status on the C026. Each unit must receive a supply status disk from the SARSS-1 site and successfully load it back into the ULLS boxes.

1. Once the ULLS clerks receive the supply status disk from the SARSS-1 site, they load that status into their ULLS boxes and post it to their document control register (DCR). The status should be either:
  - a. BA - materiel release order (MRO) cut from the supporting SSA and ready for customer pickup, or
  - b. BM - part not available at supporting SSA and requisition forwarded to next higher source of supply.
2. The ULLS clerks then create a maintenance inoperable transfer disk for the supporting SAMS-1 site containing the NMC system and the corresponding requisition with status to provide requisition status to the C026 print.



3. The SPT OPS maintenance officer produces a C026 and verifies that all units are able to receive parts status from their supporting SARSS-1 site and post that status to the C026.

4. Phase II concludes when all units have posted the test NMC system part requisition status to the C026.

### **PHASE III, Completion and Close-out. D-1.**

**Events:** The critical elements of this phase are that the ULLS clerks know where to pick up parts and are able to close NMC systems at the unit level. This phase verifies the following CSS automation functions:

➤ **The parts distribution system from the supporting or alternate SSA to the customer bin is functional.**

➤ **Customers know where to pick up their parts and *then actually pick them up.***

➤ **ULLS clerks are able to close NMC system faults.**

➤ **The closed NMC fault information is transmitted into SAMS to remove the NMC system from the C026.**

➤ **The brigade possesses the capability to produce an accurate C026 to assist in building and sustaining combat power for the duration of the operation.**

1. Phase III commences once units pick up their parts from their customer bin at the supporting SSA.

2. The parts are then brought to the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP).

3. The mechanic installs the part on the system, brings the system back to a fully mission-capable (FMC) status, and notifies the ULLS clerk the part is installed and the vehicle is FMC.

4. The ULLS clerk ensures the part is posted as received and installed in the ULLS box and closes the NMC fault.

5. After the fault is closed, the ULLS clerk produces a maintenance inop disk containing the data for the supporting SAMS-1 site to close and remove the NMC system from the C026.

6. The SAMS-1 site receives the ULLS maintenance disk and transfers the information to the SAMS-2 site, which, in turn, closes and removes the NMC system from the C026.

7. The SPT OPS maintenance officer produces a C026 and ensures that all units closed and removed the test NMC system from the C026 print.

8. This phase concludes when all units have:

➤ **Received the deadlining part.**

➤ **Posted the part as received, installed and returned the NMC system as fully mission capable in ULLS.**

➤ **Successfully closed the system in SAMS, and the NMC system no longer appears on the C026.**



**CONCLUSION:** The foundation of a viable brigade supply and maintenance management system that builds and sustains combat power is the seamless connectivity of its CSS automation infrastructure (ULLS, SAMS and SARSS) and synchronization with the brigade signal plan. This four-phased TTP was developed at the NTC to assist brigades in applying a simple, organized approach to accomplish the complex task of boresighting and zeroing their CSS automation systems to support the maneuver commander's plan.📍



## WELCOME, MAINTENANCE OFFICERS, TO THE CMTC!

### Some Guidelines for the Battalion/Squadron Maintenance Office

by CPT Edward Campbell

**M**any battalion/squadron maintenance officers want to know: *What will the observer/controller (O/C) team look at when my unit trains at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC)?*

This article answers that question. This article also provides some clarification to the CMTC maintenance-specific Rules of Engagement (ROE). When in doubt, abide by the guidance in the ROE.

CMTC training focuses on the development of *maneuver* skills at the task-force level. Because of this focus, *maintenance* usually spends most of the training time focusing on real-world deadlines/repairs, rather than on the training scenario. **DO NOT LOSE TRACK OF THE PURPOSE FOR TRAINING!** Use the CMTC rotation to practice and develop your fieldcraft as it applies to maintenance. You must be thoroughly involved in planning, preparing and executing your commander's intent as it applies to maintenance (and Class IX), and be able to execute that intent in both stability actions and support actions and High Intensity Conflict (HIC).

Your observer/controller's main goal is to assist the section in improving its ability to do the tactical mission. They do not conduct technical inspections, but they will point out problem areas that may arise. Feel free to ask questions at any time, particularly after each mission after-action review (AAR).

#### First, some clarifications on Rules of Engagement (ROE).

1. To play, a weapon system *must* cross the LD with the unit at the beginning of each battle. The unit can drag combat equipment out for later repair, as long as it has been fitted with MILES and entered into the computer.
2. For repair of simulated battle damage assessment (SBDA) vehicles, you must have the parts, mechanics, tools, and end item on hand prior to starting the CMTC MAC Chart (Maintenance Allocation Chart) repair time.

◆ **Since this is simulated, if a part is not on hand, you can present a DA Form 2765-1 with the supporting Supply Support Activity (SSA)'s stamp, to simulate the part.**

◆ **If the job is direct support, you must prepare and present a DA Form 5504.**

3. Wear MILES and use vehicle MILES at all times. If it is broken, tell the O/C and take it to the MILES repair team. The team works in the box daily.
4. MILES II should be prioritized on your M88s. Designate one of these vehicles as your "flag bearer;" he'll be the vehicle the CMTC Instrumentation System tracks when the UMCP moves or jumps.
5. The OPFOR vehicles and aircraft you may see are listed below. Make sure your soldiers know these, because fratricide is simulated at CMTC as well.
  - ◆ **BRDM simulated by a hardtop HMMVW with a modified hood.**
  - ◆ **BMP simulated by an M113A1 (no external fuel tanks).**
  - ◆ **T80 simulated by an M60 tank.**
  - ◆ **HIND simulated by a UH-1 (HUEY) with a blue bottom.**



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6. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) attacks can be expected against rear-echelon elements.
    - ◆ **Be prepared to fight on the dirty battlefield.**
    - ◆ **Soldiers who do not respond appropriately will be assessed as an NBC casualty.**
    - ◆ **Non-persistent strikes can contaminate an area for up to 2 hours.**
    - ◆ **Persistent agent *will remain effective* until decontamination measures are taken, so if you were in MOPP4 in a persistent contaminated area, you would eventually become a casualty as your MOPP gear degraded.**
  7. M1s must have a brake vehicle when being recovered. (IAW USAREUR Supp 1 to AR 750-1).
  8. Safety is the number one concern here.
  9. If a vehicle has simulated damage, the appropriate recovery assets must be used to bring it in. No tow bars or chains will be physically connected; the SBDA vehicle will follow behind the recovery vehicle.
  10. Violations of the ROE (not wearing MILES, for example) and safety violations will be referred to the soldier's chain of command.

**This is the data that will be used to develop the CSS AAR.**

1. Initial Vehicle Density (by company/troop, type, and bumper number). Focus on M1s, M2/M3s, M106s, M88s, M113s, M998s, M1026/1026s, Engineer assets, ADA assets, Medical assets, and NBC assets. These are all the vehicles that are starting the box rotation. Slice coordination and tracking is critical here, especially with the engineers.
2. Daily DA Form 2406 (turned into O/C each night). The report needs to identify what has been "circle X'd," and what pieces of equipment are still at Home Station (not in the box).
3. Daily tracking of the number of daily 02, 05, and 12 priority requisitions by company/troop.
4. Daily tracking of the number of DA Form 2404s (5988-Es) received from each company and troop.
5. Listing of recovery assets participating in the rotation, by type and bumper number (M88s, 5-ton wreckers, HEMMT wreckers, M113s), and their corresponding MILES II PID number if fitted with MILES II.
6. Description of the organizational structure of assigned maintenance personnel and assets. Include DS teams. This is what you actually have on the ground...not doctrinally.

**Consider the following critical points when preparing for Stability and Support Operations.**

1. **Risk Assessment and Reduction.** Have a program and use it. Don't just put it up for show.
2. **Enforcement of Safety Measures.** These come out of your risk assessment. Items to plan for include eyewash stations, fire plan, POL contamination, and spills.
3. **Self-Recovery.** Tracks and wheels all need the ability to self recover. Ensure each vehicle has a tow bar, cable, or chain.
4. **Recovery Training.** Ensure each recovery element knows how to recover the other equipment in the task force. You don't need an Armor company M88 destroying a Bradley's drive train because it wasn't prepared for towing properly.
5. Identify support requirements for high-use vehicles such Scouts or MPs. Scouts have been known to put in 2,000-4,000 miles per month downrange.



6. Establish your standards for deadline reporting, PMCSS, "circle X'd," etc. The bottom line on this is prior coordination with all your task force elements.

7. The four (4)-vehicle rule is enforced here in all situations, as it is downrange.

8. Pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs) are essential for everything, particularly convoys.

9. ***Bosnia is not a garrison environment.*** Avoid that mindset. If you plan and approach each mission as you would in high intensity conflict (HIC), you will succeed.

**The O/Cs will look at the following Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) tasks.**

**Maintenance Platoon:** Mission Training Plans (MTP).

1. **Task No. 1731300 - PLAN and conduct a convoy.** *Task Standards:* The platoon moves on the designated route and arrives at its new location by the time specified in the OPORD or FRAGO without losing a vehicle due to control.

**Task Elements:**

- a. Platoon leader conducts map reconnaissance (01-1250.00-002) (Includes nine subtasks.)
- b. Quartering party conducts route reconnaissance. (Includes two subtasks.) **NOTE:** Quartering party will consist of the BMT or BMS, and one soldier per section as a minimum.
- c. Platoon leader coordinates for required support. (Includes five subtasks.)
- d. Unit prepares vehicles for convoy. (Includes five subtasks.)
- e. Platoon leader organizes convoy (03-7151.00-0002). (Includes two subtasks.)
- f. Platoon leader briefs unit (121-030-3516). (Includes 14 subtasks.)
- g. Convoy crosses SP. (Includes two subtasks.)
- h. The convoy commander reports convoy location. (Includes two subtasks.)
- i. Convoy conducts scheduled halts. (Includes 10 subtasks.)
- j. Convoy moves under blackout conditions. (Includes six subtasks.)
- k. Convoy makes unscheduled halt. (Includes six subtasks.)
- l. Trail party recovers disabled vehicle. (Includes three subtasks.)
- m. Convoy moves through urban areas. (Includes five subtasks.)
- n. Convoy arrives at release point (RP). (Includes two subtasks.)

2. **Task No. 1731014 - REMOVE casualty from vehicle.** *Task Standards:* The platoon must remove the injured soldier from the vehicle without causing further injury or unnecessary discomfort and perform first aid prior to resuming operations.

**Task Elements:**

- a. Unit members locate and identify casualties. (Includes two subtasks.)
- b. Platoon extracts casualties from damaged vehicle. (Includes five subtasks.)
- c. Platoon members administer the correct lifesaving measures. (Includes 14 subtasks.)
- d. Platoon leader determines method of evacuation based on mission and extent of injuries. (Includes six subtasks.)





3. **Task No. 1741260 - PLAN and allocate maintenance support requirements.** *Task Standards:* Unit personnel and equipment are prepared to support the task force within the time stated in the OPORD.

**Task Elements:**

- a. Battalion maintenance officer (BMO) analyzes the unit's mission and current tactical situation. (Includes seven subtasks.)
- b. Platoon leader accurately evaluates the capabilities of platoon elements. (Includes three subtasks.)
- c. BMO arranges for maintenance support team (MST). (Includes four subtasks.)
- d. BMO coordinates with support maintenance. (Includes two subtasks.)
- e. BMO or BMT coordinates with the BMO or BMT of the cross-attached units. (Includes four subtasks.)

4. **Task No. 1731266 - SELECT and establish UMCP or field maintenance sites.** *Task Standards:* The platoon moves to the new location and reports occupation on or before time given in the OPORD.

**Task Elements:**

- a. Platoon leader performs map reconnaissance (01-1250.00-0002). (Includes three subtasks.)
- b. Platoon leader performs ground reconnaissance. (Includes three subtasks.)
- c. Platoon leader makes site selection. (Includes five subtasks.)
- d. Platoon leader develops the layout plan. (Includes four subtasks.)
- e. Platoon leader develops a traffic plan. (Includes two subtasks.)
- f. Platoon leader develops a defense plan. (Includes seven subtasks.)
- g. Platoon leader organizes maintenance site. (Includes six subtasks.)
- h. Platoon leader establishes maintenance control system (01-4965.21-0001). (Includes five subtasks.)
- i. Team chief provides quality control management (113-623-7028). (Includes three subtasks.)
- j. Platoon sustains unit maintenance and supply operations. (Includes four subtasks.)

5. **Task No. 1731279 - PERFORM battle damage assessment.** *Task Standards:* Maintenance teams make assessment of damage and make repairs, if possible, to the exact system or component that failed.

**Task Elements:**

- a. Team chief performs battle damage assessment (BDA) of non-operable equipment. (Includes eight subtasks.)
- b. Battalion maintenance technician (BMT) conducts BDA. (Includes four subtasks.)
- c. Platoon leader determines priorities for repair. (Includes three subtasks.)

6. **Task No. 1731280 - REPAIR unit equipment.** *Task Standards:* Repairs must be accomplished to return the vehicles to a mission-capable status without further damage to the equipment or injury to personnel.

**Task Elements:**

- a. Team chief reviews DA Form 2404. (Includes four subtasks.)
- b. Platoon repairs equipment. (Includes six subtasks.)
- c. Records clerk turns in repair parts. (Includes two subtasks.)



7. **Task No. 1731282 - PERFORM emergency destruction of equipment.** *Task Standards:* Unit personnel will destroy equipment to the extent that vital components are beyond repair or use.

**Task Elements:**

- a. Team chief supervises emergency destruction of equipment. (Includes three subtasks.)
- b. Platoon destroys combat vehicles. (Includes five subtasks.)
- c. Platoon destroys tactical vehicles. (Includes six subtasks.)
- d. Platoon destroys repair parts. (Includes three subtasks.)

8. **Task No. 1741284 - MAINTAIN the prescribed load list (PLL).** *Task Standards:* All items of the PLL must be on hand or on order.

**Task Elements:**

- a. Records clerk orders repair parts. (Includes three subtasks.)
- b. Records clerk maintains repair parts. (Includes three subtasks.)
- c. Record clerk issues repair parts. (Includes two subtasks.)
- d. BMO/BMT supervises PLL operations (03-5101.00-0007). (Includes three subtasks.)

9. **Task No. 1731288 - PROVIDE on-site maintenance support.** *Task Standards:* Repairs must be accomplished to return the vehicles to a mission-capable status without further damage to the equipment of injury to personnel.

**Task Elements:**

- a. ISG dispatches maintenance team. (Includes four subtasks.)
- b. Platoon inspects disabled vehicles and equipment for safety hazards. (Includes five subtasks.)
- c. Team chief determines maintenance requirements. (Includes nine subtasks.)
- d. Platoon repairs and recovers equipment. (Includes four subtasks.)

10. **Task No. 1731289 - PLAN a recovery mission.** *Task Standards:* The disabled vehicle is recovered to the UMCP without causing further damage to the vehicle.

**Task Elements:**

- a. Team chief develops a recovery plan. (Includes four subtasks.)
- b. Platoon leader approves and coordinates the recovery plan. (Includes two subtasks.)

**The O/Cs will look at the following Maintain Weapons Systems and Equipment tasks (Plan, Prepare, and Execute phases).**

Excerpts from the Training Feedback System (TFS) and 71-2 MTP.

**PLAN**

- Issue TF warning order.
- Analyze TF mission.
- Determine maintenance requirements and priorities.
- S4 updates Commander on combat status of unit.
- Assess status of maintenance assets.
- Provide maintenance support.



BMO coordinates with FSB Commander and staff for maintenance support.  
Develop maintenance support portion of TF Service Support Annex.  
TF evaluates ability of service support plan to support tactical operations.  
Issue Service Support Annex to TF OPORD.

### ***PREPARE***

Provide maintenance support to TF and its elements.  
Manage Class IX repair parts resupply.  
Perform periodic services.  
Perform UMCP activities.  
Recover, repair and return NMC equipment.  
Continuously monitor and update combat status.  
CTCP staff coordinates DS maintenance requests.  
Combat trains command post (CTCP) staff coordinates pickup of repaired/replacement vehicles.  
Field Trains CP (FTCP) coordinates maintenance requirements with FSB.

### ***EXECUTE***

Push maintenance forward in support of combat operations.  
Conduct Battle Damage Assessment and Repair (BDAR) as far forward as possible.  
Recover damaged equipment to next higher maintenance echelon.  
Combat trains and UMCP stay abreast of fighting forces needs.  
Perform controlled exchange.  
Maintain and report combat status.  
TF provides emergency maintenance support, recovery/repair.  
Process incoming equipment suspected of NBC contamination.  
Maintenance platoon consolidates and reorganizes.  
Prepare to continue battle or change mission.

### **An O/C Inbrief/Checklist.**

- a) Requirements Sheet (daily DA Form 2404/5988e count, daily PLL requisitions, daily DA Form 2406, vehicle density)
- b) Authority and Procedures for:
  - ✓ Controlled Substitution
  - ✓ Cannibalization
  - ✓ BDAR
- c) Location of ULLS/Reasons
- d) Slice Support Plan for:
  - Engr
  - ADA
  - NBC
- e) Method of Receiving DA Form 2404s/5988Es(LOGPAC/whenever/etc.)
- f) Method of Receiving/Issuing Parts.



- g) How Is Battle-Tracking/DA Form 2406 Update Done from Cmt to UMCP?
- h) Ability to Do Night Ops (Maint Tent, Tarps, etc.).
- i) DS Concerns:
- j) Unit/section Concerns:

**Suggested Matrix Charts for Unit DA Forms 2404 and 5988E Turn-ins/PLL Requisitions.**

**DA Form 2404/5988-E Turn-ins**

UNIT	X1	X2	X3	X4	X5	X6	X7	X8	X9	X10
HHC										
A										
B										
C										
D										
ENG										
ADA										

**TOTAL**

**PLL REQUISITIONS (02, 05, 120  
02 PRIORITY**

UNIT	X1	X2	X3	X4	X5	X6	X7	X8	X9	X10
HHC										
A										
B										
C										
D										
ENG										
ADA										

**TOTAL**

**05 PRIORITY**

UNIT	X1	X2	X3	X4	X5	X6	X7	X8	X9	X10
HHC										
A										
B										
C										
D										
ENG										
ADA										

**TOTAL****12 PRIORITY**

UNIT	X1	X2	X3	X4	X5	X6	X7	X8	X9	X10
HHC										
A										
B										
C										
D										
ENG										
ADA										

**TOTAL**



## **Movement Control in Echelons Above Brigade Support Operations** **by MAJ Bryan K. Robbins, Senior DSA Trainer, NTC**

*"Movement control is the planning, routing, scheduling, controlling, coordination, and in-transit visibility of personnel, units, equipment, and supplies moving over LOC and the commitment of allocated transportation assets according to command planning directives....Movement control is guided by a system that balances requirements against capabilities and assigns resources based on the combat commander's priorities."*

**--FM 55-10, Movement Control in a Theater of Operations**

Everything a brigade combat team needs to sustain combat operations in the theater of Mojave is pushed forward from the Division Support Area (DSA) via ground convoys. Due to the limited number of truck and personnel assets available to the echelons above brigade (EAB) battalion, main support battalion (MSB) or corps support battalion (CSB), strict adherence to established SOPs for movement control is critical. Unfortunately, strict movement control procedures are not a major factor in the planning process for conducting combat service support operations in this theater (also known as the National Training Center), and this creates problems:

- 1. Without accurate knowledge of the location and status of transportation assets at any given time, staff officers in the DSA support operations section cannot plan or synchronize support requirements to ensure they remain consistent with current and future operations.**
- 2. When accountability/visibility of a convoy is lost, the safety and welfare of soldiers are jeopardized.**

Vehicle movement is constantly one of the top concerns for safety and risk management at the National Training Center. Soldiers are our most important asset, and every step should be taken to ensure their safety and well-being at all times.

### **Movement control observations at the National Training Center:**

- Drivers are manifested for night convoys just three hours after returning from a 17-hour mission.
- Units have no accurate list of what personnel or truck assets are on mission or available for mission at the company or battalion levels.
- Convoys depart with communications but lose it within 5 km down the main supply route (MSR).
- The MSB or CSB has as many as nine separate convoys on the road at one time ranging in size from 2 to 13 vehicles.
- No current status report on active convoys is available in the Battalion TOC.
- No current enemy situation update is included in the convoy commander's staff briefing.
- Convoys enter and depart the BSA with no notification going to the FSB TOC.
- The FSB has no in-transit visibility of what is coming or current location of the next convoy.
- The convoy commander conducts very few briefbacks to the company commander or staff.
- There is a lack of concern over convoys that have not provided a recent situation report.



**Contributing factors to problems in movement control:**

- Vehicles are added or dropped at the last minute before start point.
- Vehicles depart from the DSA to the BSA without clearance from the MSB/CSB TOC.
- Planning for, or enforcement of, convoy schedules is poor.
- Communications link between the MSB/CSB and the FSB is poor.
- There is no communications plan to support convoys as they travel out of standard FM range.
- Convoy commanders do not check in and out with the FSB TOC in the BSA.
- Convoy commanders do not provide spot reports as they pass checkpoints on the MSR.
- No tracking boards for convoys/movements are used in the battalion TOC or company command posts.
- There are no status boards for monitoring status of available personnel and truck assets.
- Status boards on hand do not match at both company and battalion levels.
- Communication between companies and the battalion staff on the status of all assets on hand, whether on mission or available for tasking, is poor.

**WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF ALL THESE PROBLEMS?** Many units do not have an established SOP for movement control. When an SOP does exist, it is not used the way it is intended, or the standard is not enforced at all levels.

**WHY IS A MOVEMENT CONTROL SOP SO IMPORTANT?** The most important reason for maintaining strict compliance with movement control procedures is the *accountability of equipment and personnel assets*. Control measures established in SOPs assist leaders and planners in knowing the capabilities of the unit for support of future missions. Units have SOPs for almost every aspect of their daily operations and execution of their METL. Is it not logical for a unit that is responsible for providing support forward via ground convoys to have a thorough and user friendly SOP for movement control procedures?

Units will seldom have the freedom of movement on the battlefield or operational area that they enjoy at Home Station in CONUS. Strict movement control procedures are used in most theaters today where U.S. forces are conducting contingency operations. Some of the standard constraints and limitations include:

- **A minimum and maximum number of vehicles allowed in a convoy.**
- **Designated movement times on selected routes for specific units.**
- **Minimum security requirements.**
- **Communications requirements.**
- **Check-out/check-in procedures for convoy leaders.**

During the crisis in Panama in 1989-90, convoys were restricted to certain specified routes for specific time periods, and were required to have a minimum of four vehicles and a security vehicle. In Somalia, units had specific communications requirements on departure from their base, passing Traffic Control Points, arriving at destination, and again on the return trip. As the tactical situation changed, certain vehicles and personnel were designated for convoy security elements and were included in as many convoys as possible. Infantry, engineer, and military police units provided these security elements much of the time, but logistics units were required to perform the same duties quite often. As recent as the on-going mission in Bosnia, we see specific movement control procedures in place for the units operating in that theater. Techniques and procedures used by the first units in country included a four-vehicle rule, military police monitoring all unit moves in the area of operation, and standardized fragmentary orders and drills for vehicle movement and force protection.



**WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SOP?** Standard movement control procedures within a division are normally the responsibility of the Division Transportation Officer (DTO) and the DISCOM Movement Control Officer (MCO). Among the DTO's primary duties on the Division Battle Staff is staff responsibility for all advisory and planning functions regarding transportation matters. He also is the central coordinator for all movement control issues within the division as well as the formal link with the corps movement control center.

The MCO commits the division's transportation assets in support of the division's movement requirements and the division movement program. As the link between division transportation mode operators and transportation users, the MCO coordinates with the customer to determine requirements and plan for the distribution of material within the division, and ensures division transportation policies are enforced. The MCO also maintains the status of all transportation assets in support of the division.

Within the EAB battalion structure, the transportation management responsibility falls in the support operations section, specifically with the support operations transportation officer (SPO Trans). The responsibilities of the SPO Trans are very similar to those of the MCO; however, they are limited to within the scope of responsibility of the EAB battalion. In a theater like Mojave at the National Training Center, where there is no higher HQ available to provide DTO or MCO, **the SPO Trans becomes the primary transportation and movement control manager for the units operating in the DSA.**

Another staff officer who plays a key role in planning and supervising operations, and indirectly assists in managing the assets, is the **Battalion S3 Operations Officer**. As the primary staff officer for operations and plans, some of the responsibilities of the S3 are to:

- prepare operational SOPs and coordinate them with higher and subordinate units.
- maintain current roadnet data.
- maintain centralized operational control over subordinate units.
- monitor the battle.
- plan troop movement.
- coordinate and direct terrain management.
- coordinate and synchronize external security requirements.
- supervise and direct operation of the battalion communication services.

These duties and responsibilities make the S3 an indispensable member of the staff to assist the SPO Trans in the area of movement control SOP development and enforcement.

**WHAT SHOULD THE SOP LOOK LIKE?** At a minimum, the SOP should include command and control procedures for any convoy departing the unit area. This is the one subject that units must specifically address because the TTPs can change with each command or operational area in which the unit is located. Other areas to address should include:

- ✓ standard checklists for convoy preparation, organization, briefings, and responsibilities.
- ✓ planning processes.
- ✓ vehicle operations and convoy operations.
- ✓ convoy defense techniques and movement techniques.
- ✓ communications.

In EAB, unit convoys are routinely composed of assets from several different units. With this configuration, across-the-board standardization in procedures is critical and must be very clear to all personnel. Most movement techniques, convoy procedures, vehicle operations procedures, and checklists can be found in **FM 55-30**, the related MTP manuals, and the ARTEP Battle Drill Handbooks.





The Goldminers, the logistics trainers at the National Training Center, issue to the battalions conducting the EAB support mission in the DSA a list of movement control instructions for the unit during the Live-Fire Phase of the training rotation. These procedures, outlined below, are a set of constraints and limitations placed upon the unit specifically to maintain strict movement control and accountability of assets during this critical time of the campaign. The campaign is not unlike those a unit may see during a contingency operation overseas.

### **UNIT MOVEMENT CONTROL INSTRUCTIONS DURING THE LIVE-FIRE PHASE TD 10 - TD 13**

Safety and accountability are critically important during Live-Fire Operations. Support battalions, because of the wide range of missions and distances involved, face particular risks. Rotational units are required to certify all members of their units are accounted for, and no one is in the live-fire impact area. They report to both their chain of command and supporting O/C Team to preserve the safety of our soldiers while ensuring mission support. The following procedures are to ensure accountability is efficiently maintained.

- No Support Battalion convoy may enter the maneuver area without positive C<sup>2</sup>.
- C<sup>2</sup> vehicle w/working radio to maintain communications with the DSA and/or BSA.
- Relaying messages between the TOC or Co CP and subordinate elements through other units is authorized. Names and duty positions of all personnel involved in the message relay must be recorded in the Support Battalion TOC/Co CP.
- Units must establish a sign-in/out roster for all personnel leaving the unit area maintained at no lower than Company CP level. Roster must include time out, destination, and estimated time of return.
- *No DSA personnel/vehicles may depart Irwin Military City without clearance from the Goldminer DSA Trainers.* Phone number to the DSA Trainer office is 4-4266/5552. Information required for clearance is:
  - number/type/bumper number of all vehicles
  - number of personnel
  - name and rank of convoy commander
  - manifest of all other personnel and equipment on the convoy - written
  - mission, destination, and estimated time of return
- Any element going forward of the BSA while any unit of the BCT is in a "RED DIRECT/INDIRECT" status must have an O/C escort in addition to unit C<sup>2</sup>. Inform O/Cs immediately on receipt of any requirements forward of the BSA.
- DSA elements in the BSA must be verified by name and bumper number using a check-in/out system with the FSB TOC.
- DSA TOC must notify the FSB TOC of all elements traveling to the BSA with the number/type of all vehicles, number of personnel, and name of convoy commander. Convoy Commander must check in with the FSB TOC on arrival with the manifest of the convoy, and check out with the FSB TOC prior to departure for return to the DSA. FSB TOC and DSA TOC must confirm or deny the arrival/departure of all elements traveling between the BSA and DSA.



In the example, the Goldminer DSA Trainers replicate the DISCOM MCO, or a corps movement control team. The movement control instructions outlined above are a sample of the type of strict movement control procedures a unit could encounter in an operational environment. Units *will* encounter them during their deployment to Mojave and the National Training Center. These instructions can provide the foundation for units to develop their own movement control SOP for implementation at the company and battalion levels.

**CONCLUSION.** In keeping with the philosophy of "train as we will fight," units must include SOPs for movement control in their Battlebooks for daily operations, and train to the standard in all areas. Key personnel who are responsible for making this work in EAB units are the Commanders, the SPO Trans Officer, the S3, and convoy leaders at all levels. Whether at Home Station, the National Training Center, or overseas, the techniques that units practice in their daily routine can make the transition to an operational environment much smoother for all involved. ☺

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## CHAPTER IV HEALTH SERVICES

### BATTLE DRILL: Treat and Evacuate Battlefield Casualties

by MAJ Bruce Shahbazz

"Treat and evacuate battlefield casualties" continues to be one of the most overlooked battle drills at the National Training Center (NTC). During the past three years, the NTC has seen the died of wounds (DOW) rate increase to over 50 percent. **Why** are more soldiers dying on the battlefield? They are dying because their **units do not plan ahead** for quick treatment and evacuation.

The most decisive action a unit can take to decrease the DOW rate is to develop a thorough **plan** to treat and evacuate casualties. This **plan** is an integral piece of the unit's *Combat Health Support (CHS) plan*. The process for developing the CHS plan should follow the familiar PLAN, PREPARE, EXECUTE cycle, and should be applied at each task force, company, and platoon level.

#### **PLAN the CHS Plan:**

**Step 1.** At a minimum, the CHS planner should gather the following information:

- **Composition and location of supported force.**
- **Scheme of maneuver for the supported force.**
- **Size of enemy force and location or avenues of approach of the enemy forces.**
- **Locations of obstacles or terrain choke points.**
- **Template locations of chemical strikes.**
- **Size, composition, and capability of medical support.**
- **Locations and capabilities of supporting medical elements.**

**Step 2. Develop the casualty estimate.** The composition and location of the supported force provide the first element in developing a plan. When the supported force scheme of maneuver is overlaid onto the enemy template, the CHS planner is able to develop a casualty estimate.

**EXAMPLE:** During a movement to contact, the Lead Company team has been given the mission of identifying and fixing the location of the enemy forward security element. From the information gathered, the CHS planner knows that a force of 10-14 combat vehicles with 75-100 soldiers will come into contact with a force of about equal size. If 3-4 of those vehicles become combat losses, then there could be 8-12 casualties requiring evacuation. The casualty estimate in this example is 8-12.

Repeat this step for each phase of the operation, and also for any templated chemical strikes. By doing so, the CHS planner can develop an estimate of casualty numbers and locations through time on the battlefield.

**Step 3. Develop the workload estimate.** The workload estimate is developed from the casualty estimate. The difference between the casualty estimate and the workload estimate is the application of time/distance factors to the casualty numbers to determine how long it will take to evacuate the casualties given a set number of evacuation vehicles. In other words, determine *how many evacuation vehicles will be required* to evacuate the estimated number of casualties in a set period of time.



**EXAMPLE** (continued from the previous example): One M113 can carry four casualties. If it takes 30 minutes (including loading and unloading times) to travel to the Aid Station from the point of injury, then one M113 will take two to three hours to evacuate the 8-12 casualties. Using this logic, if the commander wants all the casualties evacuated in under one hour, then two to three M113s would be required to support the company team. The workload estimate in this example is two to three M113s.

**Step 4. Build the CHS Plan.** Now that the CHS planner has an estimate of how many casualties there will be, how many vehicles are required, and how long it will take to evacuate them, he can begin to build the CHS plan. The CHS plan should identify the locations for all medical evacuation and treatment assets for each phase of the battle.

a. Time/distance factors are the most important considerations for selecting the location for evacuation and treatment assets. Page 5-5 of **FM 8-10-4, The Medical Platoon Leader's Handbook**, states, "To reduce ambulance turnaround time in providing Advanced Trauma Management (ATM) to patients within 30 minutes of wounding, the BAS may split and place its treatment teams as close to maneuvering companies as tactically feasible." Being able to get the wounded soldiers to the aid station within 30 minutes means the aid station must be positioned no more than 15-20 minutes from the forward line of own troops. The company medic and ambulance crew would then have 10-15 minutes to locate, provide treatment, and load the casualty. Use *movement time*, not distance, as the planning factor for the location of the aid station. Time factors take into consideration the effects of visibility, weather, trafficability (how many vehicles can move through an area at once), and navigability (how fast a vehicle can move over the terrain).

b. Terrain and obstacle choke points affect the amount of *time* it takes to transport casualties. Consider the impact a narrow passage would have on traffic flow when choosing locations for medical assets. If an entire task force must pass through a narrow mountain pass, the resulting congestion and one-way traffic flow will greatly impede an ambulance from returning through the pass with a wounded soldier. Similarly, it would be difficult (or impossible) for evacuation vehicles to make it back through a single breach lane in an enemy obstacle belt. This situation is analogous to a salmon swimming upstream, except M113s usually lose to M1 tanks.

c. Consider templated locations for chemical strikes and locations of high payoff targets when selecting aid station locations. If a persistent chemical agent has been templated on an obstacle or choke point, then the CHS planner should plan for near- and far-side medical and decontamination support. Occupying a position near a high payoff target that may be targeted by the enemy with either chemical or conventional weapons may result in that medical unit being caught up in the attack. It would not be wise, for example, to set up an aid station in an area that was formerly used as a firing position for a field artillery battery—the aid station could find itself receiving counter-battery fire.

d. The CHS plan should specify support relationships and triggers for movement of the different medical elements. Specific responsibilities for area support should also be detailed in the operations order (OPORD) CSS/CHS annex. If the "follow-on assume" company during a deliberate breach has responsibility for providing evacuation support for the mortar platoon during Phase I, that information should be included in both paragraph 4 of the OPORD and the CSS/CHS annex or overlay. When available, also include the locations and radio frequencies for higher level medical support in the CSS annex.



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### ***PREPARE the CHS Plan.***

<b>Failure to conduct either of the following steps often results in mission failure.</b>
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**Step 1. *Rehearse the plan.*** Conducting rehearsals is one of two critical troop-leading activities that are done during the preparation phase. The other critical activity is conducting pre-combat checks, which is Step 2, below.

a. Rehearsals are chronological, event-driven discussions (or practices) of each phase of the operation. They reinforce understanding of the plan by helping subordinates visualize the battlefield.

b. Rehearsals must be conducted at each level of leadership. It is as important for the platoon medic to understand what his infantry platoon is going to be doing as it is for the aid station soldiers to understand the battalion's plan. If possible, the medical personnel should attend the rehearsal of both the unit they are supporting and the rehearsal of the next higher level of command. This allows the medical personnel to understand what they need to do to support their unit and where their supporting medical unit will be located throughout each phase of the battle.

**Step 2. *Conduct pre-combat checks (PCCs).*** Every level of leadership should conduct a pre-combat check on the next lower level medical element.

a. Platoon medics should check the combat lifesaver bags to ensure that they have sufficient supplies. Company medics are responsible for checking each platoon medic for supplies, overlays, radio frequencies, etc. The aid station should conduct PCCs on its personnel, vehicles, NBC equipment, and medical equipment sets.

b. Frequently, the medical equipment sets (MESSs) are overlooked during the PCCs. The MESSs should be checked to ensure that all the required supplies are on hand and serviceable and that medications have not expired. Check that packing lists are up to date and readily available. Check that compressed gas cylinders are full and properly secured. Inspect litters and litter straps. Always remember that ***a casualty cannot be treated with a "due-out" requisition.***

### ***EXECUTE the CHS Plan.***

The key to ensuring successful execution of treating and evacuating battlefield casualties is to ***maintain situational awareness.*** Situational awareness means more than just knowing the location of subordinate units. Situational awareness encompasses knowing where units are (both friendly and enemy), what they are doing, and where they are going. Leaders at every level need to actively pursue the information that they require to maintain this level of awareness. Situational awareness allows the leadership of medical units to anticipate surges in casualties and respond with proactive medical support.

**Step 1. *Ensure that the medical planner participates in the planning and preparation processes of the unit that is being supported.*** When a medical planner, be it aid station platoon leader or platoon medic, is involved in combat planning and preparation, he is better prepared to support. With knowledge of what the combat unit plans to do and a thorough understanding of the commander's intent, the medical support unit can anticipate requirements rather than respond to events after they have occurred.



**Step 2. Establish and maintain *communications*.** Timely and accurate spot reports from subordinates helps "paint the picture" of what is occurring on the battlefield. The medical support must also be able to monitor the command and control radio net of the supported unit. By monitoring the command nets and receiving spot reports, the medical leadership will be able to modify its support plan as the tactical situation dictates.

**Step 3. The final step in achieving situational awareness is *battlefield presence*.** Medical leaders must be able to identify decisive points on the battlefield and provide appropriate overwatch. Sometimes this means the leader goes forward on the battlefield "to the sound of the guns." With a personal look at what is happening on the battlefield, the leader will gain the appropriate insight into what is required to provide seamless, uninterrupted support to the maneuver commander.

## CONCLUSION

Medical support is a complicated, multifaceted activity that requires an in-depth understanding of capabilities and limitations of friendly and enemy forces, aggressive and tenacious planning and coordination with subordinate and superior units, and dedicated leadership. Israel's most decorated Armor Officer, General Avigdor Kahalani, stated in his book, *A Warrior's Way*: "**Commanders on any level who devote less than full attention to their medical teams should not be surprised to find their casualties helpless just when they need help the most.**" American soldiers deserve the *best* medical care possible; we must ensure they get nothing less. ☛



## **THE ROLE of the COMBAT HEALTH SUPPORT OFFICER in the FORWARD SUPPORT BATTALION**

**by MAJ William E. Carter**

### **EXECUTION PHASE**

The new first lieutenant sits stone-faced for six hours in a meeting next to the forward support medical company (FSMC) commander. The briefing room, at the initial staging base (ISB), is crowded and hot. It seems as if the operation order (OPORD) meeting, his fourth for the day, goes on forever. This is his first JRTC experience and his first month anniversary as the combat health support officer (CHSO) in a forward support battalion (FSB). The lieutenant, straight from a medical platoon in a different brigade, is worried about his new responsibilities. Guidance from the battalion's Support Operation Officer (SPO) is to help the FSMC commander and keep the SPO informed on the development of the combat health support (CHS) plan for the brigade. The FSMC commander, also new to the position, tells him to stay close and to be prepared to write out the plan. This very broad and confusing guidance has the young lieutenant worried. He knows he can do more for the SPO and the FSMC commander than only attend meetings, but he is not sure what. He attended every possible meeting that an infantry brigade and an FSB can have at the ISB with the commander and surgeon: wargaming; course-of-action development; OPORD briefing; and military decisionmaking process (MDMP). None of the participants ever broke away from any of the meetings to begin the planning process to develop the CHS plan. He realizes that there is no formalized CHS plan, and little, if any, firm coordination has been made with the other key medical personnel within the brigade. There are no CHS products developed for dissemination to the warfighters. Tomorrow morning is the brigade rehearsal. It will be followed by the combat service support (CSS) and combat health support rehearsal with H-Hour tomorrow night at 2200. Just before the FSMC commander falls asleep, he tells the CHSO, *"I hope to get the CHS plan out before the brigade rehearsal."* The last thing the lieutenant sees before joining the FSMC commander in a well-needed cat nap is the medical O/C writing in his notebook.

**DISCUSSION:** The role of the health service support officer (HSSO) in the FSB, more commonly referred to in the field as the combat health support officer (CHSO), is that of staff officer assigned to the support operations section of the FSB Staff. Duties and responsibilities of the CHSO are clouded with mystery and confusion due to the lack of doctrinal guidance. For the SPO, for whom the CHSO works, doctrinal guidance is limited. The SPO usually based the duties and responsibilities of the CHSO on the battalion's current needs and the SPO's experience with CHS. The Support Operation Course does an exceptional job of introducing the non-AMEDD combat service support officers on combat health support operations but does not cover the duties and responsibilities of the CHSO. The only guidance found in a manual is in **FM 63-20, Forward Support Battalion**. It does not mention the CHSO, but it states that the support operations section provides input to the service support annex on medical evacuation and hospitalization with assistance from the brigade surgeon and medical company commander. The roles and responsibility of the CHSO or HSSO are not defined in the field manuals (FMs). The 8-series FMs (medical) provide limited guidance to the duties and responsibilities of the CHSO. If the unit is lucky, it can get a highly motivated lieutenant who is willing to define his own role and responsibilities in the support operations section. Most CHSOs are junior first lieutenants who have just completed a tour of duty as a medical platoon leader in an infantry battalion. These positions have also been filled by second lieutenants out of the basic course awaiting a platoon leader job somewhere within the brigade or division. The experience and maturity of the CHSO will depend on how much guidance and supervision the CHSO will need. The ability of the CHSO to perform his duties also will depend on the willingness of the SPO and the FSMC to allow that new lieutenant to take the ball and run with it.





**RECOMMENDATION:** The CHSO's primary duty is that of a staff officer who assists in the planning, coordination and synchronization of the CHS plan. The CHSO can be a valuable asset in developing and disseminating the CHS plan. The unit must develop a standing operating procedure (SOP) for the support operation section that outlines the duties of the CHSO in garrison and in the field. The FSMC commander, the brigade surgeon and the division medical operations center must understand the duties and responsibilities. The SOP must address in detail issues concerning whom and for what the CHSO is responsible during the planning phase of the operation. Ideally, during the planning development, the CHSO works for the SPO and indirectly for the FSMC commander. The CHSO can assist the FSMC commander, who is the main medical planner in the brigade in coordinating, disseminating and executing the CHS plan. Like all good staff officers, the CHSO must be an exceptional listener, communicator, and note taker. The CHSO should read and fully understand **FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations**, with heavy emphasis on chapters three, five, and six. He needs to have access and know how to use all communications and ADP equipment in the battalion tactical operation center (TOC) and maintain his own staff library of CHS and maneuver manuals.

During the development phase of the CHS plan, the CHSO should be responsible for the following:

- **Provide liaison between the battalion and the medical community at large, for example: Level III hospitals, the Forward Support MEDEVAC Team (FSMT) and the Division Medical Operations Center (DMOC).**
  - **Write, based on guidance from the FSMC commander, and disseminate the medical annex to the brigade order plus other associated CHS graphics and documents.**
  - **Coordinate with the DMOC or Division Medical Supply Officer for Class VIII, medical supplies.**
  - **Prepare a CHS matrix in coordination with the FSMC and brigade surgeon.**
  - **With the brigade S1, plan for and coordinate the CHS rehearsal. This would also include developing a rehearsal timeline. The CHSO should be the recorder at the brigade CHS rehearsal.**
  - **Keep the SPO, FSMC and the brigade surgeon informed on any meetings or significant events that could affect the CHS plan.**
  - **If present, coordinate with the Aeromedical Evacuation Liaison Team (AELT). This includes requesting DD Form 601, *Patient Evacuation Manifest*, and DD Form 602, *Patient Evacuation Tag*, from the team.**
  - **Develop, with the FSMC commander and the SPO, a CHS timeline using the back-planning method.**
  - **Pass on information to the brigade's medical community concerning CHS operation and significant events, i.e., new fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), changes to graphic, meetings and rehearsals.**
  - **Attend meetings for the FSMC commander. The CHSO must take informative notes and be aware of any issues affecting CHS operations.**
  - **Collect and consolidate the CHS plans from the units with organic medical assets. This will assist the FSMC commander in developing a brigade-level CHS plan that supports the elements within the brigade task force.**
- The following are additional activities in which the CHSO should be involved with the FSMC commander, the brigade surgeon and the SPO:
- **Scanning operation plans and orders for prudent information affecting CHS operations.**
  - **Developing, with the FSB S2 and the FSMC commander, a medical intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) for the operation.**





→ Working with the brigade surgeon in disseminating the Medical Threat Report to the brigade.  
→ Ensuring the inclusion of the Armor team's medical assets in the CHS planning and operations.  
→ With the brigade signal officer, coordinating for adding the Army standard 9-line medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) request in the brigade communication exercise (COMMEX). The 9-line MEDEVAC request is found in the signal operating instructions (SOI).

→ Arranging for the deployment of the preventive medicine (PVNTMED) section with the reverse osmosis water purification unit (ROWPU). (*Pre-positioning the PVNTMED section with the ROWPU will decrease the amount of time it takes to issue water to the brigade.*)

- Coordinating for security for the ground ambulances assigned to the FSB.
- Linking the FSB's medical assets with brigade units.
- Ensuring that there is medical support and coverage for the ground convoy operations into the area of operations.
- With the FSMT leader and the SPO, coordinating for Class III for the vehicles and air ambulances.
- Planning medical support for units without organic medical assets.
- Issuing litters to the Aviation battalion for nonstandard MEDEVAC helicopters.
- Developing with the FSMT leader and the brigade S3 Air the method and means of requesting nonstandard MEDEVAC helicopters.
- With the brigade signal officer and the FSMC commander, coordinating and developing a MEDEVAC communication plan.
- Planning medical support for Civil Affairs (CA) operations, if required.

This list of duties and responsibilities of a CHSO is not all inclusive. These techniques and procedures serve as planning guidelines for the CHSO, SPO and the FSMC commander. Proper time management is important to properly use the CHSO. Delegation of the numerous tasks involved in developing and coordinating the CHS plan is essential. Time is the planner's worst enemy. Not properly using the time and assets available will only ensure failure.

## **EXECUTION PHASE**

The CHSO has been sitting by the radio in the FSMC command post (CP) for over 12 hours mostly dealing with miscellaneous company and battalion business. He received four MEDEVAC requests. He is learning about FSMC operations, but has a feeling of being underutilized as a staff officer. He is starting to think of himself as one of the highest paid radio and telephone operators (RTOs) in the U.S. Army.

**DISCUSSION:** Once the FSB is established in the Brigade Support Area (BSA), the CHSO duties and responsibilities again become ambiguous. The duties of the CHSO ranged from RTO in the FSMC CP to assisting the battalion sergeant major (SGM) with perimeter defense and the quick reaction force. The CHSO is an integral part of the support operations section and should perform the duties as a member of that section.

**TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:** Once in the field, the CHSO's place of duty is the battalion tactical operations center. As a member of the battalion staff, he can coordinate and work issues for the FSMC commander that affect the FSB's ability to provide medical support. This will allow the FSMC commander to



be free to work company-level issues and plan for future CHS operations. The benefits of the CHSO at the battalion's tactical operation center (TOC) are many. The tasks that the CHSO should perform include:

- Coordinating evacuation of casualties from casualty collection points (CCPs) and battalion aid stations (BASS) using nonstandard MEDEVAC platforms especially using LOGPACs or resupply helicopters.

- Arranging the movement of patients using pre-planned LOGPACs and other types of resupply missions.

- Orchestrating with the SPO for use of supply helicopters or "LOG BIRDS" from the rear area to evacuate patients to a Level III medical treatment facility (Combat Support Hospital or Field Hospital).

- Communicating with the brigade S1 located in the adjoining administration/logistical operations center (ALOC). This direct interface will facilitate immediate access to information allowing the medical community to keep abreast of any upcoming brigade- or battalion-level operation plus improving personnel replacement operations.

- Passing current information, weather and intelligence to the FSMC for dissemination. This information is used in planning future operations and ground evacuation missions.

- Ensuring that pickup zone (PZ) and landing zone (LZ) operations do not hinder air MEDEVAC operations. *(The ideal situation would be for the BSA to have two separate LZs, one for MEDEVAC operations and one for logistic operations.)*

- Updating the battalion's CSS/CHS execution matrix and the position of battalion medical assets on the battalion graphics.

- Keeping the FSB commander and staff informed on issues concerning the brigade CHS plan.

- Tracking the status of main supply routes (MSRs) and alternate supply routes (ASRs) and other routes used for evacuation of casualties and supplies.

- Serving as a point of contact for mass casualty (MASCAL) operations with tenant BSA elements.

- Coordinating for trucks for use during a MASCAL.

- Assisting in coordinating patient decontamination operations when they require tenant BSA personnel.

- Tracking patients out of the brigade area.

- Forecasting and tracking critical Class VIII supplies throughout the brigade (for example: Ringer's Lactate, field dressing and blood).

- Publishing and disseminating FRAGOs and updated graphics to the CHS plan.

- Requesting and coordinating with the FSMT OIC or the brigade S3 air for a flyover by MEDEVAC or other Army aircraft of proposed MEDEVAC LZs.

- Coordinating ambulance exchange points, if required.

- Consolidating medical reports and analyzing them with the brigade surgeon for any significant medical trends that could affect combat operations to the brigade task force.

The CHSO is a valuable asset that is often underused as a staff officer. The CHSO can drastically improve CHS operations in the brigade by maximizing the use of nonstandard evacuation platforms, tracking patients, tracking Class VIII (medical supplies), and serving as a liaison within the brigade medical community at large. A well-used CHSO will allow the FSMC commander to run the medical company and give him the time and opportunity to develop the CHS plan for the next brigade operation.

*"My war experience led me to believe that the staff must be the servants of the troops, and that a staff officer must serve his commander and the troops but himself be anonymous." --Montgomery of Alamein, Memoirs, 1958*



## CASEVAC AT TASK FORCE LEVEL

by SFC David G. Phillips

**FACT:** The average died of wounds (DOW) rate for a task force during a 10-day rotation at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) is 50 to 60 percent.

Task force commanders would agree that to leave wounded soldiers lying on the battlefield to bleed to death would be a deplorable and grievous thing to do. Yet that is exactly what occurs during every rotation on the CMTC battlefield. If units are to "train as they fight," they need to get serious about reducing the DOW rate during their CMTC rotation.

CMTC observers/controllers (O/Cs) have reported the following problem trend:

**PROBLEM TREND:** Planning and executing casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) continues to be a challenge for units at the CMTC. The most frequently observed indicators of inadequate planning and poor synchronization are:

1. Casualties are not evacuated from the point of injury to the treatment facility in a timely manner.
2. Treatment assets are not properly positioned.

**RESULT:** Soldiers die of wounds before treatment arrives.

At a training center, a DOW rate of 50-60 percent is often accepted during the training exercises. But, if we equate those losses to real-world casualties, the number of casualties becomes unacceptable. *Every day at CMTC is a mass casualty day.* Therefore, all medical support *should* be planned accordingly. Yet the system too often becomes flawed in the planning phase and is, therefore, doomed to fail throughout the preparation and execution phases. This article provides some tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for synchronizing task force medical assets during the planning, preparation and execution phases. **The result of synchronization is a reduction of the DOW rate.**

### TTPs FOR REDUCING THE DOW RATE.

**Plan:** Develop a synchronized plan.

**Prepare:** Conduct thorough rehearsals at the CO/TM and task force levels.

**Execute:**

Liberal use of nonstandard evacuation platforms.

Sufficient certified combat lifesavers in all platoons.

#### 1. THE PLANNING PHASE.

**Problem:** The S4 often develops and briefs the CSS plan without input from the medical platoon. The S4 is often unaware or unconcerned with the status of medical platoon assets and subsequently overlooks the possibility of effectively using such assets as multiple treatment teams.

**TTPs:**

a. Although the medical platoon leader is often the junior officer in the CSS arena, do not overlook him as a valuable asset during the planning phase of any mission. As part of the planning phase, medical platoon leaders must brief the S4 on the status of their vehicles, equipment and personnel.

b. The S4 should include all medical assets in the CSS plan to ensure availability for deployment to support forward elements.

c. The S4's plans must include a strong far forward care plan based on input from the medical platoon. This should include evacuation support for scouts and ADA units.



## 2. THE PREPARATION PHASE.

**Problem:** The S4 often does not include evacuation route reconnaissance during CSS rehearsals. The S4 frequently assumes that evacuation crews and other nonstandard evacuation assets know where to find the battalion aid station (BAS). On many occasions, casualties have been picked up very early in the battle, but they die while the evacuation crew tries to find the aid station.

**TTPs:**

a. During the preparation phase, the medical platoon should direct all medical assets to reconnoiter the routes to and from both primary and alternate sites. Provide easy-to-read overlays and route reconnaissance during the planning phase to ease the transition to the preparation phase.

b. The S4 and the medical platoon leader must maintain two-way lines of communication. Effective communications between these two parties forms the task force cornerstone for a fluid evacuation plan which covers all aspects of the operation from the front lines all the way to the rear.

## 3. THE EXECUTION PHASE.

**Problem:** The events in the execution phase of any mission usually highlight exactly where the unit experienced problems in planning and preparation. Unfortunately, the recommended corrections that are briefed in after-action reviews (AARs) are rarely included in the planning and preparation phases for the next mission.

**TTPs:**

a. Medical platoon leaders should assume a more assertive stance during the planning phase to make sure the S4 heeds recommendations in the AARs.

b. The S4 must fully understand the capabilities of available medical assets and learn how to use them to their fullest potential. If soldiers on the ground feel that they will receive the best, most responsive medical care available, they will perform to a higher standard without reservation.

**Problem:** Units training at CMTTC usually react very quickly to casualties on the battlefield, but then have no methodology for evacuating the urgent casualties first. Instead, the unit 1SG makes "house calls," going from one vehicle to another collecting casualties until the unit's evacuation assets are full. The evacuation assets are then pushed back to the BAS with the injured. If the 1SG finds any critically injured soldiers after the evacuation assets have left, he has no way to treat them and must leave them there until the evacuation assets return from the BAS.

**TTPs:**

a. Establish casualty collection points (CCPs) to reduce the DOW rate for urgent patients. The use of a CCP during the execution phase would greatly improve the survival rate of critically injured soldiers. Combat lifesavers and medics operate CCPs to ensure the most critical patients are evacuated first.

b. Units should gain better understanding of the role of combat lifesavers in any unit CASEVAC plan.

## SUMMARY

Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) is a complex process that includes the integration of the FSB medical assets and requires detailed planning at all levels.

- ✓ Thoroughly **PLAN** for MEDEVAC and disseminate the plan to the lowest level.
- ✓ **REHEARSE** squad- and crew-level CASEVAC drills, remembering to reconnoiter all evacuation routes.
- ✓ Prioritize your casualties for evacuation during execution.

In review, the keys to reducing DOW rates are:

1. A synchronized plan.
2. Thorough rehearsals at the CO/TM and task force levels during the preparation phase.
3. Liberal use of nonstandard evacuation platforms.✱



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## THE TROUBLE WITH SCOUT PLATOON CASEVAC

by SFC James E. Hawley

Casualty evacuation—the thorn in the side of every visiting unit at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC). With a battle raging, the OPFOR over-running, and the best thought-out plan falling to pieces, the last thing anyone wants to have to think about is casualty evacuation. But let's face it, even the *perfect* plan is likely to produce some casualties in a high intensity conflict. We have to *expect* casualties and *plan* for them, because we have an obligation to recover our injured teammates.

But CASEVAC for the task force scout platoon is especially hard to handle. The platoon's autonomy, its numerous mission-based structures, and its remote location in any given situation, all contribute to its CASEVAC troubles. Line units have a dedicated medical evacuation system (ground and air ambulances); the scout platoon does not. The scout platoon usually either begs pickups from follow-on units or tries to conduct the evacuation itself.

The rotation at CMTC provides the task force scout platoon an ideal opportunity to test and perfect evacuation procedures. Because the scout platoons *always* have casualties, the unit can try out different ideas on each mission. Unfortunately, most units do not take advantage of this important training opportunity. Instead, they play what we call "box rules."

**BOX RULES:** Units know there will be a change of mission. They also know that the observer/controllers (O/Cs) must gather everyone together for the platoon AAR at change of mission plus two. So...they can simply pick up the scouts from there. For an attack mission, units often send their scouts out deep with absolutely no CASEVAC plan except for the generic "the platoon sergeant can get them." The units do this because they know the O/Cs will ultimately help gather up the patrols from wherever they happen to be to expedite the next mission—box rules.

Rather than fine-tune evacuation procedures that could save the lives of their scouts, units get lazy and exploit the training environment. This practice is very dangerous. If the task force does not emphasize CASEVAC procedures for its scout platoon during training exercises, there is no hope for the scout platoon during real combat missions. In a training exercise, the unit can find out what doesn't work and then try something else. In real combat, there is seldom a second chance.

As a former scout platoon sergeant, I discovered the hard way that there are certain things a scout platoon sergeant must do to increase the odds for successful CASEVAC during a mission. For those who would rather learn from someone who's been there, I offer the following tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).

### TTPs

#### HOME STATION TTPs.

1. **CASEVAC coordination must begin at Home Station.** The scout platoon sergeant needs to get face to face with the medical platoon sergeant to find out exactly what the medical platoon's capabilities are. These meetings inevitably lead to a synchronized effort and inherently produce a backup plan if the task force OPORD does not address the problem of CASEVAC during any mission. Conduct shared training with the medical platoon, and with other MEDEVAC units.



**EXAMPLE:** While a PSG, I set up quarterly sergeant's time training for air evacuation with the MEDEVAC crew. The flight crew used the first two hours to cover loading procedures, radio procedures, and special considerations for hot extractions. During the third hour, we conducted a patrol, ambushed it and inserted casualties. The patrol provided first aid of the wounds (combat lifesavers would actually start IVs) and call for the MEDEVAC. MEDEVAC would actually bring in the chopper and conduct two hot extractions.

2. **Develop, maintain and use an SOP.** Any good CASEVAC plan must be based on an SOP. Not the SOP your unit uses, but an internal scout platoon SOP. Sit your entire platoon down and discuss the problem, then listen and write down what you hear. You'd be surprised how many good ideas come from the private who was a casualty every single mission at CMTC.

- **Once you have your ideas, construct an SOP and send it around your platoon for additional comments.** Try to think of any situation in which you may find yourself and plan for it.

- **Do not forget to include the medics on this; they can tell you what works, and what doesn't.**

- **Once you've finalized the SOP, TEST IT OUT.** Do not assume that because it sounds good, it works.

Go out to the local training area and test what you've written, and make changes as needed.

**EXAMPLE:** Our platoon created a CASEVAC SOP initially to dazzle the O/Cs at CMTC. But we found out that the deeper we investigated and researched, the more prepared we became. In testing out and revising the SOP, we drilled so much that crew CASEVAC procedures and the procedures for contacting other units to complete the chain actually became second nature.

3. **Get as many Combat Lifesavers as you can.** Most units show up with one Combat Lifesaver per crew. This is bare-bones okay, but what happens if the Combat Lifesaver is taken out? At CMTC it creates a nuisance. In real life, it causes real death. The more Combat Lifesavers you have, the more you're prepared in case of casualties.

**EXAMPLE:** Because we did not know who may become casualties at CMTC, our platoon coordinated with the task force CSM, the HHC 1SG, and the medical PSG to have the entire platoon certified as Combat Lifesavers all at one time. Yes, this took the platoon out of the loop for an entire week, but it yielded high payoff, not only at CMTC, but also during Operation DESERT STORM. The task force CSM understood the problems the scout platoon faced concerning casualties, and backed the plan fully.

4. **Coordinate with company 1SGs early.** Task forces will normally employ units in the same sector within the task force sector, just as scout platoons will normally employ scout teams in the same sectors within the task force sector. If this is the case, make sure scout team leaders coordinate with the appropriate 1SGs.

5. **Drill, drill, and drill again.** Nothing teaches better than practice. Practice CASEVAC drills weekly, even if it is only at the crew/team level, until the entire process is second nature to your personnel. Include shared training with the medics and even line units. The more you practice, the better you get.

## **FIELD TRAINING AND ACTUAL COMBAT TTPs.**

1. **Make sure the scout platoon sergeant is well embedded in the task force logistical chain.** This means the scout platoon sergeant has all logistical support and freedom normally afforded to company 1SGs. The autonomy of the scout platoon makes it essential that the platoon sergeant become the logistical focal point. If he is not, the platoon becomes a burden to other organic units. For CASEVAC purposes, the scout platoon sergeant must have free access to the aviation logistics (A/L) net and the administration and logistics center (ALOC). He should be able to call for, and receive, his own CASEVAC through these channels (mission dependent).

2. **The CSS annex of the task force order must specifically address scout platoon CASEVAC.** Merely stating that follow-on units will evacuate the scouts is inadequate. The process begins at Home Station by developing a tight relationship among the scout platoon leader, platoon sergeant and the S4. The relationship





matures in the field during the orders process. In an active relationship with scout platoon leadership, the S4 becomes fully aware of specific scout platoon requirements during the logistical operations of any given mission. The S4 is then better able to include scout-specific requirements during CASEVAC. If there is a question or concern by either the S4 or the scout platoon sergeant, either party will contact the other and discuss the issue, ensuring these concerns are addressed in the task force order.

3. **Do not take the scout platoon sergeant out of the loop.** Every parent unit within the task force structure has its point of contact for all logistical missions. The scout platoon is no different. The S4 or other agency is not equipped to conduct the logistical operations for the scout platoon. The scout platoon sergeant must coordinate and execute these missions to ensure things happen correctly. In the case of CASEVAC, the scout platoon sergeant must coordinate evacuation procedures either on site or remotely (depending on the mission). Those who think they can do it differently will find themselves treading deep water with no land in sight.

4. **The S4 must make sure the scout platoon has a current copy of the CSS overlay.** The S4 may consider giving the scout platoon sergeant the authority to activate casualty collection points (CCP) early. This allows the scout platoon to evacuate casualties either through internal assets or by using follow-on companies, while minimizing the amount of time the team or company 1SGs are away from the fight.

5. **The scout platoon sergeant and company 1SGs must coordinate early.** If these elements already have a good working relationship in garrison, this required coordination is all the easier. For any given mission, scout teams know what unit is adjacent. They should coordinate CASEVAC through that unit. Do *not* call the 1SG and tell him that he is going to be your CASEVAC. Coordinate the following information:

✓ **Mission of the scout team.** A brief overview of the mission broken down into a few short sentences. The 1SG needs to know what the scout team is doing, but remember he has other things to do as well.

✓ **Probable route of the scout team.** Try to let the 1SG know where the team is going and where they will be at any given time of the operation. This information is vital in case the team is hit and loses contact. The 1SG will then have an idea of where to look.

✓ **Point of contact.** The 1SG should know to whom he will be talking. Take this one step further and ensure the team leader has made radio communications with the company.

6. **Make sure all teams in the platoon give the platoon sergeant and platoon leader a copy of their intended route on any given mission.** This enables the leaders to know where to look in case they lose contact with a team. Force the teams to routinely update locations. During high-risk missions, 30-minute situation reports are not often enough, especially when covering great distances. Dismounted patrols may consider updating locations every 15 minutes. This will isolate the search area into a smaller, tighter box in the event contact is lost.

7. **Scout teams must be able to conduct and supervise CASEVAC operations themselves without waiting to be told to do so.** There comes a time in the scout platoon sergeant's mission when he must decide which holds higher priority—the successful completion of the scout platoon's, and, therefore, task force's mission, or conducting CASEVAC of scout casualties. If the team is able to conduct self-evacuation, it must take the initiative to do so without being told. The scout platoon sergeant is first and foremost a scout and, if possible, must be allowed to conduct his mission to its fullest potential. The scout platoon leadership must sit down together early and brainstorm situations where teams may be required to coordinate and conduct their own evacuation.

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There are an infinite number of ways to ensure a better CASEVAC system for the task force scout platoon. With the mission and structure of the scout platoon, CASEVAC is naturally harder to conduct. Taking the extra training time to find the solution that best fits your unit's own situation and needs pays off in saving lives. We have an obligation as leaders to look out for the welfare of our soldiers. This obligation starts in training.☘



## Individual Force Protection TTPs for a Combat Support Hospital and for Multifunctional Medical Task Force Soldiers

by MAJ Michael Rowbotham, while serving as Commander, 47th Combat Support Hospital

The 47th Combat Support Hospital (CHS) is a caretaker unit that currently has a full-time cadre consisting of only 17-percent of its total personnel staff. The remaining 83 percent of its personnel must come from the Army's Professional Officer Filler System (PROFIS). Limited staffing, such as this, will be the norm, since the Army is reducing active component deployable hospitals in both numbers and fill levels. With the majority of the hospital units being PROFIS personnel, and the turnover rate of cadre personnel being high, training force protection skills to proficiency in these hospital units becomes a great challenge. As a result, force protection of the Army hospital suffers. This article provides some individual tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that should keep soldiers in medical units aware of their force protection and safety responsibilities.

These TTPs were taken from the 47th CSH/Task Force 47 Force Protection TTP handbook. The goal of the handbook was to produce something concise and easily understood by the newest soldier in the unit. The force protection issues and accompanying TTPs pertain to all unit personnel: physicians, nurses, pharmacy technicians, clerks, ambulances drivers, cooks and mechanics, and address common individual tasks specifically covering force protection and other security/safety issues. The specific topics and prescribed actions reflect the author's strategy as a commander to protect the force and secure the unit, not to defend the area. It serves as a point of departure for new soldiers' inquiries and discussion. New soldiers will not get any answers until they first know what questions to ask.

### PREFACE

Force protection encompasses all the passive and active measures taken to protect the medical staff and patients from hazards. These measures include enemy activity, environmental threats, as well as the safety of weapons and equipment. These TTPs focus on force protection matters that all individuals face in their routine work/rest/eat/hygiene cycle in the hospital or task force headquarters area. The TTPs are generic, and each medical unit must supplement and modify the list to address their diverse missions, procedures, settings and conditions. Some other common topics are included as an aid to living and working in the unit area.

#### ***Air Defense TTPs***

1. We must be able to identify threat aircraft operating in the area. Use graphic training aids (GTAs) for training.
2. When threat air is spotted - **DO NOT** - automatically fire at it. Do not ignore it. **DO** take cover and warn others that it is approaching.
3. If the aircraft does attack by either direct fire or delivery of chemical spray, **DO** return fire. *See Spot Report.*

#### ***Air horn signals***

1. Three short horn blasts - NBC attack
2. One long horn blast - Attack or intrusion is imminent or in progress. Quick reaction force (QRF) will respond.





**Artillery** See - *Indirect fire*.

### **Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)**

After any hostile activity or an attack, personnel must assess the unit's ability to continue its mission. After any such event, sections must immediately:

1. Account for all personnel, assigned and attached. This includes soldiers who are off shift or working elsewhere under your control. Soldiers detailed to work elsewhere, i.e., security forces, KP, etc., will be accounted for by their temporary leader or supervisor.
2. Examine all essential equipment and supplies, assessing what damage or theft has occurred. Determine the section's ability to continue its mission. Forward this report to the tactical operating center stating what damage occurred, the impact of the loss or damage, and reconstitution or reinforcement requirements.

### **Battle drills**

1. The entire unit will conduct drills or rehearsals to ensure proficiency in critical tasks related to force protection. Expect rehearsals of actions taken upon receiving indirect fire, enemy air, snipers, NBC attack and ground intruders.
2. Sections must supplement generic responses based on their mission and specific conditions.
3. Initiate Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) as part of reactions to hostile activity.

**Bombardment** See - *Indirect fire*.

### **Challenge and password**

1. Each day, there is a challenge and password or sign and countersign as designated by the signal operation instruction (SOI).
2. The soldier must know the challenge and password before leaving the unit area. Learn the challenge and password for the next period if it will change before your planned return. **Do NOT write it down.**
3. When approaching a gate guard or sentry, expect to be halted at a safe distance. If approaching in a vehicle, the track commander (TC), assistant driver (AD), or ground guide will vouch for the party in the vehicle. Be prepared to provide a count of the occupants of your vehicle and having the vehicle searched. The sentry guard should challenge you in a low voice, using the challenge in a sentence. Reply using the password in the same manner. This is done to avoid compromising the challenge and password.

### **Communications, Electronic**

1. The CSH is equipped with international maritime satellite (INMARSAT), mobile subscriber equipment (MSE), AM radio and FM radio for external communications.
2. MSE system is accessed through any of the digital nonsecure voice terminals (DNVTs) that are installed throughout the unit. Personnel can use a DNVT to contact other sections within the unit if those sections have a DNVT.
3. Other forms of internal communications include handheld FM radios (two nets - PRC 127 and Motorola) and TA-312 field phones. Sections must run the wire for their systems from their location to the switch or junction box.



### ***Communication, information***

It is vital to the success of the unit to establish and use clear chains of command and communication. Section officers in charge (OICs) and non-commissioned officers in charge (NCOICs) must stay abreast of current operations and not simply pass out administrative announcements. The information must flow down to soldiers with "value added," section-specific information from their leaders. Conversely, leaders must take the initiative to analyze information from their sections, thereby, contributing to the command and control processes of the unit.

### ***Defense See - Security.***

### ***Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs).*** U.S. Army medical units routinely evacuate and treat EPWs.

1. The echelon commander is responsible for providing guards for EPWs. The CSH will request support from a Military Police unit for this task.
2. In the absence of EPW guards, the staff must be prepared to search, disarm and guard an EPW(s) during evacuation and in the CSH.
3. Care providers and others coming in close contact with an EPW(s) must not carry weapons or items that could be used as a weapon, i.e., scissors.
4. Health care providers must not pass between the guard and EPWs.

### ***Hardening the Facilities***

The unit is inherently a soft target that is vulnerable to attack by direct and/or indirect fire. The unit will continue to harden the facilities to reduce the risk of injury and damage to the patients, staff, equipment and supplies.

1. Host-nation contract labor may be available to support work details.
2. The unit will continue to improve the site. Sand bagging is one of the most effective methods of providing protection from direct and indirect fire. Each member of the staff will fill some number of sandbags each day to be used to protect patient care areas, perimeter protective positions, command and control areas and troop concentrations.
3. The unit will develop a plan to emplace bunkers with engineer support as improvements continue.

### ***Geneva Convention on the Wounded and Sick (GWS).*** See also - *Security*.

1. The unit will make maximum use of protective markings in accordance with the Geneva Convention (GC).
2. The unit will place Red Cross panels over every patient care area.
3. Red Cross flags will be posted in at least three places around the perimeter.
4. Large Red Cross panels (4'x4') will be placed just inside the hospital perimeter. Placement of these panels will be done so as to prevent outsiders, hostile forces, or looters from using the panels as an aid in breaching the unit's obstacles.

### ***Ground Guides***

Every vehicle will have a ground guide in the unit area.

- ✓ Use a light at night.
- ✓ Dismount at the main gate.



**Hygiene.** See also - *Laundry and Showers*.

1. The unit will establish adequate facilities for daily hygiene. Facilities will improve over time to include warm water and heated tents.
2. The unit will establish laundry and bath services within a few days of establishing the hospital.

**Indirect fire (artillery/mortars/bombs)**

1. **Get down low - immediately.**
2. At the first opportunity, move to better protective position on the floor or ground.
3. Perform Battle Damage Assessment after the attack.

**Intruders.** Hostile forces may breach the unit's perimeter and obstacles and roam the unit's area. These hostile forces will present a threat to unit personnel and equipment.

1. Locate and engage hostile individuals appropriately as outlined in the Rules of Engagement (ROE). The quick reaction force (QRF) will take the lead in engaging the intruders.

2. During such a situation, the risk of fratricide is high. Reduce this risk by minimizing friendly activity in the area.

3. *Staff should assume a low profile and prone position in the work areas.*

✓ **Section leaders will post internal armed guards at key entrances to their areas, in prone position.**

✓ **Soldiers must ensure that any rounds fired at intruders and inadvertently toward tents are UP and high at the target.** This way the round will pass over fellow soldiers in the prone position and medical equipment.

4. Security forces and the staff at large will report the location of intruders to the TOC.

**Latrines.** Soldiers will take all of their equipment to the latrines. At the minimum, wear boots, helmet, MILES (if equipped) and weapon.

✓ **If there is small arms fire in the distance, get out and move to a covered position or any designated post or duty.**

✓ **If small arms fire is in the immediate area, lie on the floor.** Do not get in the way of the QRF. Get out when you think it's safe and report the action to the TOC.

**Laundry.** Priority of laundry is to support CMS and hospital linens. It is likely that the unit will have the capacity to launder a small number of personal items for each member of the unit every three days.

**Lights**

1. Within the hospital area, the unit will make maximum use of lights to identify the site as a hospital, marked with appropriate GC identification markings, and to observe any potential belligerents in the area.

2. The unit will position two 500-watt halogen light sets about every 50 meters around the perimeter to illuminate the concertina obstacles.

3. Sentries and roving guards will use hand-held spotlights. Soldiers will use them from behind a covered position, since they serve as such a good target for hostile fire.

4. Personnel will practice light discipline when operating in other unit's areas and on the roads.



### **Media**

1. All media encounters will be coordinated through the headquarters.
2. Soldiers will not speak to any unaccompanied or uncredentialed media representatives.
3. If given the opportunity to speak with legitimate media representatives, soldiers will take the opportunity to tell their story and the unit's story to maintain the support of the American people.
4. Things to remember:
  - ✓ **Talk about what you know.**
  - ✓ **Do not discuss rumors, hearsay, what others may be doing, or speculate.**
  - ✓ **Stay in your lane.**
  - ✓ **Do not disclose specific unit capabilities, times, locations or future plans.**
  - ✓ **Do not discuss the number and types of injuries received.**

**Mission-Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP).** See also - *NBC*. MOPP is a progressive series of levels prescribing when Chemical Protective Over-Garments (CPOG) and protective mask will be worn and carried.

**MOPP 0** - Carry the CPOGs and mask.

**MOPP 1** - Wear the jacket and trousers.

**MOPP 2** - Add the boots.

**MOPP 3** - Don the protective mask.

**MOPP 4** - Don the gloves.

**Movement, Ground Vehicles.** See also - *Ground guides, Vehicle passes, and Challenge and Password.*

1. The traffic pattern within the compound will consist of a series of one way roads. They will generally be laid out in three concentric loops:
  - a. Ambulance or Emergency Medical Treatment.
  - b. Periphery of hospital for fuel tankers and latrine support vehicles.
  - c. General logistic support traffic for other sections.
2. Vehicles leaving the area must be properly checked and dispatched.
3. Vehicles must be equipped with basic issue items (BIIs) and topped off.
4. Crews will check out through their headquarters.
5. Crews should have clear directions and a strip map.
6. Crews must be briefed on what to do in case of ground attack, vehicle breakdown, encountering mines, obstacles and chemical contamination.

**NBC.** See also - *Mission-Oriented Protective Posture.*

1. *Contaminated persons and casualties must not enter the hospital site.* Personnel will make a strong effort to prevent contamination of the hospital. If the hospital becomes contaminated, it would be closed to all other casualties indefinitely.
2. The unit will coordinate with supported units to establish decontamination sites (*opposite wind directions*) away from the hospital site and prepare to receive NBC (*probably chemical*) contaminated casualties in that location.
3. In addition to individual protective measures, sections must prepare to minimize the damage to equipment and supplies from a chemical attack.
4. Unit sections should prepare to support the transportation, set up, security, cleaning and other extensive manpower requirements of this mission.



**Priority of Work.** See also - *Teams, Set up.*

1. The unit will focus its efforts in the following order, working concurrently in all three areas and shifting emphasis as tasks are completed:

- ✉ establish *security*.
- ✉ establish *communications*.
- ✉ establish *support operations*.

2. Within the CSH, priority is to establishing EMT, TOC, Landing Zone (LZ), operating rooms and CMS with power and intensive care unit.

**Quick Reaction Force.** The QRF is a dedicated force of one or more squad-sized elements. They will not perform other duties (*on the ward, driving, cooking, showering, etc.*) while they are on call or duty. They will remain in a central location under the control of the Sergeant of the Guard (SOG). They will remain dressed with equipment at hand to drill and respond immediately to any actual or suspected hostile actions.

**Rules of Engagement**

1. The command will provide guidance outlining how defensive force (potentially deadly) may be used against unfriendly intruders.
2. Soldiers will always have the ability to defend themselves.
3. In general, force used should be the minimum required to accomplish the mission, and responses or retaliation should be proportional.
4. Higher headquarters will publish a mission-specific ROE.

**Security.** This commander's intent is as follows:

- ✉ We will observe the requirements of the Geneva Convention.
- ✉ We will clearly mark our facility and identify it as a hospital.
- ✉ We will fly the Red Cross flag, mark our treatment areas with the Red Cross emblem, identify and mark the facility with signs outside the perimeter, and light the unit area at night.
- ✉ Other corps-level units are not afforded the same protection under the Geneva Convention and will not choose to be near us. We will not set up as part of a base cluster with non-medical units.
- ✉ We may no longer be required to harden our position and be prepared to defend against a deliberate uniformed organized hostile threat; however, we will have to contend with looters, saboteurs, terrorists, bandits and other hostile belligerents with weapons that are equal to, or superior to, our own. They may attempt to breach our security and interfere with our mission at any time. We must deter this threat.
- ✉ Our mission will be to secure, not defend our area.
- ✉ We will protect our patients, facility, equipment, and ourselves, and will direct our efforts toward that goal.
- ✉ We will emplace concertina wire to define clearly our unit area and other warning devices and obstacles to monitor and restrict movements through our area.
- ✉ Emplacing improved fighting positions could be viewed as demonstrating an intention to engage the enemy. I do not hold this view. We will construct an appropriate number of positions that will afford our soldiers adequate protection to perform their mission.
- ✉ A single roving guard would be a naive and unrealistic approach to securing the site.



**☛ We will deter aggressors with obstacles and clear signs that we are not a legitimate target.**  
**☛ We will not employ our unit to invite attack.** However, should we be required to defend against a belligerent, I intend for our soldiers to prevail and live to tell about it.  
**☛ If, despite these measures, we do come under a small arms attack, plentiful protective positions and stacks of sandbags will be of far greater comfort to our soldiers than the moral high ground that we played fair and the bad guys did not.** This view is consistent with the Group Commander's guidance, the emerging ROE at the JRTC and perhaps, most importantly, with realistic requirements for a deployment to perform our most likely mission in a Stability and Support Operation.

### **Showers**

1. The unit will establish laundry and bath services within a few days of establishing the hospital.
2. Showers should be available on alternate days.
3. Staff may wear PT uniform with helmet, LBE and mask to the shower facility.
4. Your weapon will be secured per section leader's instructions.

### **Sleep Tents**

1. The unit will erect large general-purpose (GP) tents for sleep tents.
  - ☛ Allow an area about 20 x 50 feet.**
  - ☛ Sleep tents will be hardened with sandbags during site improvement. Sand-bagging priorities for sleep tents will first go to the outside walls of the outside tents.**
  - ☛ Each tent will accommodate 15-25 personnel.**
  - ☛ Guards will sleep in a separate tent located near the Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC)'s command post (CP).** This will facilitate relief, training, communication, command and control of the guard force.
    - ☛ Cooks and KPs will sleep in a separate tent near the NCD/Unit Mess.**
    - ☛ The senior occupant of each tent will maintain a roster/diagram of occupants posted on the pole at the most common entrance.**
2. If the unit area comes under attack from indirect fire, immediately lay flat on the ground. Seek cover and adopt the appropriate MOPP. Perform battle damage assessment after the attack.
3. If the unit comes under attack from direct fire or an intruder, lay on the ground. Post guards with weapons trained on entrances and be prepared to defend against hostile intruders. Exercise extreme caution to prevent fratricide.

**Snipers.** Stay away from open or exposed areas whenever possible. If engaged, immediately drop to the ground and seek cover and concealment. Report the incident to the TOC. Perform Battle Damage Assessment.

**Spot Report.** Whenever individuals encounter suspected hostile activity, they must report the information to the TOC, where they can process the information as intelligence. Use the mnemonic "SALUTE" to easily remember the important elements of information:

- Size** - Number of persons and or vehicles spotted.
- Activity** - What they were doing, which way they were moving.
- Location** - Grid coordinates or other description.
- Unit** - Numeric designation or uniform description.
- Time** - Time of the encounter.
- Equipment** - Items of military significance spotted.



**Teams, Set up.** See also - *Priority of Work and Communication.*

1. Much of the unit's equipment requires a great deal of manpower for setup (tents, dollies, obstacles, etc.). The unit is not staffed with dedicated guards, cargo handlers, engineers, etc., to help in the setup. Establishment of the unit is according to a priority of work that is consistent with the tactical situation. The unit must detail staff from their normal duty sections to serve as part of these setup teams. Some sections and personnel complete their tasks quickly and are disbanded; others are required longer.

2. Communication is critical, and, ironically, most difficult during this transition period. Team leaders must provide leadership and assume responsibility for their team members while the team is together. Leaders must meet with their HQs continually during this turbulent time since many communication systems are not in place, requirements change, related teams and tasks may lag or progress quicker than planned. Teams must be prepared to adjust their missions.

**Uniform.** See also - *Weapons, Latrine, and Showers.* Unless otherwise directed by the commander, the uniform is weather-appropriate battle-dress uniform (BDU), helmet, load-carrying equipment (LCE), and protective mask.

**Vehicle passes.** See also - *Movement, Ground Vehicles.*

1. Whenever a unit vehicle leaves the unit's area, the departing personnel will check out at the TOC. The TOC will issue a vehicle pass that identifies that vehicle as part of the unit.

2. The driver will display the pass while exiting, hide it during the trip, and again display the pass when returning.

3. Failing to display the pass will signal the unit guards that the vehicle has been captured or the crew is being held hostage.

4. Vehicles coming in from another unit will not display a pass, and will be searched closely.

**Weapons.** See also - *Enemy Prisoners of War.*

1. Patients will be disarmed; coordinate with Patient Administration Section and HHC. Simulated patients will retain their weapons.

2. Doctrine and MTOE do not provide weapons for the entire CSH staff.

☛ **Staff armed with pistols should retain personal control of their weapons at all times.**

☛ **Depending on the tactical situation, staff armed with rifles may rack their weapons in their section per section leader's instructions, while the CSH is operational (setup).** Sling or stack nearby with guard while working details (KP, tents, obstacles, dollies, etc.).

3. Keep weapons away from EPWs.

4. Do not keep rounds chambered but do keep weapons on safe. Exercise caution with blanks as well as live ammunition. ☛